United States v. Aldridge

• Decision Date: 20 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–1344.,11–1344.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Dale Wayne ALDRIDGE, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

664 F.3d 705

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,

v.Dale Wayne ALDRIDGE, Appellant.

No. 11–1344.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Sept. 22, 2011.Filed: Dec. 15, 2011.Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Jan. 20, 2012.

Timothy Ross–Boon, argued, AFPD, Des Moines, IA, for appellant.

Nicholas A. Klinefeldt, argued, AUSA, Des Moines, IA, appellee.

Before MELLOY, SMITH, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Dale Wayne Aldridge of conspiring to distribute 500 grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. The district court ¹ sentenced him to life imprisonment. Aldridge appeals, asserting (1) error in denying his motions to suppress, (2) error in admitting evidence of prior drug convictions, (3) insufficiency of the evidence, and (4) violation of the Eighth Amendment. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

I.

In early 2010, a confidential informant told police that Annquinette Lynn Klaus was distributing meth. Police put a GPS device on her vehicle and made four controlled buys from her. Then, police (with a search warrant) found meth, syringes, and other paraphernalia at her house. Police arrested Klaus for distributing meth. She identified Aldridge and another person, Joann Burns Carter, as two of her suppliers. Police used Klaus for a controlled buy from Carter, who also named Aldridge as a supplier.

Based on this information and after further investigation, two Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents decided to talk to Aldridge. They contacted Aldridge's probation officer and requested she contrive a meeting between them at the county courthouse. (Aldridge was required to follow his probation officer's orders to report.) Aldridge had already seen his probation officer that day, but she called and directed him to return. She did not mention the agents. Aldridge entered the courthouse and headed downstairs to the probation office and sheriff's department. The agents stopped Aldridge at the bottom of the stairs, introduced themselves, and asked to talk with him. He agreed to speak with them. The agents led Aldridge into the interrogation room inside the sheriff's office. They questioned him about his meth activities. The agents did not read him his Miranda rights. They told him he was not under arrest and was free to go at any time. They asked him to cooperate and help pursue his drug suppliers. At one point, the agents told him they had his fingerprint on a bag of meth, which was not true. He admitted distributing meth to Klaus and Carter and to two other people, Norman Miner and Christine Dunkin. Aldridge tried two unsuccessful calls to his supplier. He also agreed to a search of his person and house that afternoon, and drove himself and one agent there. The search did not produce any money or drugs. Aldridge returned with the agents to the courthouse and consented to a pat-down search. In his wallet, the agents found what they thought were “drug notes” detailing who had paid and who owed money. Aldridge told officers he was unsure of the notes' purpose and was unable to identify the notations. He agreed to continue to cooperate and walked out of the courthouse at the end of the interview.

Three days later, Aldridge, the two DEA agents, and two city officers met in the same room at the courthouse.² The agents again said he was free to leave and not under arrest. Aldridge told them about a second supplier, who gave him half pounds of meth every Monday for the last five or six months. At the end of the meeting, Aldridge agreed to record a conversation between himself and this supplier. However, when next contacted, he stopped cooperating. Police then arrested him.

Before trial, Aldridge recanted his confessions and moved to suppress them under Miranda and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. After a hearing, the court denied the motions.

At trial, Klaus, Carter, Miner, and Dunkin testified they received meth from Aldridge. The agents testified to Aldridge's confessions. Also admitted were the drugs purchased from Carter during the controlled buys, and evidence of Aldridge's four felony drug convictions. Several witnesses testified for Aldridge about his character, ability as a carpenter, and that they had not seen him using or dealing drugs.

The jury convicted Aldridge of conspiracy to distribute meth. He was sentenced to the statutory minimum of life imprisonment based on two prior felony convictions.

II.

A.

Aldridge argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confessions and the resulting evidence. He contends that the agents violated his Fifth Amendment rights by not giving him Miranda warnings during their two meetings. Aldridge further asserts that the use of his confessions violated the Due Process Clause because they were obtained through improper coercion and deception.

