United Refining Co. v. Department of Energy
| Decision Date | 22 June 1983 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 79-144 ERIE. |
| Citation | 566 F. Supp. 270 |
| Parties | UNITED REFINING COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY and Charles W. Duncan, Jr., Secretary of Energy, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
J. Tomlinson Fort, Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, Pittsburgh, Pa., Daniel Joseph and Joseph T. Casey, Jr., Akin, Gump, Hauer & Field, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.
June Wagoner Edwards, Federal Programs Branch, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendants.
William Bode, Washington, D.C., John McLaughlin, Erie, Pa., amicus curiae, Independent Terminal Operators Assn.
This is a declaratory judgment action which is now before the court on cross-motions for partial summary judgment. The plaintiff, United Refining Company, in its complaint and in its motion challenges the substantive and procedural validity of certain Department of Energy regulations, alternatively referred to as "banking regulations" or "fictitious recovery rules." In its motion the plaintiff contends that these regulations were not promulgated in a manner which comports with the requirements of either the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. or the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act, 15 U.S.C. § 751 et seq.
The defendant in its answer to plaintiff's complaint and its own motion for partial summary judgment presents two allegations. First, the defendant contends that these regulations were validly promulgated. In addition, the defendant argues that the equitable doctrine of laches now bars plaintiff's assertion of this claim.
The defendant's defense of laches is of particular concern at this stage. On December 26, 1980, this court entered an opinion and order indicating that because the plaintiff's complaint was essentially "defensive" in nature the defendant was likely precluded from asserting a laches defense.
Since that time the Department of Energy has filed the materials supporting their cross-motions for partial summary judgment. In these materials the Department argues that laches is a defense which should be available to it in this case. The issue has been fully briefed by both parties. The Department points out that the regulations at issue were promulgated in September of 1974. The Department's administrative review of United Refining Company began some three years later in 1977. This lawsuit was filed two years after that in 1979. The Department argues that this constitutes a five year delay resulting in prejudice to the defendant. We do not at this time reach the merits of the government's laches defense. We must, however, consider the question of whether the government is entitled as a matter of law to interpose a defense of laches.
In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), various drug manufacturers challenged labelling regulations claiming that the Food and Drug Administration and the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare had exceeded their authority. The plaintiff sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Discussing cases of this nature the Court stated:
Further, the declaratory judgment and injunctive remedies are equitable in nature, and other equitable defenses may be interposed ... The defense of laches could be asserted if the government is prejudiced by a delay. Id. at 155, 87 S.Ct. at 1519.
Other courts have given application to this principal. In Independent Bankers Assoc. of America v. Heimann, 627 F.2d 486 (D.C.Cir.1980), the court held that laches was available to the government as a defense to an equitable action challenging an interpretative ruling of the Comptroller of Currency. Where the Comptroller first made the interpretation in 1966, and the suit was not filed until 1978, the court held that laches barred the remedy. Similarly, the government was permitted to interpose a laches defense in an action in equity challenging the validity of administrative regulations of daily commodity trading. Economou v. Butz, 370 F.Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The court held that a two year delay in challenging on procedural grounds an administrative order setting daily trading limits was "inexcusable" and "does not commend itself to a court of equity." Id. at 363, citing Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. 136, 155, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1519, 18 L.Ed.2d 681.
A recent decision employs a laches rationale in a situation similar in some respects to the one in ...
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