United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Lail, A89A0620

• Decision Date: 13 July 1989
• Docket Number: No. A89A0620,A89A0620
• Citation: 385 S.E.2d 424,192 Ga.App. 487
• Parties: UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION v. LAIL et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 424

385 S.E.2d 424

192 Ga.App. 487

UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION v. LAIL et al.

No. A89A0620.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

July 13, 1989.

Rehearing Denied July 26, 1989.

Certiorari Denied Sept. 7, 1989.

Dennis, Corry, Porter & Thornton, William E. Gray II, Atlanta, for appellant.

Don M. Jones, Michael R. Jones, Sr., Loganville, for appellees.

Tracy Williams, pro se.

CARLEY, Chief Judge.

Appellant-plaintiff United Services Automobile Association (USAA) issued an automobile policy on a vehicle owned by David Boss. While he was driving Boss' vehicle, appellee-defendant Tracy Williams was involved in a collision. As the result of this collision, appellee-defendants Michael, Terry and Sandra Lail were injured. When the Lails brought suit against Williams, he requested that USAA undertake to defend him, contending that, for purposes of liability coverage, he was an insured under Boss' policy.

USAA responded to this request by filing the instant declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration that it provided no liability coverage to Williams and was not required to defend him against the Lails' suit. The Lails answered and also filed a counterclaim, seeking damages for abusive litigation under Yost v. Torok, 256 Ga. 92, 344 S.E.2d 414 (1986). After discovery, the Lails moved for summary judgment. As to USAA's main declaratory judgment action, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Lails. As to the issue of USAA's liability on the Yost counterclaim, the trial court also granted summary judgment in favor of the Lails, leaving only the issue of damages for jury resolution. USAA brings this appeal from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Lails.

1. With regard to its main declaratory judgment action, USAA urges that a genuine issue of material fact remains as to Williams' status as an insured under the terms of the policy that it issued on Boss' vehicle. USAA relies upon the following exclusion contained in the policy: "We do not provide [l]iability [c]overage for any person ... [u]sing a vehicle without a reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do so."

It is undisputed that Williams had Boss' express permission to use the vehicle. Boss had authorized Williams to drive the vehicle to Loganville from a jobsite in Atlanta. At the time of the collision, Williams was doing just that. Construing the evidence most favorably for USAA, however, Boss had also given Williams specific instructions as to how and when he was to drive the vehicle from Atlanta to Loganville. In Boss' affidavit, he averred that he had "instructed Williams to drive directly to Loganville after the work was finished using [a specified] route used on previous days." Since Williams had not driven directly to Loganville after leaving the worksite and the collision had not occurred on the route designated by Boss, USAA urges that Williams' deviation from his instructions would render the exclusion applicable and the trial court's grant of summary judgment erroneous. Accordingly, the issue presented for resolution is whether, notwithstanding Williams' express permission to drive Boss' vehicle, his deviation from instructions as to time and route would serve to exclude him from coverage as a driver who was "[u]sing [the] vehicle without a reasonable belief that [he was] entitled to do so."

"[C]ompulsory motor vehicle liability insurance in this state established the public policy that 'innocent persons who are injured should have an adequate recourse for the recovery of their damages.' [Cit.]" Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Neese, 254 Ga. 335, 338(1), 329 S.E.2d 136 (1985). "[F]inancial responsibility laws are designed to protect the general public and ... automobile liability policies are to be construed in conjunction with these laws. [Cit.]" Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 248 Ga. 350, 351, 282 S.E.2d 115 (1981). The relevant language of the policy here at issue does not appear in a traditional "omnibus" clause which expressly extends coverage only to those drivers who have obtained and have acted within the scope of the permission given by the vehicle's owner. See Georgia Farm, etc., Ins. Co. v. Fire, etc., Ins. Co. of Conn., 180 Ga.App. 777, 779, 350 S.E.2d 325 (1986). Compare Select Ins. v. Register, 192 Ga.App. 145, 384 S.E.2d 238 (1989). Instead, the language appears in an "easy reading" policy in the form of an exclusion from coverage of only those drivers who have no reasonable belief that they were entitled to use the owner's vehicle. "Any exclusion sought to be invoked by the insurer ... will be liberally construed in favor of the insured and strictly construed against the insurer unless [it] is clear and unequivocal. [Cits.]" Travelers Indem. Co. v. Whalley Constr. Co., 160 Ga.App. 438, 441, 287 S.E.2d 226 (1981). Accordingly, "cases which have construed the meaning of omnibus clauses ... are distinguishable in that omnibus clauses contained in standard automobile insurance policies explicitly refer...