United States Ex. Rel. Lealton Chears v. Acevedo
| Decision Date | 23 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 06 C 2118.,06 C 2118. |
| Citation | 752 F.Supp.2d 879 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES ex. rel. Lealton CHEARS, Petitioner,v.Gerardo ACEVEDO, Warden, Hill Correctional Center, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Alan D. Goldberg, Deborah Jane Israel, Jennifer Lynn Bontrager, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, IL, for Petitioner.
Illinois prisoner Lealton Chears (“Chears”) is serving a thirty-year extended-term sentence for second-degree murder. (R. 29, State Ct. R., Ex. I at 39.) Presently before the Court is Chears' amended petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Section 2254”), which challenges the sentence imposed by a state court. (R. 16, Am. Pet.) For the reasons stated below, Chears' amended petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.1
Early on the night of June 7, 1997, Chears and Edmond Chambers (“Chambers”) got into a verbal altercation. (R. 29, State Ct. R., Ex. B at 3.) Their argument took an tragic turn when Chambers threw an empty liquor bottle at Chears. ( Id.) After tossing the bottle at Chears, Chambers ran away. ( Id.) Chears then pulled out a gun, chased Chambers, and shot him four times; two of the bullets hit Chambers in the lower back, while the remaining two entered his head and right buttock. ( Id. at 3–4; Ex. A at 28.) As a result of the injuries he sustained, Chambers died later that night. ( Id., Ex. F at G13.) Chears turned himself in the following day. ( See id. at G66–67.)
Chears' jury trial began on December 9, 1997. ( See id., Ex. D.) At trial, witness testimony varied as to whether all the shots Chears fired at Chambers were in rapid succession or whether there was a final shot after Chambers fell to the ground. (R. 29, State Ct. R., Ex. B at 3.) Two of the state's witnesses, Darryl Ferguson (“Ferguson”) and Edward Riggs (“Riggs”), testified that after Chambers fell to the ground, Chears shot him again. ( Id. at 4.) Riggs testified that Chears ran past Chambers as he fired the fourth and final shot. ( Id.) Ferguson, on the other hand, stated that Chears stood over Chambers' wounded body and shot him a fourth time. ( Id.) In apparent contrast to the testimony of Ferguson and Riggs, the state's other witnesses, Lilly Jones, Michael Jones, and Keith Thomas (“Thomas”), along with defense witnesses Edward Clark (“Clark”) and Robert Murphy (“Murphy”), all testified that the shots they heard were fired in rapid succession. ( Id.)
Dr. Thamrong Chira (“Dr. Chira”), a medical examiner, testified that Chambers' head wound was “consistent” with being on the ground at the time he was shot; he did, however, note that the wound could have an alternative explanation. ( Id.) Specifically, Dr. Chira testified that the head shot could have resulted from a person measuring 63 6?. ( Id.) Adding to this alternative explanation, Dr. Chira also testified that it is not uncommon for an individual to throw his head back while running. ( Id.)
At the conclusion of his trial, Chears was found guilty of second-degree murder.4 ( Id.) The trial court subsequently sentenced Chears to an extended-term sentence of thirty years.5 ( Id.) In doing so, it found that certain aggravating factors supported an extended-term sentence. Specifically, the trial court concluded that “the conduct under the circumstances of this case for shooting an unarmed, fleeing individual in my opinion is particularly brutal or heinous, indicative of wanton cruelty and falls within that statute authorizing an extended term sentence.” ( Id., Ex. G at I26.) On February 9, 1998, Chears' trial counsel filed a notice of appeal, but failed to prosecute the appeal. ( Id.) As a result, the appeal was dismissed. ( Id.)
On July 9, 2001, Chears filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel's failure to pursue the direct appeal. ( Id., Ex. I at C32–38.) On March 14, 2002, the trial court granted Chears relief in the form of allowing him to file a late notice of appeal. ( Id., Ex. I at C60.)
Chears presented three arguments in challenging his sentence on direct appeal. First, he contended that his thirty-year extended-term sentence violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). ( Id., Ex. N at 21–26.) Second, Chears argued that the trial court's imposition of an extended-term sentence was improper because it “effectively rejected the mitigating evidence that the jury accepted in finding [Chears] guilty of second degree murder rather than first degree murder.” ( Id. at 27–38.) Finally, he asserted that the trial court's findings of aggravating factors were not supported by the record. ( Id. at 39–47.)
