United Scis. v. Kellett
Docket Number | A21A1060,A21A1061 |
Decision Date | 23 June 2023 |
Parties | UNITED SCIENCES, LLC et al. v. KELLETT et al. SHARPE v. KELLETT et al. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
This multiparty litigation concerns the control of a limited liability company, United Sciences, LLC. As relevant here, in the first appearance of this case before this Court United Sciences, LLC v. Kellett, 361 Ga.App. XXIX (Case Nos. A21A1060, A21A1061) (October 7, 2021) (unpublished) ("United Sciences I"), we affirmed the trial court's ruling that OCGA § 9-11-41's two-dismissal provision barred certain claims brought by Wess Eric Sharpe, United Sciences' former Manager, against Robert R. Joseph and his law firm, Hill Kertscher &Wharton, LLP ("HKW"), and Michael R Smith and his law firm, King &Spalding, LLP ("KS"). Slip Op. at 20-26. On September 20, 2022, the Supreme Court of Georgia vacated Division 5 of United Sciences I (, and remanded )the case to this Court for reconsideration of that division in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Joyner v. Leaphart, 314 Ga. 1 (875 S.E.2d 729) (2022).[1] For the reasons explained more fully below, we affirm.
The underlying facts in this dispute are set forth in United Sciences I as follows:
United Sciences I, Slip Op. at 3-7.
Shortly after the above-summarized events, Sharpe, proceeding individually and on behalf of United Sciences, instituted several lawsuits related to his ouster. Specifically, on February 10, 2014, Sharpe filed suit in the Superior Court of Fulton County against Kellett, Jr. and other United Sciences board members, seeking injunctive relief and asking the court to appoint a receiver and award damages. During the pendency of the February 2014 action, Smith began acting as counsel for United Sciences. Sharpe voluntarily dismissed that case on April 25, 2014.
Thereafter, in July 2014, Sharpe filed a five-count complaint against Kellett Jr. in Fulton County State Court, asserting claims for tortious interference with contractual and business relations, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, punitive damages, and attorney fees and litigation expenses. On December 8, 2015, the parties informed the state court that they had reached a settlement, and they filed a joint motion for administrative closure, which the court granted on December 11, 2015. In August 2018, the state court granted Sharpe's motion to reopen the case, finding that he had demonstrated that he had not been fully compensated as required under the terms of the parties' settlement. Then, in 2018 and 2019, Sharpe filed four separate actions in Fulton County State Court against various individuals and entities associated with United Sciences, including one suit against Joseph and HKW, and another suit against Smith and KS. He voluntarily dismissed those state court actions on January 14, 2020.
On January 31, 2020, Sharpe and other parties[2] filed a complaint, as amended, in the Superior Court of Fulton County, raising multiple claims against Kellett, Jr. and several other defendants. As relevant here, in Counts 9 to 12, Sharpe alone brought claims against Joseph, HKW, Smith, and KS for aiding and abetting a breach of the Operating Agreement (Count 9), conspiracy to breach the Operating Agreement (Count 10), aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty (Count 11), and conspiracy to breach fiduciary duty (Count 12).[3] Those counts were premised on the defendants' actions that allegedly resulted in a breach of the Operating Agreement and the fiduciary duty owed to the minority shareholders and Sharpe as Manager. Joseph and HKW and Smith and KS filed motions to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing, in relevant part, that Sharpe's claims against them were barred by the two-dismissal rule. They also argued that Sharpe's claims were precluded as a matter of law under the so-called "stranger doctrine" because neither Joseph nor Smith was a stranger to the Operating Agreement.
After a hearing, the trial court found that, pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-41, Sharpe's numerous voluntary dismissals of suits related to his removal as Manager warranted dismissal of his present claims against the lawyer/law firm defendants. Alternatively, the trial court determined that Counts 9 to 12 of the amended complaint sounded in tortious interference, and were therefore due to be dismissed under the "stranger doctrine," which provides that "only a stranger to both the contract at issue and the business relationship giving rise to and underpinning the contract may be liable for tortious interference with the contract or the relationship." Perry Golf Course Dev., LLC v. Housing Auth. of City of Atlanta, 294 Ga.App. 387, 390 (3) (670 S.E.2d 171) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted).
This Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Sharpe's claims. United Sciences I, Slip Op. at 20-26. As noted above, our Supreme Court remanded the case to us for reconsideration of Division 5 in light of Joyner, in which the Supreme Court clarified that the two-dismissal rule satisfies only one of the prerequisites that must be established before res judicata will operate to bar a subsequent action. 314 Ga. at 6-7 (2) (a) ().
However as this Court noted in United Sciences I, because we affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Sharpe's claims based on the application of OCGA § 9-1141 (a) (3), we did not address the trial court's alternative ruling that Sharpe's claims against Joseph, HKW, Smith, and KS were due to be dismissed...
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