United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. Gale Shoe Mfg. Co.
Decision Date | 28 June 1943 |
Citation | 49 N.E.2d 913,314 Mass. 142 |
Parties | UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORPORATION v. GALE SHOE MFG. CO. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Action of contract by United Shoe Machinery Corporation against Gale Shoe Manufacturing Company to recover the sum of 55 cents with interest under defendant's covenant, in a lease of machinery, to pay taxes assessed upon or in respect to leased property. Defendant's demurrer to the declaration was sustained, and plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed, and judgment for defendant.Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Hanify, Judge.
Before FIELD, C. J., and QUA, DOLAN, and RONAN, JJ.
P. Nichols, of Boston, for plaintiff.
J. N. Clark, of Boston, for defendant.
This action of contract brought in the Superior Court to recover the sum of fifty-five cents and interest thereon was heard upon a demurrer to the declaration. The demurrer stated five grounds of demurrer including the ground that the declaration ‘fails to state substantive facts necessary to constitute the cause of action alleged.’ The demurrer was sustained and the plaintiff appealed. G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 231, § 96.
The amount in controversy would not warrant consideration of the plaintiff's appeal if no substantial right was at stake. Feeney v. Eastern Racing Association, Inc., 303 Mass. 602, 603, 22 N.E.2d 259, and cases cited. See A. Doykos & T. Pappas, Inc., v. Leventhal, 290 Mass. 375, 376, 377, 195 N.E. 348. The defendant, however, does not raise the point. And counsel for the plaintiff assures us that the question involved in the present case is a matter of substantial interest to the plaintiff by reason of the existence of numerous agreements to which it is a party similar in form and effect to the agreement upon which the action is brought. Consequently we consider the case.
The plaintiff's declaration alleges that
The demurrer admits only facts well pleaded and does not admit inferences from these facts unless they are necessary inferences, nor does it admit conclusions of law from facts averred. Johnson v. East Boston Savings Bank, 290 Mass. 441, 446, 447, 195 N.E. 727.
Fundamental facts alleged by the declaration and admitted by the demurrer are that the plaintiff is a foreign manufacturing corporation; that during the year 1936 it was engaged in manufacturing within the Commonwealth; that the plaintiff was then the owner of a machine of the value of $100 which by an agreement for a consideration and under seal it had leased in 1930 to the defendant, a domestic manufacturing corporation engaged in manufacturing in this Commonwealth, and which was being used in 1936 by the defendant for manufacturing within the Commonwealth; and that by the lease the defendant covenanted and agreed, among other things, that ‘at all times until redelivery of the leased machinery to the * * * [plaintiff] the * * * [defendant] shall pay all taxes and assessments which shall be assessed upon or in respect to the leased machinery or any interest therein or the rights to payments thereunder upon whomsoever the same shall be assessed.’
On the facts above stated the plaintiff was subject in the year 1936 to the excise imposed by G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 63, § 39, St.1936, c. 362, § 6, which, so far as material, is as follows:
General Laws (Ter.Ed.) c. 63, § 30(4), as appearing in St.1934, c. 237, § 1 (see now St.1939, c. 24, § 6), defined the term ‘Corporate excess employed within the commonwealth’ (as used in G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 63, §§ 30-52, inclusive) by a foreign corporation, so far as here material, as ...
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