United States ex rel. Davis v. Yurkovich
| Decision Date | 17 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 12 C 6610 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES ex rel. JERMAINE DAVIS (#R42349), Petitioner, v. JOSEPH YURKOVICH, Warden, Hill Correctional Center, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
Before the Court is pro se Petitioner Jermaine Davis' petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). For the following reasons, the Court denies Davis' habeas petition and declines to certify any issues for appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).1
Davis does not present clear and convincing evidence challenging the statement of facts in the last state court decisions to address his arguments on the merits - which were the Supreme Court of Illinois' 2009 decision and the Illinois Appellate Court's 2011 decision - and thus the Court presumes those facts are correct for purposes of its habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Carter v. Thompson, 690 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 2012). The Court therefore adopts the underlying facts as set forth by People v. Davis, 233 Ill.2d 244, 330 Ill.Dec. 744, 909 N.E.2d 766 (2009), and People v. Davis, No. 1-10-0254 (1st Dist. Dec. 28, 2011) (unpublished).
At trial, evidence was presented that a group of men beat Demetrius Thomas unconscious on October 10, 1999, near a Chicago housing project. Thereafter, a Chicago Housing Authority police officer responded to a call about the incident and found Thomas lying in a garbage dumpster. Thomas was taken to the hospital and remained in a coma for approximately two months before he died of an infection that resulted from the brain injury he had suffered as a result of the beating.
The State's key witness was Quincy Campbell, who had a criminal record and remained a suspect in the case until he gave a statement to police. At trial, Campbell testified that he witnessed a group of men beat the victim. Campbell, however, had a hard time remembering the names and events, but he did acknowledge that he had given a written statement to police on January 3, 2000, about the incident. According to his written statement, he knew four of the five men who beat the victim from his neighborhood, namely, Maurice Thomas, Pee Wee, Hip Hop, and Kevin. Campbell then identified Davis as Hip Hop.
Also, Campbell's written statement indicated that during the encounter, Pee Wee struck the victim with a stick three times. Campbell described the stick used to beat the victim December 17, 2012 as a piece of cut lumber. In addition, in his written statement, Campbell stated that the victim got up and ran, but the men chased him around a building where the others began beating him. When the victim fell to the ground, Davis began striking him with his feet. While Campbell was watching the beating, Maurice Thomas asked Campbell to act as lookout for police, but Campbell refused. According to Campbell, when the beating ended, Davis picked up the victim by the collar and pants and tossed him into a garbage dumpster. Campbell deniedparticipating in the beating.
Other evidence presented at trial included that the police conducted a lineup on January 22, 2000, in which Campbell identified Davis. Later that same day, police confronted Davis with the fact of Campbell's identification and Davis gave a written statement to an Assistant State's Attorney in which Davis admitted his involvement in the incident. According to his statement, Davis was "hanging out" in the area when he saw Maurice Thomas bring the victim outside from a building. According to Davis, the victim broke free of Maurice Thomas' grasp, ran around the back of the building, and entered a hallway on the first floor. Maurice ran after him, and Maurice and Pee Wee proceeded to beat the victim. Davis maintains that he "kept watch" from about two feet away to make sure no one saw what was going on. After Maurice Thomas and Pee Wee finished the beating, the victim was lying face down and unconscious. Davis then grabbed him by the back of his pants and shirt and threw him into a dumpster.
Samara Sadler, the sister of the victim, testified for the defense. She testified that she observed the victim come out of the building with Campbell and Maurice Thomas and that Campbell and Thomas began hitting the victim. She stated that she knew both Campbell and Thomas from the neighborhood. Thereafter, she testified that the group ran around the building and she followed them. When she got there, she observed the victim lying on the ground and unconscious. She also observed that two or three people were around the victim, but she did not know if one of them was Davis. She testified that she knew Davis from the neighborhood, but that she did not see Davis strike the victim at any time.
During its closing argument, the State argued that it was not necessary for it prove that Davis intended to kill the victim, but only that Davis or one for whom he was accountablecombined to do an unlawful act, such as commit an aggravated battery, and that the victim was killed by one of the parties committing that act. In other words, the State argued that because Davis was a part of the aggravated battery, he was legally responsible for the victim's death. The jury returned a verdict finding Davis guilty of first degree murder and the Circuit Court sentenced him to 25 years in prison.
Davis appealed his conviction and sentence to the Illinois Appellate Court arguing that: (1) his case should be remanded for a hearing to analyze the State's peremptory challenge of an African-American juror under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); and (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury. On June 29, 2007, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed Davis' conviction and sentence. Davis then filed a petition for leave to appeal ("PLA") to the Supreme Court of Illinois arguing both his jury instruction issue and Batson claim. The Supreme Court of Illinois allowed Davis' PLA on November 29, 2007. On November 20, 2008, the Supreme Court of Illinois remanded Davis' case to the trial court to conduct a Batson hearing. See People v. Davis, 231 Ill.2d 349, 369, 326 Ill.Dec. 21, 899 N.E.2d 238 (2008). After the trial court completed the Batson hearing on remand and concluded that Davis had failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in use of peremptory challenges, the Supreme Court of Illinois considered both the Batson claim and the jury instruction issue, affirming the judgment of the Illinois Appellate Court that affirmed Davis' conviction and sentence. See People v. Davis, 233 Ill.2d 244, 275, 909 N.E.2d 766, 783, 330 Ill. Dec. 744, 761 (2009).
On October 27, 2009, Davis filed a post-conviction petition pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/122-1, et seq., in the Circuit Court of Cook County arguing that his trial counsel had been constitutionally ineffective. More specifically, Davis argued that trial counsel refused the State's plea offer made just before jury selection without first conveying the offer to him. On December 16, 2009, the Circuit Court dismissed Davis' post-conviction petition as frivolous and patently without merit because Davis had failed to provided sufficient evidentiary support for his claim that his trial counsel failed to disclose the plea offer.
Davis appealed the Circuit Court's decision to the Illinois Appellate Court arguing ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On December 28, 2011, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the Circuit Court's dismissal of Davis' post-conviction petition. The Illinois Appellate Court concluded that Davis had failed to provide sufficient evidentiary support for his claim that counsel had been ineffective for failing to convey a plea offer under the procedural requirements of the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 725 ILCS 5/122-2.
Thereafter, Davis filed a post-conviction PLA in the Supreme Court of Illinois reiterating his argument that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to convey a plea offer. On March 28, 2012, the Supreme Court of Illinois denied Davis' PLA. Davis also moved for leave to file a motion to reconsider the denial of his PLA that the Supreme Court of Illinois denied on April 25, 2012.
On August 9, 2012, Davis filed the present 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Construing his pro se allegations liberally, see Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 864-65 (7th Cir. 2012), Davis brings the following habeas claims: (1) that his trial counsel wasconstitutionally ineffective for failing to inform him of a plea offer that the State made the first day of trial; and (2) the State violated his due process rights when the prosecutor argued in closing arguments that a first degree murder verdict would be appropriate based on the State's proof that Davis committed aggravated battery against the victim.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), the Court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court's decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of federal law clearly established by the Supreme Court. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-03, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); Resendez v. Smith, 692 F.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 2012). In Williams, the Supreme Court explained that a state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court law "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law" or "if the state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to ours." Williams, 529 U.S. at 405.
Under the "unreasonable application" prong of the AEDPA standard, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate that although the state court identified the correct legal rule, it...
To continue reading
Request your trial