People v. Chears
| Decision Date | 08 April 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-06-3270.,1-06-3270. |
| Citation | 907 N.E.2d 37 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lealton CHEARS, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Jennifer L. Bontrager, Assistant Appellate Defender, Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.
James Fitzgerald, Tasha-Marie Kelly, Molly E. Donnelly, Assistant State's Attorneys, Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Cook County, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
The defendant appeals from the second-stage dismissal of his petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2006)), following a second-degree murder conviction. The defendant acknowledges that no better result than a second-degree murder conviction was possible under the facts of his case. The postconviction petition challenges only the extended-term sentence he received. The defendant contends the trial court erred in dismissing his petition because he made a substantial showing of a constitutional violation where: (1) the trial court considered the wrong sentencing range; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to correct the trial court's consideration of the wrong sentencing range and for failing to file a motion to reconsider the sentence imposed; (3) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the sentencing issue on direct appeal; (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present the testimony of two eyewitnesses regarding the manner in which the defendant committed the shooting; and (4) the State violated the defendant's due process rights by failing to disclose the complete criminal history of a key witness and failing to correct the witness's false testimony as to his criminal background, where this witness testified the defendant fired the final shot into the victim's head while the victim was on the ground. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
At trial, the evidence established that on June 7, 1997, the defendant shot Edmond Chambers four times, killing him. The defendant and Chambers were members of rival gangs and were engaged in an argument that night. The witnesses testified that as a group of people stood around, Chambers threw an empty liquor bottle at the defendant, before running away. The defendant followed, shooting him. The witnesses' testimony varied as to whether all the shots the defendant fired at Chambers were in rapid succession or whether there was a final shot fired after Chambers fell to the ground. Two of the State's witnesses, Darryl Ferguson and Eddie Riggs, testified that after Chambers fell to the ground, the defendant shot him for a final time. Riggs testified the defendant ran past Chambers as he fired his final shot. Ferguson testified the defendant stood over Chambers's fallen body and shot him a fourth time.
Dr. Thamrong Chira, a medical examiner, testified that Chambers's head wound was "consistent" with being on the ground at the time he was shot, but that was not the only possible explanation. Dr. Chira testified the head shot could have resulted from a person measuring 6 feet 1 inch or 6 feet 2 inches shooting a person about 5 feet 7 inches from behind if the person shot had a hyperextension of his head or face. He testified it is not uncommon for an individual to throw his head back while running. Three witnesses testified the defendant's height is 6 feet 1 inch. Robert Murphy, the defendant's grandfather, testified Chambers was 5 feet 6 inches.
The State's other witnesses, Lilly Jones, Michael Jones, and Keith Thomas, along with defense witnesses Edward Clark and Robert Murphy, all testified that the shots they heard were rapidly fired.
At the conclusion of the jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of the second-degree murder of Edmund Chambers. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an extended-term sentence of 30 years. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a)(3) (West 1996). On February 9, 1998, the defendant's trial counsel filed a notice of appeal, but failed to prosecute the appeal, resulting in its dismissal. On December 7, 1999, the defendant filed a pro se motion to reinstate the appeal. This court denied the defendant's motion for want of jurisdiction.
On July 9, 2001, the defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging, among other claims, ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to pursue the direct appeal. On March 14, 2002, the trial court granted the defendant's postconviction petition.
The defendant's direct appeal proceeded.
On appeal, the defendant argued: (1) his 30-year extended-term sentence violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); (2) the trial court's imposition of an extended-term sentence was improper because the court failed to consider mitigating evidence; and (3) the trial court's imposition of an extended-term sentence based on its finding that the offense was carried out with exceptionally brutal and heinous conduct was not supported by the record.
On June 1, 2004, we affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence. People v. Chears, No. 1-02-0998, 349 Ill.App.3d 1035, 322 Ill.Dec. 364, 890 N.E.2d 1283 (2004) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). While we held the trial court violated Apprendi by sentencing the defendant to an extended term based on its own finding of exceptionally brutal and heinous conduct, we concluded the error was harmless because the defendant was not prejudiced by the absence of a jury's finding "as the record provide[d] overwhelming evidence that this crime was committed in a brutal and heinous manner." We also found the trial court considered the mitigating evidence when it imposed the extended-term sentence. The defendant's petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was denied. People v. Chears, 212 Ill.2d 538, 291 Ill. Dec. 710, 824 N.E.2d 286 (2004).
Thereafter, the defendant sought to reinstate the remaining, unadjudicated postconviction claims and to amend his petition to include additional claims that arose out of his direct appeal. During the hearing on the defendant's motion to reinstate his original postconviction petition, the court noted that the allegations contained in the defendant's original postconviction petition were addressed on direct appeal. Assistant public defender (APD) Harold Winston argued that certain witnesses did not testify at trial due to trial counsel's ineffectiveness. The court stated that even if those witnesses had testified, based on the evidence presented, the best result the defendant could have obtained was a second-degree murder conviction, which is what he received. Defense counsel agreed that it was unlikely the witnesses' testimony would have changed the outcome of the trial, but argued their testimony was relevant to the extended-term sentence the defendant received. The court reminded counsel that the extended-term sentence was upheld on direct appeal. Defense counsel noted that the propriety of the sentence was assessed without the benefit of the testimony of those same witnesses. Judge Sacks granted the defendant's motion, reinstated the postconviction petition, and allowed the defendant to file a supplemental petition.
On July 19, 2006, defense counsel filed the defendant's supplemental petition for postconviction relief, asserting four claims:
(1) the trial court relied on an incorrect sentencing range to impose an extended-term sentence, thus denying him due process;
(2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: investigate and call certain witnesses, investigate the criminal history of State witness Darryl Ferguson, correct the trial court's use of an incorrect extended-term sentencing range, and file a motion to reconsider the defendant's sentence;
(3) the State committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose Ferguson's full criminal history; and
(4) appellate counsel was ineffective because she failed to raise the incorrect sentencing range issue on direct appeal.
As support for his due process claim, the defendant attached a copy of the sentencing statute in effect at the time he was sentenced. When the defendant was sentenced, second-degree murder, a Class 1 felony, carried with it a sentencing range of 4 to 20 years. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1.5) (West 1996). Under the Unified Code of Corrections, an extended-term sentence may be imposed if "the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty." 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(2) (West 1996). The extended-term range for second-degree murder at that time was 15 to 30 years. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2 (a)(3) (West 1998). The defendant also attached the portion of the transcript from the sentencing hearing in which Judge Sacks incorrectly stated the extended-term sentencing range for second-degree murder was 20 to 40 years.
To support his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on counsel's failure to present the testimony of Robert Porter and Larry Young, the defendant attached affidavits from each. In their affidavits, Porter and Young claimed they witnessed the shooting and that the defendant did not fire the final shot while Chambers was on the ground. Porter and Young maintained they were never contacted by an investigator or defense counsel to testify on behalf of the defendant. The defendant also attached his own affidavit claiming he advised his trial counsel of the availability of these witnesses.
Supporting his claim that Darryl Ferguson testified falsely concerning his criminal history, the defendant attached copies of the circuit court clerk's records confirming Ferguson's criminal history, the portion of Ferguson's trial testimony in which he...
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