United States ex rel. Neal v. Wolfe, Civ. A. No. 40870.

• Decision Date: 07 August 1972
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 40870.
• Citation: 346 F. Supp. 569
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Gaylord NEAL v. Clarence WOLFE, Deputy Superintendent; Clayton Ruth, Major of the Guards.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

346 F. Supp. 569

UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Gaylord NEAL v. Clarence WOLFE, Deputy Superintendent; Clayton Ruth, Major of the Guards.

Civ. A. No. 40870.

United States District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.

August 7, 1972.

Ralph Spritzer, Univ. of Pa., Professor of Law, Sami Shad, Robert Heim, Univ. of Pa., law students, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Michael Luber, Asst. Atty. Gen., Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants.

OPINION

MASTERSON, District Judge.

Plaintiff has brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983¹ to recover $10,489 damages for violation of his constitutional right to due process of law by defendants, Clarence Wolfe, Deputy Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Graterford and Clayton Ruth, Major of the Guards at Graterford. The issue before the court is whether or not plaintiff was afforded procedural due process by the prison authorities when he was subjected to institutional punishment. This case was tried before the court without a jury on March 29, 1972, and we have resolved the issue in favor of the plaintiff.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. In May, 1964, Gaylord Neal, plaintiff, was committed to the State Correctional Institution at Graterford on two concurrent sentences of five to twenty years for separate counts of armed robbery and aggravated robbery. (N.T. 2).

2. On August 30, 1964, the plaintiff was apprehended by one Sergeant Zanesky, a guard at the Graterford Institution, for being in possession of a piece of beaverboard which is used for construction purposes in the institution. The beaverboard, which had been converted into a checker board by another inmate, was being used by plaintiff for his personal enjoyment. Sergeant Zanesky reported this infraction of prison rules to the Disciplinary Board of the Institution. (N.T. 3).

3. Plaintiff was advised of the charge against him and accorded a hearing before the Prison Disciplinary Board. Major Clayton Ruth presided over that hearing. (N.T. 11). The Board authorized the deduction of $1.00 from plaintiff's prison account to compensate the state for the conversion of its property. (N.T. 3).

4. On June 23, 1966, plaintiff decided to appeal the action of the Disciplinary Board. He was motivated by a desire to remove any blemish that might impede commutation of his sentence, early parole, or bail pending appeal. He was also concerned that his institutional conviction might adversely influence his opportunity to obtain a better job position within the institution. (N.T. 12, 14).

5. On June 23, 1966, plaintiff submitted an institutional request form to Superintendent Rundle challenging the legitimacy of the 1964 fine imposed by the Disciplinary Board. The request read as follows:

"I would like to have my institutional record expunged. . . . The Disciplinary Board, scoundrels that they are, sat upon my case, and with a false cloak of judicial authority, confiscated over 6 days kitchen pay from me.

Is this the origination (sic) of the term, `It takes a thief to catch a thief'?

I would sincerely appreciate consideration about any change that could be made in my record."

6. Approximately one hour after submission of this request, plaintiff was locked in his cell and not permitted to join the prison population. (N.T. 17).

7. About an hour after that plaintiff was brought before Mr. Wolfe in Wolfe's office. Defendant Clayton Ruth and the block sergeant were the only other individuals present. (N.T. 17-18, 46).

8. Mr. Wolfe inquired only whether plaintiff had written the statements on the request form to which plaintiff responded affirmatively. Without further elaboration or explanation, Mr. Wolfe ordered that plaintiff be taken out. Plaintiff was then taken to the maximum security block (solitary confinement). (N.T. 17).

9. Mr. Wolfe afforded plaintiff no opportunity to explain his remarks. (N.T. 19, 45, 46). Nor was plaintiff informed of the charges against him or brought before the Disciplinary Board prior to being placed in solitary confinement. (N.T. 18).

10. Plaintiff was not afforded an opportunity to speak to anyone else about the action taken against him prior to his confinement in the maximum security block. (N.T. 19).

11. In an annotation on plaintiff's request slip, Mr. Wolfe indicated that he resented being called a scoundrel and thief. See Inmate's Request to Staff Member, JBC-135A, dated June 23, 1966. Mr. Wolfe, however, had not sat upon the Board which fined plaintiff in 1964.

12. Upon arriving at maximum security, plaintiff was stripped of his clothes and left naked for a period of approximately nine hours. There was no light in his cell. Bedding for the steel shelf that served as a bed was supplied at night and removed in the morning. (N.T. 21, 22).

