United States v. Alamo-Gutierrez, EP-18-CR-3125-PRM
| Decision Date | 15 January 2019 |
| Docket Number | EP-18-CR-3125-PRM |
| Citation | 368 F.Supp.3d 1093 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. Jesus Gerardo ALAMO-GUTIERREZ, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Miguel Rafael Acosta, U.S. Attorney's Office, El Paso, TX, for United States of America.
Andrew Lafayette Steed, Jose F. Moncayo, Federal Public Defender, El Paso, TX, for Jesus Gerardo Alamo-Gutierrez
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
On this day, the Court considered Defendant Jesus Gerardo Alamo-Gutierrez's [hereinafter "Defendant"] "Motion to Suppress" (ECF No. 21), filed on November 9, 2018; the Government's "Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress" (ECF No. 29) [hereinafter "Response"], filed on November 29, 2018; and Defendant's "Reply to Government's Response" (ECF No. 32) [hereinafter "Reply"], filed on December 10, 2018, in the above-captioned cause. After due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that Defendant's Motion to Suppress should be granted in part and denied in part, for the reasons that follow.
On August 28, 2018, United States Border Patrol Agent Young stopped Defendant after the agent observed that Defendant was driving erratically. Mot. to Suppress 1–2. Prior to this traffic stop, Agent Young had been approached by a citizen who informed Agent Young that a motorist on the Border Highway was driving dangerously. Id. at 1. According to the Government, Agent Young "located the vehicle in question and observed the vehicle making several hazardous lane changes and hitting a guardrail." Resp. 1. Agent Young then called the El Paso Police Department to request assistance and conducted a traffic stop. Id.
Agent Young detained Defendant until the El Paso police arrived, and the El Paso police officer arrested Defendant under suspicion of driving while intoxicated. Mot. to Suppress 1–2. After Defendant was arrested, Agent Young conducted an immigration record check and discovered prior immigration offenses and removals. Id. at 2. Thereafter, Defendant pled guilty to driving while intoxicated and was sentenced to fifty days of confinement. Resp. 2. Based upon Agent Young's discovery of Defendant's immigration history and removals, an immigration detainer was placed on Defendant while he was incarcerated at the El Paso County Detention Facility. Id.
On October 3, 2018, Defendant was released from the El Paso County Detention Facility to the custody of the United States Border Patrol at the Paso Del Norte Border Patrol Processing Center. Id. At the Paso Del Norte Center, Border Patrol Agent Hernandez obtained information from Defendant regarding his citizenship and immigration status. Mot. to Suppress 2. Defendant admitted that he is not a citizen and does not have any documents allowing him to remain in the United States legally. Id. Thereafter, an Agent used Defendant's biometric information1 to determine Defendant's prior immigration history. Id. After Defendant had revealed his immigration status and his biometric data was collected, a Border Patrol agent read Defendant his Miranda rights. Id. Defendant thereupon invoked his right to counsel. Id. On October 24, 2018, Defendant was charged with illegal reentry, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Indictment, ECF No. 11.
Defendant filed his Motion to Suppress on November 9, 2018. Therein, Defendant avers that Agent Young's welfare stop on August 28 violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 3. Specifically, according to Defendant, (1) Agent Young lacked the authority to conduct the traffic stop, (2) Defendant was detained beyond the scope of the welfare check, and (3) after El Paso police arrived, Agent Young conducted an unlawful immigration record search. Id. at 3–5. Based on these alleged Fourth Amendment violations, Defendant asserts that "all evidence" stemming from the traffic stop must suppressed. Id. at 5.
Further, Defendant contends that Agents at the Paso Del Norte Center violated the Fifth Amendment on October 3, 2018, by questioning Defendant about his immigration history and collecting his biometric data before reading Defendant his Miranda rights. Id. at 6. Accordingly, Defendant believes that the following evidence should be suppressed: Defendant's statements concerning his identity and nationality, fingerprints, A-file, and criminal and immigration history. Id. at 7.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "A person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the government's action under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, ‘by means of physical force or show of authority,’ terminates or restrains his freedom of movement ‘through means intentionally applied.’ " Brendlin v. California , 551 U.S. 249, 254, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (emphasis removed) (quoting Florida v. Bostick , 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) ; Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo , 489 U.S. 593, 597, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989) ; Terry v. Ohio , 329 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ).
"For a traffic stop to be justified at its inception, an officer must have an objectively reasonable suspicion that some sort of illegal activity, such as a traffic violation, occurred, or is about to occur, before stopping the vehicle." United States v. Lopez-Moreno , 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005) ; see also United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (citing United States v. Sokolow , 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) ). In order to then arrest the defendant, "a warrantless arrest must be based on probable cause." United States v. Zavala , 541 F.3d 562, 575 (5th Cir. 2008). "Probable cause to arrest exists when facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officer would be sufficient to cause an officer of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed." United States v. Carrillo-Morales , 27 F.3d 1054, 1062 (5th Cir. 1994). "Although more than mere ‘reasonable suspicion’ is required, the arresting officer need not have in hand evidence sufficient to convict." Passman v. Blackburn , 652 F.2d 559, 564–65 (5th Cir. 1981).
In Miranda v. Arizona , the Supreme Court "established that the prosecution may not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." United States v. Bennett , 626 F.2d 1309, 1311 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) ). "The safeguards of Miranda v. Arizona ... are well-established," United States v. Payne , 954 F.2d 199, 201 (4th Cir. 1992), and include "the now famous Miranda rights," Bennett , 626 F.2d at 1311. "[A] practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect ... amounts to interrogation."
Rhode Island v. Innis , 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). However, because "the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Id. at 301–02, 100 S.Ct. 1682.
"When [law enforcement officers] forego legal means of investigation simply in order to obtain evidence in violation of a suspect's constitutional rights, the need to deter is paramount and requires application of the exclusionary rule." United States v. Cherry , 759 F.2d 1196, 1206 (5th Cir. 1985). "The exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits the introduction at trial of not only primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but also evidence discovered later that is derivative of an illegality, or constitutes ‘fruit of a poisonous tree.’ " United States v. Jackson , 596 F.3d 236, 241 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Grosenheider , 200 F.3d 321, 327 (5th Cir. 2000) ) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"The primary limit on this rule is that otherwise suppressible evidence will still be admitted if the connection between the alleged illegality and the acquisition of the evidence is ‘so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.’ " Id. (quoting Grosenheider , 200 F.3d at 327 ). "One example of this ‘attenuation’ limit is known as the inevitable discovery doctrine, which renders the exclusionary rule inapplicable to otherwise suppressible evidence if that evidence would inevitably have been discovered by lawful means." Id. "For the inevitable discovery exception to apply, ‘the alternate means of obtaining the evidence must at least be in existence and, at least to some degree, imminent, if yet unrealized.’ " Zavala , 541 F.3d at 580 (quoting Cherry , 759 F.2d at 1205 n.10 ). The Government must establish a reasonable probability that evidence would have inevitably been discovered by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Lamas , 930 F.2d 1099, 1102 (1991).
First, the Court considers whether Agent Young violated Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights during the August 28, 2018, traffic stop. Defendant does not contest that reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed at the time of the arrest. Rather, Defendant challenges the agent's authority to conduct a traffic stop as well as the scope of the stop. Defendant seeks to suppress evidence obtained as a result of this stop as fruit of the poisonous tree. Mot. to Suppress 3. The Court concludes that whether the traffic stop exceeded the scope of...
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