United States v. 100 ACRES OF LAND, MARIN CTY., CAL., 26483
Decision Date | 06 December 1972 |
Docket Number | 26531.,No. 26483,26483 |
Citation | 468 F.2d 1261 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. 100 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, IN MARIN COUNTY, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and Drake's Beach Estates, Inc., a corporation, et al., Appellees, Cross-Appellants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Carl Strass (argued), Raymond N. Zagone, Kent Frizzell, Attys., Shiro Kashiwa, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D.C., James L. Browning, Jr., U.S. Atty., Robert H. Hamblin, Asst. U.S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for appellant, cross-appellee.
Jess S. Jackson, Jr. (argued), Burlingame, Cal., Edward D. Landels (argued), Earl M. Ripley, of Landels Ripley, Gregory & Diamond, San Francisco, Cal., Robert S. Webber, Burlingame, Cal., E. Warren McGuire, County Counsel, San Rafael, Cal., for appellees, cross-appellants.
Before BROWNING and WRIGHT, Circuit Judges, and TAYLOR*, District Judge.
This is a condemnation action involving a small peninsula of sandy real estate on the coast of Marin County, California, commonly known as Limantour Spit, some 45 miles north of the city of San Francisco on the Pacific Coast. Appellee (Drake's Beach) claims title through a patent of the United States to Andrew Randall issued June 4, 1860. The Government contends that the land in question was not included in the patent. These proceedings had their inception when the United States purchased from Drake's Beach some 850 acres adjacent to this parcel of land for the Point Reyes National Seashore Project. As a part of that purchase agreement the United States agreed to institute this condemnation proceeding against the parcel in question which the United States claimed it owned. Pursuant to the condemnation proceedings, the parcel of land was taken by the Government on October 23, 1963.
The trial of the issues was bifurcated, the issue as to title was tried to the court, without a jury, and subsequent to the court's finding title in Drake's Beach, the issue of just compensation for the taking was tried to the court and a jury which lasted about 12 weeks. The jury returned a verdict for $700,000 as the just compensation which was considerably more than the Government's evidence of value and substantially less than what Drake's Beach contended it should have as just compensation.
The final judgment was entered on May 7, 1970, from which the Government appealed and Drake's Beach cross-appealed. The principal issues presented by the Government on its appeal relate to the question of title to the property being condemned and the admissibility of the evidence introduced on behalf of Drake's Beach in determining market value of the property taken. The issues raised by Drake's Beach by its cross-appeal relate to the denial of its motion for interest at the prevailing rate rather than the 6% awarded in the judgment; the denial of Drake's Beach's motion for just compensation to include expenses and disbursements necessarily incurred in defending its title, surveying and determining the size and dimensions of the land taken and establishing value; and the refusal of the trial court to promptly order an increase of the deposit from $1.00 to the amount of the judgment plus interest.
We shall first consider the issue raised in regard to title and ownership of the property condemned.
The Government concedes that Drake's Beach is the successor in interest of the patentee, Andrew Randall, and that the shore line (mean high tide line) of Tomales Bay, the Pacific Ocean and Limantour Bay constituted the northerly and westerly boundaries of the land patented. The patent was issued pursuant to a decree confirming a Mexican grant to one Antonio Maria Osio. This decree is incorporated in the patent and recites that the land title is the same as that formerly granted to Osio and is bounded on one side by the Estero of Tomales, on two sides by the Pacific Ocean, and on the fourth side by land known as the Ranches of James Richard Perry and Rafel Garcia.
Following the decree of confirmation on December 28, 1857, a survey was made of the land confirmed. The surveyor ran a meander line along the shores of Tomales Bay, Limantour Bay and the Pacific Ocean. A description of the land in accordance with this survey is included in the patent and a plat thereof attached to the patent. When the surveyor reached a point part way up the Limantour Bay side of the Spit, he made a traverse . This line has been referred to in these proceedings as "the 415 line". The effect of this course No. 415 was that the balance of the Spit lay outside the traverse lines constituting the courses and distances of the meander line and this is what gave rise to this controversy.
On this appeal the Government concedes that the lines drawn by the surveyor were meander lines along the shores of Limantour Bay and the Pacific Ocean and that under well established principles, the actual shore line and not the traverse lines of the survey constitutes the boundary of the land patented.1 Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 11 S.Ct. 808, 35 L.Ed. 428 (1891); Thomas B. Bishop Co. v. Santa Barbara County, 96 F.2d 198 (9th Cir.1938), cert. den. 305 U.S. 623, 59 S.Ct. 84, 83 L.Ed. 398 (1938).
The Government concedes that if the portion of the Spit in question was at the time of the survey and patent a continuation of the peninsula lying above mean high tide, then Drake's Beach owns it, but if below mean high tide, then it was an island and not within the survey and patent.
In regard to the question of title to that portion of the Spit, the only issue to be resolved by this court is whether the findings of the trial court are supported by the evidence. The trial court found as follows:
In determining the question of title to the parcel of land in question, the crucial issue before the court is whether the low lying Limantour Spit was above the mean high tide line in 1858, the time of the survey on which the patent was based. It appears to be the Government's theory that in 1858, although Limantour Spit may have existed at low tide, it was only two islands at mean high tide and therefore the patent only granted to Randall the land to the seashore and the islands remained the property of the United States. Drake's Beach contends, and the trial court found, that the entire spit existed above the mean high tide line in 1858.
We have carefully considered the evidence in the record on which the respective parties rely, both documentary and otherwise, in regard to the title issue and believe there is ample evidence to support the findings and conclusions of the trial court on this issue. Certainly the findings and conclusions are not clearly erroneous.
Having resolved the question of title, we now turn to the evidentiary issues raised by the Government. The precise questions presented here are whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Drake's Beach to introduce evidence of lot sales and development costs in support of its "developer's residual approach" theory for the purpose of determining the fair market value of the property taken; and whether the court erred when it admitted evidence as to probabilities of integrated use of the condemned land with state-owned tidelands.
This court in United States v. 55.22 Acres of Land, etc., Yakima County, Wash., 411 F.2d 432, 434 (9th Cir.1969) announced the rule in regard to the admissibility of evidence as follows:
"The determination of that question referring to the admissibility of evidence calls for an exercise of a sound discretion by the trial court, and the ruling thereon is reviewable only for abuse of discretion.
In a condemnation proceeding, such as we have here, the desired result is to see that the landowner is put in as good a position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been taken. Seaboard Airline Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304, 43 S.Ct. 354, 67 L.Ed. 664 (1923). The Supreme Court of the United States has laid down broad guidelines for the purpose of achieving this desired result. In United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373, 374, 63 S.Ct. 276, 280, 87 L.Ed. 336 (1943), the Court state...
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