United States v. 2600 State Drugs, 11654.
Decision Date | 08 October 1956 |
Docket Number | No. 11654.,11654. |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 2600 STATE DRUGS, Inc., Edward Kravetz, Melburn Holtzman and Raymond Holtzman, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Bernard H. Sokol, Chicago, Ill., for appellants.
Robert Tieken, U. S. Atty., Albert F. Manion and John Peter Lulinski, Asst. U. S. Attys., Chicago, Ill., of counsel, for appellee.
Before DUFFY, Chief Judge, and LINDLEY and SWAIM, Circuit Judges.
Writ of Certiorari Denied October 8, 1956. See 77 S.Ct. 68.
The defendant, 2600 State Drugs, Inc., and the individual defendants, Edward Kravetz, Melburn Holtzman and Raymond Holtzman, all of whom were either officers or employees of the defendant drug corporation, were charged in a criminal information with having sold, without a prescription, certain drugs in violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq. In a trial before the District Court all of the defendants were found guilty of violating the Act.
The principal question presented by this appeal is whether or not those sections of the Federal Food and Drug Act which prohibit the sale of dangerous drugs without a prescription are sufficiently definite to give reasonable notice to persons bound by the proscriptions of the Act and subject to its penalties.
The applicable parts of Section 331 of 21 U.S.C.A. provide:
Section 353 of 21 U.S.C.A., concerning prescriptions by physicians, prescription requirements and the misbranding of drugs provides:
Section 355 of 21 U.S.C.A., concerning new drugs and the necessity of effective application, provides:
At the beginning of the trial of this case the parties stipulated that the drugs which the defendants were accused of dispensing without a prescription were drugs within the meaning of 21 U.S.C.A. § 353(b) (1) (B), as amended, and which prior to January 16, 1954, were shipped in interstate commerce into the State of Illinois and were held in the manufacturer's original labeled bottle, the label upon which included the statement, "Caution: Federal Law Prohibits Dispensing Without Prescription."
In this case the evidence in the record furnished a sufficient basis for the finding of the trial court that the drugs in question could be safely used only under the direction and supervision of a physician and that the defendants dispensed said drugs without prescriptions, as charged in the information.
Although admitting that the drugs here in question had been shipped in interstate commerce, that the container carried a label stating that federal law prohibited the sale of the drugs without a prescription, and that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the defendants had made sales of such drugs without prescriptions, the defendants insist that the language of the statute is so vague, uncertain and indefinite as to fall short of the constitutional requirements of due process of law. On this point the defendants contend that the statute here in question is so vague and indefinite "that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application," and that, therefore, the statute is too vague, indefinite and ambiguous to constitute a legal basis for a criminal charge. We think the provisions of this Act are sufficiently definite to support a criminal charge for the violation of the Act.
In Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 72 S.Ct. 329, 330, 96 L.Ed. 367, the Court was considering the validity of a regulation promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission which provided that drivers of motor vehicles transporting certain explosives and poisonous gases should "`avoid, so far as practicable, and, where feasible, by pre-arrangement of routes, driving into or through congested throughfares, places where crowds are assembled, street car tracks, tunnels, viaducts, and dangerous crossings.'" In its opinion in that case the Court said, 342 U.S. at page 340, 72 S.Ct. at page 330:
In Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 52 S.Ct. 581, 582, 76 L.Ed. 1167, the Court was considering a Texas statute which prohibited the carriage of overweight and oversize loads by commercial carriers but which permitted the granting by the State Highway Department of permits, for ninety days, for the carrying of such loads "as cannot be reasonably dismantled". The statute provided further that these loads were to be carried "by the shortest practicable route." The Court there held, 286 U.S. at page 393, 52 S.Ct. at page 587, that the phrase, "shortest practicable route", was not an expression too vague to be understood. The Court explained:
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