United Mine Workers of America, District 22 v. Roncco

Decision Date26 August 1964
Docket NumberCiv. No. 4558.
PartiesUNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, DISTRICT 22, Plaintiff, v. Leo RONCCO, Jr., and Pete Cavalli, partners doing business as Roncco Coal Company, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Wyoming

Robert S. Lowe, Rawlins, Wyo., for plaintiff.

Richard S. Kitchen, Sr., Denver, Colo., and Gerald A. Stack, Thermopolis, Wyo., for defendants.

KERR, District Judge.

This action was commenced on November 24, 1961, under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 185). Plaintiff originally alleged various violations of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950 as amended, as a result of which it allegedly suffered damages in the sum of $30,000. Plaintiff asked, also, for a declaration of the rights, duties and liabilities of the parties under said contract. This court sustained the defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the trustees of the Welfare and Retirement Fund are the proper parties to commence suits to enforce payment to the fund; and that the court did not have jurisdiction over those alleged breaches of contract which related to rights which are uniquely personal to the individual employees. This court acknowledged jurisdiction over the alleged failure of defendants to check off dues as being a matter of direct and peculiar concern to the plaintiff as an organization, but dismissed the complaint because the dispute alleged was arbitrable under the agreement and plaintiff had not pursued its contractual remedy before resorting to the court.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court concerning the matters which were not of peculiar concern to the plaintiff union as an organization to give the court jurisdiction. United Mine Workers of America, District 22 v. Leo Roncco, Jr., and Pete Cavalli, partners doing business as Roncco Coal Company, 10 Cir., 314 F.2d 186 (1963). It further agreed that the alleged failure to check off dues is a matter of direct and peculiar concern of the plaintiff as an organization and within the jurisdiction of the court. The Court of Appeals, however, was of the opinion that the plaintiff could not be required to resort to its contractual remedy of arbitration until the existence of a binding agreement to arbitrate was settled. It therefore remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether any contract actually existed at all. This question, stated the Court of Appeals, includes the very real question of fact as to whether a notice of termination was sent by defendants to the plaintiff as required by the contract.

After the Mandate of the Court of Appeals was filed, the trial court vacated its order sustaining the motion to dismiss and granted plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint. In its second amended complaint plaintiff alleged that on or about August 1, 1961, while the agreement was in full force and effect, defendants, in violation of the provisions of said Agreement ceased operating under and in conformity with the terms thereof; and from and after January 1, 1961, defendants violated and otherwise failed to observe certain of the terms and provisions set forth and contained in said Agreement which are of peculiar concern to the plaintiff as an organization. These uncertain and ambiguous allegations are clarified to some extent in the next paragraph of the second amended complaint wherein plaintiff alleged that "As a consequence thereof, defendant operator refuses to check off dues and initiation fees as stipulated in the agreement and has failed and refused to conform to the decision of and otherwise comply with the settlement procedures of disputes set forth in said agreement and defendant operator has generally damaged plaintiff by virtue of said breach of the parties' agreement." To what decision plaintiff refers in said allegation is not revealed, and no further reference is made to it in the course of these proceedings. Plaintiff also alleged that it suffered damages due to defendants' violation of the contract and that it is entitled to exemplary damages. In substance, plaintiff claims that the Agreement remained in full force and effect since its effective date to the time of this suit, even though plaintiff avers, also, that the termination of the Agreement's provisions and the unilateral cancellation of the Agreement by defendants constitute a violation thereof. A few days after this action was instituted and service had on the individual defendants, the Roncco Coal Company was incorporated. Upon leave of Court said incorporated company was added as a party defendant.

Defendants' answer to the second amended complaint put in issue the jurisdiction of this Court, the existence of the agreement, and its violation or performance by the parties. Defendants counterclaimed for damages in the amount of $100,000 allegedly suffered by reason of plaintiff's unlawful strike in October 1960.