13. For the first three days of his confinement, plaintiff was fed a regular noon meal and a reduced diet for breakfast and supper. (Exhibit B). Plaintiff received no exercise privileges and no shower privileges. (N.T. 24, 54, 55).

14. Plaintiff was not permitted any reading material other than a bible. He was not allowed visitors, he could not work and was not permitted to converse with other prisoners and he had no commissary privileges. (N.T. 25, 26).

15. Plaintiff was confined in maximum security from June 23, 1966 to July 1, 1966, but he was never advised when he would be released. (N.T. 26).

16. On July 1, 1966 (Exhibit D) plaintiff was brought before the Disciplinary Board, presided over by Mr. Wolfe. He was then released from maximum security. (N.T. 26, 52).

17. Upon release from maximum security, plaintiff was transferred from his job in the weave shop to the position of block runner. (N.T. 26, 27).

18. The position in the weave shop is one earned through good performance. (N.T. 89).

19. Plaintiff instituted the instant action on August 2, 1966 after having been released from maximum security. (N.T. 29).

20. After being released from maximum security and until the time of his transfer from Graterford, plaintiff experienced a number of difficulties with Mr. Wolfe relating to his receipt of legal materials in the mail. (N.T. 72-74).

21. On January 9, 1967, plaintiff attempted to serve Interrogatories upon Superintendent Rundle, the latter having answered plaintiff's complaint against the named defendants. Mr. Rundle refused to accept the Interrogatories. (N.T. 31).

22. Plaintiff was not permitted to serve the Interrogatories upon the defendants, and mailed them instead on the same day, January 9, 1967. (Exhibit C) (N.T. 32).

23. On January 16, 1967, pursuant to the express request of Mr. Wolfe, a reclassification summary and reclassification transfer petition were prepared. The reclassification was designated as being "demotional" and transfer was requested to the State Correctional Institution at Philadelphia. The security reclassification selected was maximum. (Exhibit D) (N.T. 34, 35).

24. On February 2, 1967 plaintiff was again committed to solitary confinement without any notice or explanation of the reason therefor. (N.T. 36, 37, 39).

25. On February 3, 1967, plaintiff was transferred to the State Correctional Institution for Philadelphia and segregated from the general prison population. He was not advised of the reason for his transfer or told when he could expect to be released from segregation. (N.T. 37, 86, 94).

26. Prisoners so segregated do not have the same privileges accorded other prisoners on other cell blocks and experience significant restrictions on their liberties. (N.T. 37, 38, 92, 93).

27. Plaintiff was released after seven days of segregation on February 9, 1967 upon review of his record and a vote by the staff at the State Correctional Institution, Philadelphia. (Defendant Exhibit 2) (N.T. 87).

28. The vote in favor of releasing plaintiff to the prison population was six to one, the one dissenting vote being based upon the fact that plaintiff had been received in a demotional punitive status. (N.T. 90).

29. Plaintiff was subsequently assigned to the kitchen and later entered the barber training program while at the State Correctional Institution, Philadelphia. (N.T. 74).

30. Plaintiff was released on parole on April 18, 1969. (N.T. 81).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The first issue which must be resolved is whether the federal courts can and should intervene in matters of penal administration or must defer to the discretionary authority of prison officials. Historically, the courts have been hesitant to intervene in the internal operation of state penal facilities. Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487, 489 (4th Cir. 1963); Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548, 551 (4th Cir. 1963); Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196, 197 (4th Cir. 1961). Because prison officials have expertise in the maintenance and proper functioning of correctional institutions, it has been argued that they should be permitted wide discretion in promulgating rules to regulate the behavior of the inmates. McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1964). This is in accord with theories of criminal punishment which hold that incarceration involves a consequent loss or limitation of rights and privileges enjoyed by citizens of a free society.² According to the historical view the courts may not inquire into the discretionary authority of penal officials unless the inmate's "exercise of a constitutional right is denied without semblance of justification arising out of the necessity to preserve order and discipline within the prison . . ." 337 F.2d at 74. See also Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961).

Despite the historical reluctance of the courts to intervene in matters of prison administration, recent cases support the proposition that federal courts may inquire into the restriction of an inmate's constitutional rights by prison officials.

"There is no doubt that discipline and administration of state detention facilities are state functions. They are subject to federal authority only where paramount federal constitutional or statutory

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