UNITED STATES EX REL. DICKEL v. Rundle, Civ. A. No. 71-800.

• Decision Date: 09 July 1971
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 71-800.
• Citation: 328 F. Supp. 1013
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America ex rel. John H. DICKEL v. Alfred T. RUNDLE, Supt.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

328 F. Supp. 1013

UNITED STATES of America ex rel. John H. DICKEL v. Alfred T. RUNDLE, Supt.

Civ. A. No. 71-800.

United States District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.

July 9, 1971.

John H. Dickel, pro se.

J. Shane Creamer, Atty. Gen., Leonard Packel, Deputy Atty. Gen., Harrisburg, Pa., for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOSEPH S. LORD, III, District Judge.

This habeas corpus relator, a state prisoner, seeks his release from custody under a 10-20 year sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to Bills of Indictment Nos. 190(a), 190(b) and 191 in the Lancaster County Court of Quarter Sessions, September Term, 1967. He alleges that his guilty plea was not voluntary in that it was induced by the conditions of his incarceration and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Dickel has presented these allegations to the state courts through a Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA) petition, 19 Pa.Stat.Ann. § 1180-1 et seq. He argues that since the fact hearing on those allegations in the state court was not full and fair, this court should hold an evidentiary hearing.

Careful examination of the 101-page transcript, covering two days of hearings, convinces us that the state judge reliably found after a full and fair hearing that petitioner's guilty plea was not induced by the conditions of his confinement. Therefore, we need hold no evidentiary hearing. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312-313, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963); United States ex rel. Thomas v. Maroney, 406 F.2d 992, 994 (C.A.3, 1969). Petitioner alleges that the hearing was not full and fair because it originally had not been scheduled to cover his allegations that his plea was unlawfully induced. As a result, he says, his counsel was left wholly unprepared and he was denied the right to present witnesses who would support his allegations. Petitioner's claim of surprise carries little weight, since it was on his motion that the court agreed to hear the charge that his guilty plea was unlawfully induced. In any event, the second day of the hearing occurred a week after the first day, giving petitioner ample time to procure necessary witnesses. The district attorney stipulated with Dickel's counsel that the testimony of three prospective witnesses would be the same as that of petitioner in regard to the conditions of incarceration. Neither Dickel nor his counsel mentioned any additional witnesses or sought to present any further evidence at the hearings.

After hearing petitioner's evidence and the Commonwealth's rebuttal, the state judge explicitly found that "there was no such cruel and inhuman treatment of the petitioner as he contends." The judge then ruled that Dickel's guilty plea was not induced by cruel and unusual confinement. We conclude that this factual determination is fairly supported by the record as developed in a full and fair hearing. There is no allegation by petitioner of newly discovered evidence. We therefore accept the findings of the state court. See Townsend v. Sain, supra, 372 U.S. at 313-318, 83 S.Ct. 745; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In the absence of such inducement, petitioner's guilty plea must stand as voluntary. See, e. g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed.2d 747 (1970).

Petitioner's second argument is a general allegation that his guilty plea was not made intelligently and voluntarily. A plea of guilty entered with advice of counsel is presumptively valid, and the burden is on the habeas petitioner to show that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Russell, 444 F.2d 1177 (C.A.3, 1971); United States ex rel. Grays v. Rundle, 428 F.2d 1401 (C.A.3, 1970). Dickel was represented by counsel when he entered his plea. Petitioner has not even suggested the availability of evidence, other than that which purportedly supported his claim that the plea was unlawfully induced, which would show that his guilty plea was unintelligent or involuntary. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption of the plea's validity controls, fortified as it is in this case by the...