United States v. 2014 Chevrolet Corvette Coupe
Decision Date | 03 November 2020 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-CV-4027-AT |
Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. 2014 CHEVROLET CORVETTE COUPE, VIN 1G1YH2D7XE5102360, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v.
2014 CHEVROLET CORVETTE COUPE, VIN 1G1YH2D7XE5102360, et al., Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-CV-4027-AT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION
November 3, 2020
ORDER AND OPINION
This civil forfeiture case is before the Court on Plaintiff United States and Claimants Julio and Daniel Martinez's (collectively, the "Parties") cross motions for summary judgment. [Docs. 60, 61]. The Court originally stayed this matter pending the resolution of criminal proceedings in the Northern District of Illinois, United States v. Delvalle, et al., No. 1:16-CR-197 (N.D. Ill. 2016). (Doc. 12). The Court lifted the stay on May 8, 2018 after the Government reported that Claimant Julio Martinez (referred to Julio) pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin. (Docs. 13, 14). After Claimant Alicia Farah withdrew her claim to the Defendant Mazda and Defendant 2012 BMW, the Court entered a judgment of forfeiture as to those Defendants (Docs. 32, 33). The Parties conducted discovery as to the remaining
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11 Defendant vehicles, and filed cross motions for summary judgment on August 22, 2019.
I. Legal Standard
The Court must grant summary judgment if the record shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual issue is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual issue is material if resolving the factual issue might change the suit's outcome under the governing law. Id. The motion should be granted only if no rational fact finder could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 249.
When ruling on the motion, the Court must view all the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all factual disputes in the non-moving party's favor. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). The moving party need not positively disprove the opponent's case; rather, the moving party must establish the lack of evidentiary support for the non-moving party's position. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the moving party meets this initial burden, in order to survive summary judgment, the non-moving party must then present competent evidence beyond the pleadings to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324-26. The essential question is "whether the evidence presents a
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sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52.
The standard of review for cross-motions for summary judgment does not differ from the standard applied when only one party files a motion, but simply requires a determination of whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on the facts that are not disputed. Am. Bankers Ins. Group v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005). The Court must consider each motion on its own merits, resolving all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration. Id. The Eleventh Circuit has explained that "[c]ross-motions for summary judgment will not, in themselves, warrant the court in granting summary judgment unless one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not genuinely disputed." United States v. Oakley, 744 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1984). Cross-motions may, however, be probative of the absence of a factual dispute where they reflect general agreement by the parties as to the controlling legal theories and material facts. Id. at 1555-56.
II. Factual Background
Keeping in mind that when deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, the Court provides the following statement of facts. See Optimum Techs., Inc. v. Henkel Consumer Adhesives,
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Inc., 496 F.3d 1231, 1241 (11th Cir. 2007) (observing that, in connection with summary judgment, court must review all facts and inferences in light most favorable to non-moving party). This statement does not represent actual findings of fact. Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 925 n.3 (11th Cir. 2000) ("We . . . have repeatedly stressed that the 'facts', as accepted at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, may not be the 'actual' facts of the case."). Instead, the Court has provided the statement simply to place the Court's legal analysis in the context of this particular case or controversy.
The Court notes that the Parties have made the process of compiling the factual background of this case difficult. The Parties both failed to follow the Court's procedure in its Standing Order requiring responses to Statements of Undisputed and Material Facts to restate the fact before setting forth the response. (Doc. 2 at 23). Claimants have also unhelpfully objected to every single one of the Government's Statements, including those based on admissions in Claimants' Answer.
Furthermore, the Parties have presented a bevy of background information to the Court ranging from a period of over 30 years, and have done so in a piecemeal, non-chronological way. As such, the Court has found it helpful to place the events on a timeline. The Court is aware that Claimants have raised several objections to the admissibility of many of these events. The Court's placement of events on the timeline does not constitute a finding admitting the underlying evidence, but is solely for clarity and convenience.