This court reviews de novo the legal determinations in the denial of a motion to suppress, and reviews the underlying factual determinations for clear error. United States v. Nguyen, 608 F.3d 368, 374 (8th Cir.2010).

This court first reviews Aldridge's challenges to the district court's factual findings: “Defendant was told that he was free to leave at any time and that he did not have to answer any questions, in addition to being told that he was not under arrest,” and “Defendant's mobility was unimpeded by law enforcement.” Aldridge argues that the evidence does not establish these facts, relying mostly on his own testimony. He believes he was “not free to leave the area, nor did he have the freedom to get to the door should he have tried to leave.” The district court found that the men were spread around the table, the door was sometimes open, and Aldridge was free to move if he wanted. The district court resolved the conflicting testimony, and its factual findings on custody are not clearly erroneous. This case is not like United States v. Ollie, where this court found “no evidence” whether the police restrained Ollie's freedom of movement. 442 F.3d 1135, 1138 (8th Cir.2006).

Second, the district court found, “Defendant acquiesced to questioning.” Aldridge disagrees, claiming to be very uncooperative, taking a long time to respond to the agents' questions, refusing to explain the drug notes found on him, and declining to name his suppliers. There was, however, much contrary evidence, as summarized by the district court: “Defendant agreed to attempt to call his suppliers and to set up a controlled purchase of methamphetamine; consented to the search of his home, his vehicle, and his person; and provided incriminating information regarding his drug distribution operation.” The district court did not clearly err in finding that Aldridge acquiesced to questioning.

As to the district court's legal determination on custody, this court reviews de novo the conclusion that Aldridge was not in custody. Miranda warnings are required when a suspect is interrogated while in custody. Nguyen, 608 F.3d at 374, citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Aldridge was undoubtedly interrogated, as “interrogation occurs when a law enforcement officer engages in ‘either express questioning or its functional equivalent.’ ” United States v. Hernandez–Mendoza, 600 F.3d 971, 976–77 (8th Cir.2010), quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). The issue is whether Aldridge was in custody. Custody depends on the totality of the circumstances; this court considers six factors:

(1) whether the suspect was informed at the time of questioning that the questioning was voluntary, that the suspect was free to leave or request the officers to do so, or that the suspect was not considered under arrest; (2) whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of movement during questioning; (3) whether the suspect initiated contact with authorities or voluntarily acquiesced to official requests to respond to questions; (4) whether strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems were employed during questioning; (5) whether the atmosphere of the questioning was police-dominated; or, (6) whether the suspect was placed under arrest at the termination of the questioning.

United States v. Carlson, 613 F.3d 813, 817 (8th Cir.2010), citing United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1349 (8th Cir.1990). The ultimate test is whether a reasonable person in that position would have felt free to end the interview. Ollie, 442 F.3d at 1137.

Aldridge relies on Ollie to argue that he was in custody during the first interview. In that case, the defendant (a convicted felon) was ordered by his parole officer to meet police to discuss the ownership of a weapon found in his home. The defendant met with an officer in a police station, was not Mirandized, eventually confessed, and was convicted. Id. at 1136–37. Based on the first five factors above, this court concluded that the defendant was in custody. First, the officers told him he was not under arrest, but never told him he was free to leave. This court noted that “an explicit assertion that the person may end the encounter is stronger medicine” than advising someone he or she is not under arrest. Id. at 1138. As noted above, this court found no evidence on the second factor, unrestrained freedom of movement. Regarding the third factor—voluntary acquiescence—the court found that Ollie did not acquiesce in the questioning, because he was there only at his parole officer's order (which he had to follow). Fourth, the police officers used almost the same deceptive tactics as in this case (falsely implying they had Ollie's fingerprints on the weapon). This court noted that this type of deception was irrelevant to the question of custody. Finally, the court found a police-dominated atmosphere. Id. at 1139.

This case is distinguishable from Ollie. The Ollie court identified as the tipping...