United Pharmacal Co. v. Bd. of Pharmacy

Decision Date05 April 2005
Docket NumberNo. SC 86104.,SC 86104.
PartiesUNITED PHARMACAL COMPANY OF MISSOURI INC., Respondent, v. MISSOURI BOARD OF PHARMACY, Appellant.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Daryl R. Hylton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, for Appellant.

R. Todd Ehlert, R. Dan Boulware, Sharon Kennedy, St. Joseph, MO, for Respondent.

WILLIAM RAY PRICE, JR., Judge.

United Pharmacal Company of Missouri brought suit in Buchanan County for declaratory judgment against the Missouri Board of Pharmacy claiming jurisdiction under section 536.050, RSMo 2000,1 which allows suit to be brought in the county where plaintiff resides if the suit concerns an administrative rule. The trial court granted summary judgment on the merits for Pharmacal. After opinion by the court of appeals, this Court granted transfer. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10. The state claims that venue was only proper in Cole County under the general venue statute, section 508.010(1). The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded because the facts pleaded concern statutory violations, which cannot support venue in Buchanan County.

I. Background

Pharmacal is a St. Joseph, Missouri, business selling animal supplies. It has been in business for twenty years and sells federal "veterinary legend" drugs to animal owners with a veterinarian's prescription. The board of pharmacy is a part of the Missouri Division of Professional Registration and is in charge of pharmacy licensing for the state. Secs. 338.140, 620.010.14. The board maintains its offices in Jefferson City.

The board issued a cease-and-desist letter on June 21, 2001, demanding that Pharmacal stop selling animal drugs without a pharmacy license. The cease-and-desist letter stated "[s]pecifically, it is the Board's determination that the following Laws and/or rules are being violated." The letter then listed sections 338.010.1, 338.220, and 338.195 including the text of each statute. It listed no rules as authority. The board claims that it has statutory authority over animal drugs prescribed by veterinarians as well as human medicines. Pharmacal denies that the board has any authority over animal drugs.

Pharmacal claims that the cease-and-desist letter was issued pursuant to an agency rule posted as a frequently asked question (FAQ) on the board's website. Sometime in 2001, the board of pharmacy's website displayed a number of FAQs. One of them, which is no longer displayed on the website, reads as follows:

Missouri

Board of Pharmacy

Division of Professional Registration

Frequently Asked Questions — General Pharmacy Law

. . . .
8. Does an entity have to be licensed as a pharmacy to sell veterinary legend drugs to the consumer/owner of the animal(s)? Yes. Veterinary legend drugs may only be sold based on the order/prescription of a veterinarian. An entity may not sell veterinary legend drugs directly to the consumer (owner of animal) based on a prescription without being licensed as a pharmacy.
If an entity sells veterinary legend drugs to veterinarians or other wholesalers, the entity would have to be licensed as either a pharmacy or a drug distributor. Pharmacies are limited to 5% of their gross pharmaceutical sales before licensure as a drug distributor is required. State law allows a licensed veterinarian to dispense veterinary prescription drugs to clients with whom he has an established relationship.

The board denies that the FAQ was a rule. The board did not comply with the rulemaking requirements of section 536.021 concerning this FAQ.

Pharmacal brought this action for declaratory judgment stating in its petition:

22. On information and belief, in 2001, the Board of Pharmacy adopted a rule, applicable to all sellers of federal veterinary legend drugs to consumers, requiring those entities to have licensed pharmacists present when such sales take place and to obtain a license to operate a pharmacy to conduct such sales.
. . . .
28. The Board of Pharmacy's rules requiring sellers of federal veterinary legend drugs to consumers to comply with licensure and regulatory requirements as a licensed pharmacy and to have a licensed pharmacist on duty when such sales take place fall outside of the delegation of authority to the Board of Pharmacy by the General Assembly, and were promulgated without notice and hearing. Said rules are, therefore, unlawful, illegal and void under the applicable statutory provisions and all other pertinent law.

The board of pharmacy was the only defendant named in the declaratory judgment suit.

