United Parcel Serv. v. Strothers

Decision Date04 February 2022
Docket Number0743, Sept. Term, 2020
Citation269 A.3d 400,253 Md.App. 708
Parties UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, et al. v. David STROTHERS
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Argued by: Erinn F. Grzech (Nikhil Cheerharan, Semmes, Bowen, Semmes, Baltimore, MD), on the brief, for Appellant

Argued by: Ruth M. Schaub (Law Offices of Ruth M. Schaub, Lutherville, MD), on the brief, for Appellee

Panel: Arthur, Shaw, Glenn T. Harrell, Jr. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Shaw, J.

This appeal arises from an order of the Circuit Court for Howard County, affirming the March 9, 2020 decision of the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Commission. Appellee, David Strothers, filed a claim against appellants, United Parcel Service ("UPS") and Liberty Mutual Insurance ("LMI"), seeking compensation after he developed a hernia

during the course of his employment. The Commission found that appellee sustained a compensable accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment; that the hernia was the result of the aforesaid accidental injury; and that appellee was temporarily totally disabled from September 20, 2019, to January 21, 2020.

Appellants then filed a Request for Rehearing with the Commission, which was denied. Following an "on-the-record" judicial review hearing on August 27, 2020, the circuit court judge affirmed the Commission's decision. Appellants timely appealed and present the following questions for our review:

1. Did the circuit court and Maryland Workers’ Compensation Commission err in applying a preponderance of the evidence standard to the "definite proof" standard required by § 9-504?
2. Did the circuit court and the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Commission err in the finding that the appellee met the evidentiary standard of "definite proof" when he provided opinions that only constituted a preponderance of the evidence standard?
3. If, arguendo , the appellee did satisfy the standard of "definite proof," did the circuit court and Maryland Workers’ Compensation Commission err in finding that the hernia

operation took place "immediately," as required by § 9-504?

For reasons discussed below, we conclude there was no error, and we affirm.

BACKGROUND

On September 17, 2019, appellee, during the course of his employment with UPS, sustained a hernia1

injury, while using a power jack to move a load of pallets. Following the injury, appellee went to Howard County General Hospital with complaints of right-side abdominal pain and nausea. He reported a history of hernias and surgeries and stated that he had two prior hernias. The first hernias were a left inguinal2 and umbilical hernia3

due to a work-related injury with UPS that occurred on May 12, 2016. The second was a nonwork-related right-side lateral4 hernia

that occurred over twenty years ago. Both required surgical repair. During appellee's emergency room visit, he was diagnosed with a 3.3 cm right-side paraumbilical hernia that appeared slightly increased in size when compared to a past study performed on May 14, 2016. It was recommended that he follow up with his primary care physician and/or a general surgeon within 7 days.

Appellee filed a First Report of Injury or Illness with his employer the next day. On September 23, 2019, appellee went to Columbia Medical Practice where he was diagnosed and recommended for surgery. The surgery was scheduled for September 30, 2019. Appellants, however, contested the injury and did not authorize the surgery or request that appellee be evaluated by an independent physician of their choice. As a result, the surgery was cancelled. Appellee then tried several alternatives for surgical authorization, but he was unsuccessful. Appellee met with Dr. Alan Kravitz on September 27, 2019 for further assessment, and he performed the hernia

repair on November 14, 2019. An evaluation was conducted by Dr. Robert Macht on January 15, 2020. In his report, Dr. Macht opined to a reasonable degree of medical probability that appellee "developed a new onset of an umbilical hernia at the time of his accident," and he underwent "urgent surgery" due to the umbilical hernia.

The Workers' Compensation Commission held a hearing on the contested issues of accidental injury and causal relationship of the umbilical hernia

in February 2020. Approximately one month later, the Commission issued its findings, stating:

The Commission finds on the issues presented that the claimant sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment on September 17, 2019, that the disability of the claimant's hernia

is the result of aforesaid accidental injury, and that as a result thereof the claimant was temporarily totally disabled from September 20, 2019 to January 21, 2020 inclusive. The Commissioner finds that the employer and insurer shall authorize surgical repair of the claimant's hernia. The Commission further finds that the employer and insurer shall pay causally related medical expenses in accordance with the Medical Fee Guide of this Commission. The issue of nature and extent was raised but not litigated. Average weekly wage — $843.03.

Appellants then filed a Request for Rehearing, contending that the Commission's decision finding the hernia

compensable was an error of law. Appellee, in response, submitted a letter to the Commission on March 24, 2020 with a medical report from his surgeon, Dr. Alan Kravitz, that stated the hernia

was "more likely than not caused by the September 2019 injury." The Commission denied the request for a rehearing.

