United Farm Workers v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 29 July 1977
• Docket Number: P,AFL-CI
• Citation: 72 Cal.App.3d 268,140 Cal.Rptr. 87
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2792, 82 Lab.Cas. P 55,094 UNITED FARM WORKERS OF AMERICA,etitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF KERN COUNTY, Respondent; MOUNT ARBOR NURSERIES et al., Real Parties in Interest. Civ. 3426.

Page 87

140 Cal.Rptr. 87

72 Cal.App.3d 268, 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2792,

82 Lab.Cas. P 55,094

UNITED FARM WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF KERN COUNTY, Respondent MOUNT ARBOR NURSERIES et al., Real Parties in Interest.

Civ. 3426.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

July 29, 1977.

Jerome Cohen, Sanford N. Nathan, W. Daniel Boone, Glenn E. Rothner, E. Michael Heumann II, Tom M. Dalzell III, and Linton Joaquin, Salinas, for petitioner

Harry J. Delizzonna, Dennis Sullivan, Manuel M. Medeiros, Sacramento, for amicus curiae on behalf of petitioner.

Thomas, Snell, Jamison, Russell, Williamson & Asperger and Jay V. Jory, Howard Alan Sagaser, and Nickolas J. Dibiaso, Fresno, for real parties in interest.

No appearance for respondent.

OPINION

HOPPER, Associate Justice.

In this case we are called upon to determine whether the superior court has jurisdiction to entertain an action for declaratory relief as to bargaining rights of agricultural employers and agricultural employees. We conclude that the Agricultural Labor Relations Board ¹ has exclusive jurisdiction and that the superior court may not entertain such an action.

Real parties grow roses and employ farm workers in their operations. In November 1975, petitioner (herein UFW) won elections held under the Act with respect to employees of real parties. On December 3, 1975, the UFW was certified by the Board as the bargaining representative for real parties' employees. No collective bargaining agreement has been entered into between the UFW and real parties.

Prior to the expiration of 12 months following certification, the UFW requested extension of its certification. That request (as was a subsequent one for reconsideration) was denied. By a letter received by real parties February 3, 1977, the UFW demanded that real parties bargain with it. No response was made to that demand. On February 4, 1977, real parties filed in the Superior Court of Kern County the complaint for declaratory relief which is the subject of this dispute. That complaint sought a declaratory judgment informing real parties as to their obligation with regard to the UFW. On March 10, 1977, the UFW demurred to the complaint, alleging failure to plead exhaustion of all remedies open to real parties, lack of jurisdiction of the court, and defect or nonjoinder of parties in that the Board was not joined. On March 28, 1977, the Board issued a decision in the unrelated case of Kaplan's Fruit & Produce Company, Inc. (1977) 3 ALRB No. 28. In this case the Board addressed the issue raised in the present case, and ruled that the employer's duty to bargain does not expire at the end of a year's time, holding that the employer must continue to bargain with the union until the employees elect to the contrary. A copy of this opinion was provided to the trial court at the hearing on the UFW's demurrer. On April 4, 1977, respondent court overruled the demurrer. On April 20 the UFW filed the instant petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandamus, alleging that respondent court has determined that it has jurisdiction to hear the action, that it will do so unless restrained by this court, and that it has no jurisdiction to do so.

Prior to the filing of real parties' petition in superior court, on October 22, 1976, the UFW had filed unfair labor practice charges with the Board, alleging that real parties had violated their duty to bargain in good faith. These charges related to events occurring before the expiration of the one-year perior alluded to above. On April 29, 1977, the Board served real parties with complaints alleging that the latter were engaged in an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the UFW. Subsequently, the charges against real parties have apparently been expanded.