It is the position of defendants that District 22 of the United Mine Workers of America is not the proper party to sue for the alleged violation of the contract as it is not a party to the contract, and is not the bargaining agent of defendants' employees. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act can be invoked only by or against a party to the collective bargaining agreement on which the action is founded. Square D Co. v. United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, et al., D.C. Mich., 123 F.Supp. 776 (1954). Plaintiff alleged that it is and was a labor organization within the meaning of the Act and that it and its duly authorized officers and agents were and are now engaged in representing and acting for employee members within Thermopolis, Wyoming. In the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950 as amended, upon which this suit is predicated, it is agreed that the United Mine Workers of America is recognized as the exclusive bargaining agency representing the employees of the Operators. Under the Constitution of the International Union of the United Mine Workers of America, the districts are not independent entities. They are chartered by and are under the jurisdiction of and are subject to the laws of the International Union and rulings of the International Executive Board. The International officers designate the numbers and territory of the districts. The districts may adopt such laws for their government as do not conflict with the laws or rulings of the International Union or Joint Agreements. The signatories to the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950 and its amendments were representatives of the International Union and of District No. 22, though the Agreement itself describes the party of the second part as the International Union, United Mine Workers of America on behalf of each member thereof. Neither the Agreement, nor the constitutions of the International Union or of the District 22 appear to empower the District to discharge the obligations of the International Union to preserve the integrity of the contract provisions. cf. Mile Branch Coal Company v. United Mine Workers of America, 105 U.S.App.D.C. 321, 266 F.2d 919 (1959).

In view of my conclusion herein that this Court does not have jurisdiction to settle the contractual disputes of the parties because they failed to comply with the arbitration or grievance provisions of the Agreement, it is not necessary for me to decide whether a district of the International Union was intended by Congress to be included in Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.

Defendants have contended that Roncco Coal Company is not engaged in interstate commerce. In June 1961 the Attorney for the Regional Office of the National Labor Relations Board stated that Roncco Coal Company was not engaged in interstate commerce. In October 1961 the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board wrote to counsel for the plaintiff that Roncco Coal Company did not meet the Board's jurisdictional standards. Notwithstanding these credible assertions, I am bound by the preponderance of the evidence adduced in the trial of this case. The record shows that of the coal shipments from the Roncco Coal Company approximately twenty per cent was shipped out of the State of Wyoming. The railroad facilities of the Burlington railroad were used for shipping coal both in and out of the State of Wyoming. The explosives which constitute an important item in the mining operations of defendants were manufactured in the State of Washington; and practically all of the defendants' equipment and materials used in the operation of the mine were from out of state. See Shirley-Herman Co., Inc. v. International Hod Carriers, etc., Local Union No. 210, 2 Cir., 182 F.2d 806, 17 A.L.R.2d 609 (1950). The preponderance of the evidence supports the finding that the defendants were engaged in an industry affecting commerce. The de minimis doctrine enunciated in the case of Groneman, et al. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 354, 10 Cir., 177 F.2d 995 (1949), is not applicable to the circumstances of the case before me.

Pursuant to the mandate of the Court of Appeals, a trial was held to determine whether the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950 as amended was in existence when this suit was commenced so as to require recourse to the arbitration machinery provided therein, or whether it was terminated by a notice of termination pursuant to the Contract. Defendants contend that the Agreement was terminated when the plaintiff breached the contract in July 1960 when defendants' rights to the benefits of the Welfare and Retirement Fund were cancelled, or when plaintiff went on strike against defendants in October 1960. Defendants claim also that in October 1960 the Agreement was mutually cancelled by plaintiff and defendants when it was allegedly agreed that defendants would check off the union dues but would not make the...

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  • Martin v. Parkhill Pipeline, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • September 6, 1973
    ...pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Baker v. Fleet Maintenance, Inc., 409 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1969); United Mine Workers of America, District 222 v. Roncco, 232 F.Supp. 865 (D. Wyo.1964); Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical State Employees, 84 F.Supp. 667 (S.D.Col.1949). It is clear ......

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