II. The Venue Statutes

This Court has held that "when a state agency is the sole defendant, [s]ection 508.010(1)2 . . . requires that the action be brought in Cole County unless a special venue statute allows the action to be filed elsewhere." State ex rel. Mo. Dept. of Natural Res. v. Roper, 824 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Mo. banc 1992). Alternate venue may be available pursuant to section 536.050.1. That section provides:

The power of the courts of this state to render declaratory judgments shall extend to declaratory judgments respecting the validity of rules, or of threatened applications thereof, and such suits may be maintained against agencies whether or not the plaintiff has first requested the agency to pass upon the question presented. The venue of such suits against agencies shall, at the option of the plaintiff, be in the circuit court of Cole County, or in the county of the plaintiff's residence, or if the plaintiff is a corporation, domestic or foreign, having a registered office or business office in this state, in the county of such registered office or business office.

Sec. 536.050.1 (emphasis added). Pharmacal claims that this statute provided it with venue in Buchanan County, where its business office is located. The state claims that the venue for this case was improper in Buchanan County. Unfortunately, after judgment by the circuit court and opinion by the court of appeals, this Court agrees because this case does not concern an administrative rule or the validity or threatened application of a rule.

A. The FAQ was not a rule

Administrative rules have independent power as law. Psychare Mgmt., Inc. v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. Div. of Med. Serv., 980 S.W.2d 311, 313-14 (Mo. banc 1998). For this reason, specific and detailed protective procedures are required for an agency to promulgate an administrative rule. In St. Louis Christian Home v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights, 634 S.W.2d 508, 515 (Mo.App.1982), the court observed:

The very purpose of the notice procedure for a proposed rule is to allow opportunity for comment by supporters or opponents of the measure, and so to induce a modification. . . . To neglect the notice . . . or to give effect to a proposed rule before the time for comment has run . . . undermines the integrity of the procedure.

Section 536.010(6) defines the substantive requirements of a rule as follows: "`Rule' means each agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy, or that describes the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of any agency."3 However, "[o]nly rules promulgated by an administrative agency with properly delegated authority have the force and effect of law." Psychare Mgmt., Inc., 980 S.W.2d at 313-14; see Mo. Soybean Ass'n v. Mo. Clean Water Comm'n, 102 S.W.3d 10, 22-23

(Mo. banc 2003). Section 536.021 provides these promulgation requirements. "No rule shall hereafter be proposed, adopted, amended or rescinded by any state agency unless such agency shall first file with the secretary of state a notice of proposed rulemaking and a subsequent final order of rulemaking, both of which shall be published in the Missouri Register by the secretary of state as soon as practicable after the filing thereof in that office. . . ." Sec. 536.021.

This Court has held that "[f]ailure to follow rulemaking procedures renders void purported changes in statewide policy." NME Hosps. Inc. v. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 850 S.W.2d 71, 74-75 (Mo. banc 1993). This Court has further held that "something that is void is null; ineffectual; nugatory; having no legal force or binding effect . . .; an instrument or transaction which is wholly ineffective, inoperative, and incapable of ratification and which thus has no force or effect so that nothing can cure it." R.E.J., Inc. v. City of Sikeston, 142 S.W.3d 744, 745 (Mo. banc 2004) (citation omitted).

Not everything that is written or published by an agency constitutes an administrative rule. In this case, the board made no attempt to comply with the protective procedures required for the promulgation of a rule. In fact, the agency did not even try to promulgate the FAQ as a rule. Pharmacal's claim of venue pursuant to section 536.050.1 must fail because the FAQ was not an administrative rule and, as such, there is no challenge to the validity of a rule or to a threatened application of a rule. The FAQ was merely an expression of the board's interpretation of law without any force or legal effect.

B. A challenge to "validity" requires at least a promulgated rule.

Pharmacal continues its argument by claiming that section 536.050.1 provides venue because it is challenging the validity of this FAQ as an administrative rule. Section 536.014 provides circumstances in which a rule could be invalid. It states that:

No department, agency, commission or board rule shall be valid in the event that: (1) There is an absence of statutory authority for the rule or any portion thereof; or (2) The rule is in conflict with state law; or (3) The rule is so arbitrary and capricious as to create such substantial inequity as to be unreasonably burdensome on persons affected.

Sec. 536.014 (emphasis added). Section 536.024 provides: "When the general assembly authorizes any state agency to adopt administrative rules or regulations, the granting of such rulemaking authority and the validity of such rules and regulations...

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