United Hebrew Benevolent Ass'n v. Benshimol

• Decision Date: 10 February 1881
• Citation: 130 Mass. 325
• Parties: United Hebrew Benevolent Association v. Joshua Benshimol
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

130 Mass. 325

United Hebrew Benevolent Association v. Joshua Benshimol

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

February 10, 1881

Suffolk. Contract by a charitable corporation to recover of a member of the corporation five years' dues and interest. Trial in the Superior Court, without a jury, before Putnam J., who found the following facts:

The plaintiff was duly organized, on February 5, 1867, under the Gen. Sts. c. 32. The objects of the association are to raise funds for the purpose of granting "temporary relief to poor and helpless Israelites." Its constitution provides that "any Israelite desiring to become a member can apply or be proposed to the board of direction by paying one dollar admittance fee; and, when declared elected, can, after signing the constitution and by-laws, vote at all meetings held by the association, and be eligible to the various offices;" and that "every member must pay five dollars yearly in advance, as dues to the association." Its funds are derived from dues assessed upon the members, in conformity with its constitution, and from donations. The dues are the main and only fixed resources, and the expenditures of the association are made in reliance upon the dues.

The defendant was elected a member of the corporation in 1869 and paid his admission fee of $ 1.00 and $ 5.00, which was assessed upon him for that year, and continued to pay $ 5.00 each year for dues up to May 1875, since which time he has made no payments. The defendant never signed the constitution and by-laws, but it was not customary for members to do so and such signing by a member was never insisted upon by the corporation as a prerequisite to his being allowed to exercise all the privileges of a member.

Each year there has been expended by the corporation an amount equal to or greater than the aggregate amount of the dues of members for that year. The dues not paid had been demanded of the defendant from time to time up to the bringing of this action.

The defendant contended that he was never a member of the association; and that the payments made by him were only voluntary contributions on his part. But the judge found that he was a member, and was entitled to all the rights and privileges of a member; that the payments made by him were payments of his annual dues as such member; and that he had never resigned his membership.

The defendant also contended, and asked the judge to rule, that, as the St. of 1874, c. 375, repealed the Gen. Sts. c. 32, the plaintiff had no longer any legal existence as a corporation, and could not maintain this action; and that, even if he was a member, he was under no legal obligation to pay these dues, and so the plaintiff could not recover.

The judge declined so to rule; ruled that the defendant, being a member of the corporation, was legally bound by an implied promise to pay the dues provided for by the constitution and by-laws, and that his liability rested on a good consideration, and found for the plaintiff. The defendant alleged exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

G. F. Piper, for the defendant.

L. D. Brandeis, for the plaintiff.

Colt J. Morton, J., absent.

OPINION

Colt, J.

The corporation was organized under the Gen. Sts. c. 32 which provides that seven or more persons associating by agreement in writing, for educational, charitable or religious purposes, and complying with its requirements, should become a body corporate. This chapter was repealed by the St. of 1874, c. 375, which, so far as relates to the creation of such corporations, substantially reenacts its provisions, and was declared by an act of the following year not to have been intended to affect corporations...