The UFW and the Board ² contend that the superior court's jurisdiction to entertain the petition for declaratory relief has been preempted by the Act. The Act was an attempt to apply the basic concepts embodied in the National Labor Relations Act (herein NLRA) to farm labor disputes in California. Much of the Act is copied verbatim from the NLRA, and the Act goes so far as to provide that the Board must follow applicable NLRA precedent (Lab.Code, § 1148). The basic method of dispute resolution accompanied by appellate review embodied in the statutory schemes of both the NLRA and the ALRA is the unfair labor practice proceeding (Lab.Code, § 1160ff.). This procedure not only provides a means by which the Board may resolve allegations that employers and labor organizations have engaged in various practices specified by the Act to be improper (see Lab.Code, §§ 1153 and 1154), but also provides the means by which the employer may challenge the propriety of elections conducted by the Board. If the employer feels that the Board has improperly certified a union as the employees' bargaining representative, its remedy is to refuse to bargain with the union, whereupon the Board will initiate unfair labor practice proceedings against it. At this time the validity of the union's claim to represent the employees may be contested. The Act provides that review of the Board's rulings is by the court of appeal (Lab.Code, § 1160.8).

The court in Nishikawa Farms Inc. v. Mahony (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 781, 136 Cal.Rptr. 233 held that the procedure under the Act could not be circumvented by seeking mandamus in the superior court challenging the Board's orders certifying elections. The same reasoning applies to the facts of this case.

We hold that the Board has exclusive primary jurisdiction over all phases of the administration of the Act as regards unfair labor practices. Support for this position is found both in the language of the Act (Ch. 6) and cases interpreting the NLRA.

The Act provides in section 1166.3 subdivision (b): 'If any other act of the Legislature shall conflict with the provisions of this part, this part shall prevail.' ³ The Act also provides in section 1160.9: 'The procedures set forth in this chapter shall be the exclusive method of redressing unfair labor practices.'

Real parties argue that the Board's exclusive jurisdiction only goes to 'redressing' unfair labor practices; that in the present case they are not asking the superior court to redress an unfair labor practice; rather, they are requesting it to determine if they have a duty to bargain with the UFW. This contention is fallacious. Whether real parties have a duty to bargain with the UFW is incident under the Act to many possible future unfair labor practices and is inseparable therefrom, much in the same way that an easement appertains to or is tied to a tenement. If every time an incident or condition precedent were involved in an alleged unfair labor practice and any party could first obtain declaratory relief in the superior court instead of from the Board, the Board would be replaced by ad hoc determinations by already overcrowded courts. The legislative effort to bring order and stability to the collective bargaining process would be thwarted. The work of the Board would be effectively impaired, its decisions similar in impression to that of a tinkling triangle practically unnoticed in the triumphant blare of trumpets.

Under the NLRA, the federal district courts do not have jurisdiction to issue declaratory relief in labor-management disputes. (California Association of Employers v. Building and Construction Trades Council of Reno, Nevada, and Vicinity (9th cir. 1949) 179 F.2d 175; International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. International Union of United Brewery, Flour, Cereal, and Soft Drink Workers of America (9th Cir. 1939) 106 F.2d 871; Bradley Lumber Co. v. NLRA (5th Cir. 1936) 84 F.2d 97.) The United States Supreme Court has not specifically stated that the federal district courts have no jurisdiction to issue declaratory relief. However, that court has made general statements that federal and state courts do not have jurisdiction to involve themselves in matters within the purview of the National Labor Relations Board. As the court stated in Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 776 (1953) 346 U.S. 485, 490--491, 74 S.Ct. 161, 165--166, 98 L.Ed. 228:

'Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties. It went on to confide primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and notice, and hearing and decision, including judicial relief pending a final administrative order. Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies.'

(See also Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge (1971) 403 U.S. 274, 91 S.Ct. 1909, 29 L.Ed.2d 473.)

We believe that in the Act (containing provisions for appellate review almost identical to the NLRA's) the California Legislature similarly intended to foreclose actions for declaratory relief in the superior court, when the issue could be raised in an unfair labor practice proceeding.

The particular issue sought to be answered in the instant declaratory relief action could not arise under the NLRA. Only the Act prohibits bargaining with other than a 'certified' union (§ 1153 subd. (f)). Nor is there any provision in the NLRA similar to section 1155.2 subdivision (b), which provides that the Board may extend union certification for a period of one year. Furthermore, under the NLRA (29 U.S.C., § 159(c)(1)(B)) the employer would have a direct means of bringing out the issue before the National Labor Relations Board. Nevertheless, the question of jurisdiction remains. Although this particular issue may...