Appellants filed a timely petition for judicial review in the Howard County Circuit Court. On August 27, 2020, following an "on-the-record" hearing, the judge issued an order affirming the Commission's decision. Appellants timely filed this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Generally, in an appeal from judicial review of an agency action, this Court "review[s] the agency's decision directly, not the decision of the circuit court...." Long v. Injured Workers’ Ins. Fund , 448 Md. 253, 264, 138 A.3d 1225 (2016). Section 9-745(c) of the Maryland Labor and Employment Article provides that when an appeal is filed, the standard to be used by the court is limited to determining "whether the Commission: (1) justly considered all of the facts about the accidental personal injury, occupational disease, or compensable hernia

; (2) exceeded the powers granted to it [by the Maryland Code]; or (3) misconstrued the law and facts applicable in the case decided." This Court "respect[s] the expertise of the agency and accord[s] deference to its interpretation of a statute that it administers; however, we may always determine whether the administrative agency made an error of law." Id . The Commission's decision is presumed to be prima facie correct. LE § 9-745(b)(1). "That presumption does not extend to questions of law, which we review independently. We do, though afford the Commission a degree of deference, as appropriate, in its formal interpretations of the Workers’ Compensation Act." Id .

DISCUSSION
I. The Commission did not err in applying a preponderance of the evidence standard in accordance with § 9-504.

Appellants argue the Commission erred in applying the preponderance of the evidence standard to appellee's claim because the statute created a higher standard of proof for hernia

cases. Appellants assert the term "definite proof," as used in the statute, requires analysis under the clear and convincing standard. Appellants contend that "if the legislature intended for ‘definite proof’ to mean ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ ... the legislature would have used that well-known standard" in the statute. Because of this, appellants state that, as a matter of law, the Commission erred in finding that appellee suffered a compensable hernia. In opposition, appellee argues the Commission properly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard and liberally construed the statute, as was the intent of the legislature.

To determine whether the Commission erred in applying the preponderance of the evidence standard, this Court must first examine the language of Section 9-504 of the Labor and Employment Article. Where the statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity, we do not look "beyond the words of the statute itself to determine legislative intent." Md. Ins. Admin. v. Md. Individual Practice Assn., Inc. , 129 Md. App. 348, 355, 742 A.2d 22 (1999). Where the language of the statute is ambiguous, this Court must "consider ... [the] meaning and effect [of the language] in light of the setting, the objectives, and purpose of the enactment." Id . We "construe the statute as a whole and interpret each of its provisions in the context of the entire statutory scheme." Id .

The Maryland Workers' Compensation Act is a remedial statute, and "as a result, is generally interpreted liberally in favor of the claimant." McLaughlin v. Gill Simpson Elec. , 206 Md. App. 242, 253-54, 47 A.3d 1074 (2012). While remedial statutes are "to be given a liberal construction, the predominant goal of the Court is to ascertain and implement the legislative intent, and the ascertainment of that intent is done, in the first instance, by considering the language used by the Legislature and giving that language a plain and common sense meaning." 1081 Arundel Corp. v. Marie , 383 Md. 489, 502, 860 A.2d 886 (2004).

The Maryland Labor and Employment Article, Section 9-504 states:

[A]n employer shall provide compensation in accordance with this title to a covered employee for a hernia

caused by an accidental personal injury or by a strain arising out of and in the course of employment if:

(1) the covered employee provides definite proof that satisfies the Commission that:

(i) the hernia did not exist before the accidental personal injury or strain occurred; or

(ii) as a result of the accidental personal injury or strain, a preexisting hernia has become so aggravated, incarcerated, or strangulated that an immediate operation is needed; and

(2) notwithstanding any
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3 cases
  • In re X.R.
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 2 Mayo 2022
    ...as Mother argues, but refers to the quality of the evidence to be adduced at CINA dispositions. C.f., United Parcel Service, et al. v. Strothers , 253 Md.App. 708, 269 A.3d 400 (2022). Mother argues that the standard to deny custody at the dispositional stage must be by "clear and convincin......
  • United Parcel Serv. v. Strothers
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 1 Diciembre 2022
    ...the Commission. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed in a reported opinion. United Parcel Serv. v. Strothers , 253 Md. App. 708, 269 A.3d 400 (2022).We granted certiorari, 478 Md. 511, 275 A.3d 346 (2022), for the following three questions, which we slightly ......
  • United Parcel Serv. v. Strothers
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Maryland
    • 1 Diciembre 2022
    ...of persuasion. Petitioners latch onto the definition of "definite" provided by the Court of Special Appeals in its opinion below. Strothers, 253 Md.App. at 717 (providing a definition of "definite"). Petitioners' faith is, however, misplaced. The requirement for definite proof in hernia cla......

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