United Gov't Sec. Officers of Am. Int'l Union v. G4S Regulated Sec. Sols.
| Decision Date | 11 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 19-cv-10373-ADB |
| Parties | UNITED GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICERS OF AMERICA INTERNATIONAL UNION and UNITED GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICERS OF AMERICA INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 15, Plaintiffs, v. G4S REGULATED SECURITY SOLUTIONS, A DIVISION OF G4S SECURE SOLUTIONS (USA) INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
BURROUGHS, D.J.
Plaintiffs United Government Security Officers of America International Union ("Union") and United Government Security Officers of America International Union Local 15 ("Local" and, collectively with Union, "Plaintiffs") initiated this action against Defendant G4S Regulated Security Solutions ("Defendant") to resolve whether the parties' collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") mandates arbitration of a grievance filed by Plaintiffs regarding Defendant's use of forced overtime for maintenance work. [ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 14-15]. Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief, an order compelling arbitration, and damages resulting from Defendant's refusal to proceed to arbitration. [Id. ¶¶ 24-36]. Currently before the Court are the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. [ECF Nos. 28, 31]. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' motion, [ECF No. 28], is GRANTED in part and Defendant's motion, [ECF No. 31], is DENIED.
Except as otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed. The Court refers to the statements of fact submitted by the parties in support of their respective motions, [ECF Nos. 30 ("PSOF"), 33 ("DSOF")], and responses to those statements insofar as they identify factual disputes, [ECF Nos. 35, 37].
Union is a labor organization representing government security services employees, including "guards" as defined under 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3), some of whom are represented by Local in Rowe, Massachusetts. [PSOF ¶ 1]. Defendant provides security to nuclear utility plants, including decommissioned sites like the Yankee Atomic Plant in Rowe. [DSOF ¶¶ 5-6, 10]. During the relevant period, Plaintiffs were the exclusive bargaining agent for security guards employed by Defendant at the Yankee Atomic Plant in Rowe. [PSOF ¶ 3]. Plaintiffs and Defendant are parties to the CBA, which runs from January 1, 2018 through December 31, 2020. [Id.]. The CBA contains a grievance provision, Article VII, Section I, which defines a grievance as "a difference of opinion between [Defendant] and an employee or [Plaintiffs] regarding only the meaning or application of [the CBA], but restricted to specific terms of [the CBA] . . . ." [ECF No. 30-2 at 12 (CBA Article VII); PSOF ¶ 4]. The CBA outlines the multi-step grievance process. [ECF No. 30-2 at 12, 10; PSOF ¶ 4]. Steps 1 and 2 involve submitting written notice of the grievance to Defendant's representatives. [ECF No. 30-2 at 12]. If a party is not satisfied after Step 2, Step 3 allows Plaintiffs to "submit the grievance for arbitration by written notice" to Defendant. [Id. at 10; PSOF ¶ 4]. In order to begin the arbitration process, the CBA allows Plaintiffs to request the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service ("FMCS") to nominateseven potential arbitrators, and Plaintiffs and Defendant then may each eliminate three potential arbitrators until one remains. [ECF No. 30-2 at 10; PSOF ¶ 5].
The CBA also contains a provision, Article XII, regarding forced overtime by security guards. [PSOF ¶ 7; ECF No. 30-2 at 18-19]. Article XII, Section 4 discusses the procedures by which Defendant can staff an overtime shift when no one has volunteered to work the shift. [PSOF ¶ 7; ECF No. 30-2 at 19]. Plaintiffs' employees perform both security and maintenance tasks for Defendant, and maintenance tasks are included in the job description for security guards. [DSOF ¶¶ 20, 23; ECF No. 35 at 9, 10]. Maintenance tasks include cleaning floors, snow removal, trash collection, and mowing. [DSOF ¶ 24; ECF No. 35 at 11].
Defendant identified a need for maintenance work (cleaning floors) to be completed by Plaintiffs' employees on August 4 and 5, 2018, and decided to have employees clean the floors during overtime. [DSOF ¶¶ 30, 31]. Defendant states that it first attempted to staff the shifts using the CBA's voluntary overtime procedures, [DSOF ¶¶ 32, 33], though Plaintiffs dispute this insofar as they are without knowledge as to whether Defendant did so, [ECF No. 35 at 15]. Defendant then states that it followed the CBA's forced overtime procedures to select two employees to complete the maintenance tasks, [DSOF ¶¶ 34, 35], though Plaintiffs dispute this, again, insofar as they are without knowledge as to whether the procedures were followed. [ECF No. 35 at 15, 16]. According to Defendant, this was the first time it used forced overtime to have employees perform maintenance tasks, [DSOF ¶ 37], though Plaintiffs also dispute this based on lack of knowledge, [ECF No. 35 at 17].