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DATE | EVENT | RECORD |
1983 | While working as a runner at the Chicago Board of Trade, Claimant Julio receives $1.8 million from six stockbrokers in exchange for not cooperating with the federal government's Operation Closing Bell investigation into stock market fraud. | (USA's MSJ Ex. 8-2, Transcript of Interview at 74:13-17, 76:1-5, 77:12-14, Doc. 60-10). |
1986 | Claimant Julio was convicted of delivering drugs in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. | (Martinez, Sr. Obj. to PSR, USA's MSJ Ex. 6, Doc. 60-8; 1986 Conviction, USA's MSJ Ex. 30, Doc. 60-32). |
1988 | Claimant Julio was released from prison, works as a spray painter for two years. | (Ex. 8-2 at 80:1-4; Obj. to PSR at 2-3, Doc. 60-8. |
1990 | Claimant Julio opens a Dollar Store in Illinois. Eventually opens a second location. | Ex. 8-2 at 80:1-4; Obj. to PSR at 2-3, Doc. 60-8. |
1995- 1996 | Claimant Julio sells the Dollar Stores, works for two years for First Metropolitan Mortgage | Id. |
1996- 2000 | Claimant Julio opens his own mortgage company, M&R Mortgage Solutions. | Ex. 8-2 at 80:1-4; Obj. to PSR at 2-3, Doc. 60-8; Ex. 8-2 at 48:7-20. |
2009 | Claimant Julio claims unemployment from state of Illinois. | Ex. 8-2 at 48:2-6. |
Jan. 2010 | Claimant Julio contends he sold a building he owned in Chicago netting $880,000. | Ex. 8-2 at 29:14-15, 71:18-19. |
Feb. 2010 | Claimant Julio contends he sold a lot he owned netting $195,000. | Ex. 8-2 at 29:15-20, 71:18-19. |
Aug. 2010 | Tax returns show Claimant Julio sold real property resulting in a capital gain of $91,309. | Claimant's Discovery Responses, USA.'s Ex. 26, Doc. 60-28. |
Oct. 2010 | HUD-1 shows that Claimant sold Maplewood property in Chicago with $0 cash to seller. | Id. |
2010 | Claimant Julio moves to Atlanta, at some point sets up Rada Designz, a company that imports jeans from Colombia. | Ex. 8-2 at 21:9-26:10, 47:19-24. |
2010- 2015 | Per Edwin DelValle's guilty plea, during this period, DelValle bought cocaine and heroin from Claimaint Julio. DelValle | DelValle Plea Agreement, USA.'s Ex. 12 at 3, Doc. 60-14. |
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stated that he bought about seven kilograms of cocaine and 300 grams of heroin from Claimant Julio. | ||
Feb. 2011 | Claimant Julio put $40,000 down payment towards purchasing Rivermark Court property, titled in Ziad Farah's name. | USA's Ex. 20, Ex. 8-2 34:25-36:2, 70:25-71:8. |
Apr. 2012 | Claimant Julio purchases Grassy Trace property for $71,000. | USA's Ex. 19; Ex. 8-2 at 92:10-93:8. |
Feb. 2012 | Claimant Julio sold one or more real properties resulting in a capital gain of $117,120. HUD-1 statement indicates Claimant sold N. Albany Ave property in Chicago with cash to seller of $309,227.57 | Ex. 26. |
Dec. 2012 | Claimant Julio purchases Foxxie Boutique in Lawrenceville for $144,200. At some point invested $38,000 into it. | USA's Ex. 17; Ex 8-2 at 42:18-43:6. |
Late 2013 to Feb. 2015 | Per his plea (see below) Claimant Julio admits that he conspired to possess heroin and cocaine with intent to distribute during this time. | Julio Martinez, Sr. Plea Declaration, USA's MSJ Ex. 2, Doc. 60-4. |
Nov. 2014 | Claimant Julio purchases Azalea Drive property for $295,050. Spent approx. $45k on improvements. | Ex. 18, Ex. 8-2 at 37:5-23, 37:11-17. |
Feb. 14, 2015 | Agents allegedly observe Claimant Julio and Ziad Farah put bags containing 2.2 kilograms of heroin and $128,460 in currency into a parked Audi. | Vuong Decl., Ex. 8. |
Nov. 2016 | Grand jury in N.D. Ill. indicts Claimant Julio, DelValle, and others for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin | United States v. Delvalle et al., No. 1:16-cr-197 (N.D. Ill 2016). |
July 2017 | Claimant Julio enters a plea of guilty to conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine and heroin. | Julio Martinez, Sr. Plea Declaration, USA's MSJ Ex. 2, Doc. 60-4. |
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On June 23, 2015, DEA and IRS agents arrested Claimant Julio pursuant to a State of Georgia arrest warrant for narcotics trafficking. (Vuong Decl., USA's Ex. 8 ¶ 13.) Several of the Defendant Vehicles were seized at his residence. (Id.) Claimant Julio was initially interviewed by agents at his residence, but denied...
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