On June 1, 2004, 349 Ill.App.3d 1035, 322 Ill.Dec. 364, 890 N.E.2d 1283 (2004), the Illinois Appellate Court, First Judicial District (“state appellate court”), affirmed Chears' conviction and sentence. ( Id., Ex. A at 1–31.) In its decision, it rejected all three of Chears' arguments. With respect to Chears' first argument, the state appellate court found that while the trial court clearly violated Apprendi by sentencing Chears to an extended-term sentence based on a judicially-determined finding, it concluded that this mistake was not plain error because Chears was not prejudiced by the absence of a jury's finding of exceptionally brutal and heinous conduct.6 ( Id. at 18–24.) The state appellate court's conclusion was buttressed by its determination that “the record provide[d] overwhelming evidence that th[e] crime was committed in a brutal and heinous manner.” ( Id. at 24.) Next, it rejected Chears' second contention by concluding that the trial court had considered mitigating evidence. ( Id. at 24–29.) The state appellate court also found no inconsistency between the “jury's finding of unreasonable self defense” and the imposition of an extended-term sentence based on the aggravating factors identified by the trial court. ( Id.) Finally, the state appellate court found that the extended-term sentence was supported by the record. ( Id. at 30–31.) Chears subsequently filed a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court; his petition was denied on November 24, 2004, 212 Ill.2d 538, 291 Ill.Dec. 710, 824 N.E.2d 286 (2004). ( Id., Ex. X at 1.)
After direct review of his case was complete, Chears filed an amended motion to reinstate the previously-submitted postconviction petition with the trial court. ( Id., Ex. L at C57.) The motion was granted, and Chears subsequently submitted a supplemental postconviction petition which included additional claims that arose out of his direct appeal. ( Id., Ex. L at C72; Ex. M at 1–23.) Chears presented several arguments in his petition. First, he asserted that his sentence was improper because the trial judge considered an incorrect extended-term sentencing range of twenty-to-forty years, rather than the correct fifteen-to-thirty years. ( Id., Ex. M at 7–9.) Building from this contention, Chears also argued that his appellate counsel was ineffective because she did not raise the trial court's reliance on an incorrect sentencing range on direct appeal. ( Id. at 9–11.) Additionally, Chears argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, he pointed to the following alleged deficiencies: (1) a failure to investigate and call Robert Porter (“Porter”) and Larry Young (“Young”), two witnesses Chears claims would have demonstrated that he did not fire a final shot into Chambers' head after he fell to the ground; (2) a failure to investigate Ferguson's criminal history; (3) a failure to remind the trial court of the appropriate extended-term sentencing range; and (4) failing to file a motion to reconsider the sentence. ( Id. at 11–19.) Finally, Chears argued that the state committed a violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) by failing to disclose Ferguson's full criminal history. ( Id. at 19–22.)
On September 27, 2006, the state moved to dismiss Chears' postconviction petition. ( Id., Ex. L at C16.) Later that fall, on November 1, 2006, the trial court granted the state's motion to dismiss. ( Id., Ex. K at H9.) In its oral ruling, the trial court, in a proceeding presided over by the same trial judge who sentenced Chears, did not directly address the merits of Chears' ineffective assistance of counsel or Brady claims. ( See id. at H1–H11.) Rather, the trial court focused on Chears' challenge to its reliance on an incorrect sentencing range. ( See id.) While admitting that at the time of Chears' sentencing he mistakenly believed that the correct extended-term sentencing range was twenty-to-forty years, the trial judge stated that his misapprehension did not affect his sentencing decision. ( Id. at H8.) Specifically, the trial judge stated that his mistake “had no bearing on [his] decision one way or another concerning [Chears]”; rather, he declared that “the sentence of thirty years was warranted by the facts regarding [Chears].” ( Id. at H7–H8.) Chears immediately appealed the trial court's denial of his postconviction petition. ( Id. at H10.)
On April 8, 2009, 389 Ill.App.3d 1016, 329 Ill.Dec. 718, 907 N.E.2d 37 (2009), a state appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of Chears' postconviction petition. ( Id., Ex. B at 1.) In doing so, it rejected all of Chears' arguments. First, it concluded that Chears failed to make a substantial showing of a due process violation with respect to the trial judge's application of an incorrect sentencing range. ( Id. at 7–9.) Second, the state appellate court rejected any ineffective assistance of counsel claims tied to the application...
To continue reading
Request your trial