On August 7, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a grievance at Step 1 on behalf of the two employees who were forced to work overtime to do the maintenance work on August 4 and 5. [PSOF ¶ 9]. The grievance stated that Defendant violated the CBA by forcing the employees to workovertime for non-security reasons and referenced Article XII, "forced O.T.," call-in procedures, and "past practice." [Id.; ECF No. 30-3 at 2]. Plaintiffs had not previously filed a grievance about maintenance tasks being assigned to its members. [DSOF ¶ 26; ECF No. 35 at 12]. After being dissatisfied with Defendant's response to Steps 1 and 2 of the grievance procedures under the CBA, Plaintiffs filed a demand for arbitration under Article VII of the CBA on September 4, 2018. [PSOF ¶ 10]. Plaintiffs then filed a request with FMCS for an arbitration panel and the parties were given a list of potential arbitrators. [Id. ¶¶ 10-11].
Counsel for Plaintiffs and Defendant then exchanged a series of e-mails in which counsel for Plaintiffs repeatedly asked Defendant to select an arbitrator. [Id. ¶¶ 12, 14, 16, 19; ECF No. 30-7 at 2; ECF No. 30-9 at 2; ECF No. 30-11 at 2; ECF No. 30-14 at 2]. Counsel for Defendant repeatedly told counsel for Plaintiffs that the substance of the grievance was unclear and refused to select an arbitrator. [PSOF ¶¶ 13, 15, 17, 20; ECF No. 30-8 at 2 (); ECF No. 30-10 at 2 (); ECF No. 30-12 at 2; ECF No. 30-15 at 2].
Plaintiffs filed this action on February 28, 2019. [ECF No. 1]. The parties mediated on September 19, 2019 before Magistrate Judge Bowler but were unable to reach a resolution. [ECF No. 27]. After discovery, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on February 12, 2020. [ECF Nos. 28, 31]. Both parties opposed, [ECF Nos. 34, 36], and Plaintiffs replied, [ECF No. 38].
Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party can show that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "[A]n issue is 'genuine' if it 'may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.'" Robinson v. Cook, 863 F. Supp. 2d 49, 60 (D. Mass. 2012) (quoting Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50, 56 (1st Cir. 2008)). "A fact is material if its resolution might affect the outcome of the case under the controlling law." Cochran v. Quest Software, Inc., 328 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Thus, "[a] genuine issue exists as to such a fact if there is evidence from which a reasonable trier could decide the fact either way." Id. (citation omitted). By invoking summary judgment, "the moving party in effect declares that the evidence is insufficient to support the nonmoving party's case." United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop. (Great Harbor Neck, New Shoreham, R.I.), 960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)).
"To succeed in showing that there is no genuine dispute of material fact," the moving party must "'affirmatively produce evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's claim,' or, using 'evidentiary materials already on file . . . demonstrate that the non-moving party will be unable to carry its burden of persuasion at trial.'" Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 777 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 132 (1st Cir. 2000)). Conversely, "[t]o defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must establish a trial-worthy issue by presenting enough competent evidence to enable a finding favorable to the nonmoving party." ATC Realty, LLC v. Town of Kingston, N.H., 303 F.3d 91, 94 (1st Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That is, the nonmoving party must set forth specific, material facts showing that thereis a genuine disagreement as to some material fact. One Parcel of Real Prop., 960 F.2d at 204 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57 (1986)).
In reviewing the record, the Court "must take the evidence in the light most flattering to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Cochran, 328 F.3d at 6 (citation omitted). The First Circuit has noted that this review "is favorable to the nonmoving party, but it does not give him a free pass to trial." Hannon v. Beard, 645 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2011). "The factual conflicts upon which he relies must be both genuine and material[,]" Gomez v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 670 F.3d 395, 397 (1st Cir. 2012), and the Court may discount "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Cochran, 328 F.3d at 6 (quoting Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., ...
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