Holland-St. Louis Sugar Co. v. Shraluka

• Citation: 116 N.E. 330,64 Ind.App. 545
• Decision Date: 28 May 1917
• Docket Number: No. 9590.,9590.
• Parties: HOLLAND-ST. LOUIS SUGAR CO. v. SHRALUKA.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

64 Ind.App. 545

116 N.E. 330

HOLLAND-ST. LOUIS SUGAR CO.

v.SHRALUKA.

No. 9590.

Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 2.

May 28, 1917.

Appeal from Industrial Board.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Barton Shraluka, opposed by Holland-St. Louis Sugar Company. Upon hearing before one member of Industrial Board compensation was awarded, and employer through its insurance carrier filed application for review before full board, where plaintiff was awarded compensation, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Pickens, Moores, Davidson & Pickens and Smiley N. Chambers, all of Indianapolis, for appellant.

DAUSMAN, J.

On the 13th day of January, 1916, appellee was in the employ of appellant, and was working in appellant's sugar factory at Decatur, Ind. His hours of work were from 6 in the morning to 6 in the evening continuously and without the allowance of time for noonday lunch, and for seven days in each week. His regular task was operating a centrifugal machine, but on said day he was ordered by the foreman to go to the third floor and wipe the belt on the beet slicer. While working on the third floor, appellant's chemist called to him from the second floor and informed him that he was wanted on the telephone. In response to said call Shraluka started to walk down the stairway, and after taking the first step on the stairs he slipped on some pieces of beet and fell to the floor below, thereby sustaining the following injuries: A broken elbow, broken nose, a cut on the forehead, a cut on the chin, four teeth knocked out, and both kneecaps fractured. It afterward developed that the telephone call was not for Shraluka, but was for another employé. At the time of the accident he was married and had two children. Appellant denied liability for compensation,and appellee filed his application with the Industrial Board for an award. A hearing was held before one of the members of the board which resulted in an award. Appellant then, through its insurance carrier, filed an application for a review, and thereupon the full board reviewed the evidence, made a finding of facts, and awarded compensation to appellee.

The question presented by this appeal is: Was the accident which resulted in appellee's injuries an “accident arising out of and in the course of the employment”?

[1] To entitle a workman to an award of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act his injuries must result from an accident both arising out of and in the course of the employment. The two elements must coexist. They must be concurrent and simultaneous. The one without the other will not sustain an award. Appellant frankly concedes that in the case at bar the accident occurred in the course of the employment, but denies that it arose out of the employment. Appellant's contention is that Shraluka, by leaving his work to go to the telephone in response to the call of appellant's chemist, withdrew from its employment to such an extent that the accident did not arise out of the employment. While appellant's concession theoretically eliminates one element, yet the two are so entwined that they are usually considered together in the reported cases, and a discussion of one of them involves the other.

[2] The courts are practically unanimous in holding that the words “by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment,” as used in the Workmen's Compensation Acts, should be given a broad and liberal construction in order that the humane purpose of their enactment may be realized. Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 Atl. 372, L. R. A. 1916A, 436;Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 106 N. E. 1;In re Coakley, 216 Mass. 71, 102 N. E. 930, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 867;In re Petrie, 215 N. Y. 335, 109 N. E. 549;Moore v. Lehigh Valley, 169 App. Div. 177, 154 N. Y. Supp. 620; Donahue v. Sherman's Sons Co. (R. I.) 98 Atl. 109, L. R. A. 1917A, 76; Zappala v. Industrial Ins. Comm., 82 Wash. 314, 144 Pac. 54, L. R. A. 1916A, 295;Kiel v. Industrial Comm., 163 Wis. 441, 158 N. W. 68;Milwaukee v. Miller, 154 Wis. 652, 144 N. W. 188, L. R. A. 1916A, 1, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 847;Winfield v. New York Central, 168 App. Div. 351, 153 N. Y. Supp. 499;In re Panasuk, 217 Mass. 589, 105 N. E. 368;Post v. Burger & Gohlke, 168 App. Div. 403, 153 N. Y. Supp. 505.

[3] In general terms an accident may be said to arise out of the employment when there is a causal connection between it and the performance of some service of the employment. In re McNicol, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697, L. R. A. 1916A, 306;Milliken v. Towle & Co., 216 Mass. 293, 103 N. E. 898. The causal relation is established when the accident is shown to have arisen out of a risk which a reasonable person might have comprehended as incidental to the employment at the time of entering into the employment or, when the evidence shows an incidental connection between the conditions under which the employé works and the resulting injury. Zabriskie v. Erie R. R. Co., 85 N. J. Law, 157, 88 Atl. 824;In re McNicol, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697, L. R. A. 1916A, 306;Von Ette's Case, 223 Mass. 56, 111 N. E. 696, L. R. A. 1916D, 641;Clem v. Chalmers Motor Co., 178 Mich. 340, 144 N. W. 848, L. R. A. 1916A, 352; Donovan v. Royal Indemnity Co., 217 Mass. 76, 104 N. E. 431, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 778;Pigeon Case, 216 Mass. 51, 102 N. E. 932, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 737; Sundine's Case, 218 Mass. 1, 105 N. E. 433, L. R. A. 1916A, 318; Case of Brightman, 220 Mass. 17, 107 N. E. 527, L. R. A. 1916A, 321; ...