United States v. Alfaro

• Decision Date: 26 April 2022
• Docket Number: 4:12-CR-252(1)
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MIGUEL ANGEL ALFARO
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MIGUEL ANGEL ALFARO

No. 4:12-CR-252(1)

United States District Court, E.D. Texas

April 26, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MARCIA A. CRONE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the court is Defendant Miguel Angel Alfaro's (“Alfaro”) pro se Motion for Hardship Credit for Hard Time Served (#805), wherein he requests the court to grant him two days of sentence credit for every one day he has served while “locked-down” due to Coronovirus Disease 19 (“COVID-19”). Having considered the motion, the record, and the applicable law the court is of the opinion that Alfaro's motion should be denied.

I. Background

On August 13, 2013, Alfaro was named in a single-count Information, charging him with Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. On August 14, 2013, Alfaro pleaded guilty to Count One of the Information. On April 14 2014, the court sentenced him to 200 months' imprisonment, to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release. On May 20, 2014, Alfaro filed a notice of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which the court dismissed.

On July 30, 2021, Alfaro filed the instant motion for Hardship Credit for Hard Time Served (#805), wherein he alleges that Correctional Institution Giles W. Dalby (“CI Giles W. Dalby”), located in Post, Texas, is “a hard time detention facility” because of lock-down measures imposed to prevent the spread of COVID-19.^[1] Specifically, Alfaro claims the following lock-down measures at CI Giles W. Dalby violate prisoners' rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution:

1. [CI] Giles W. Dalby is currently operating a communal segregation prison limiting liberty interest[s] afforded to the inmates in general population.

2. The access to recreational services is limited to only [sic] times per week and at times less than one hour each time. At times several days can pass without any recreation at all making the facility intolerable.

3. Dietary needs of inmates are below federal prison standards and “meals” can be “cruel.” Inmates are having to use discolored and brown water from sinks located in the cells to drink due to long lockdown hours which is tolerable for one or two days but cruel and unusual under the eight[h] amendment beyond that.

4. The time an inmate in general population spends in his cell can at times be in excess of 22 hours in a single-day period, which can amount to solitary confinement and serious and significant deprivation of liberty.

5. The lack of movement where an inmate who is not in protection segregation, isolated segregation, administrative segregation, or otherwise disciplinary segregation is subjected to the aforementioned treatment creating a disproportionate punishment to offense.

6. Personal hygiene is significantly degraded which depends on the inmate population which is transient in nature to maintain cleanliness of the facility and common illness, which are easily avoidable, can become a problem that the already limited medical staff is unable to suppress before the entirety of the inmates is affected. During normal operations, inmates have the opportunity to utilize hair care to cut and maintain our hair but due to the lockdown we have been unable to even cut our hair.

7. Medical care is scarce since the beginning of the lockdown due to Covid-19 in March of 2020. It can take months to see medical staff, including dental, medical, and mental health doctors. We have not had an optometrist since this lockdown began and many inmates are in need of glasses to see. After applying to see any medical staff during this pandemic and continuously awaiting for a response, if any, confined to your cell up to 22 hours out of a 24 hour day easily depletes your mental health. This situation has created a serious issue for those inmates dealing with depression and anxiety.

Thus, Alfaro requests that the court grant him two days of credit for every one day he has served during the time he has been “locked-down” in CI Giles W. Dalby due to COVID-19.

II. Analysis

The court's authority to reduce or modify a sentence is limited once a sentence of imprisonment has been imposed. Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 819 (2010); United States v. Varner, 948 F.3d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 2020); United States v. Banks, 770 F.3d 346, 348 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Hernandez, 645 F.3d 709, 711 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Alonzo, 516 F.Supp.3d 623, 632 (E.D. Tex. 2021). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), a district court is authorized to modify a previously imposed term of imprisonment only under the following circumstances: (1) when the court receives a motion from the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), or under certain circumstances, a motion from the defendant, indicating that there are extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a reduction and that reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; (2) when the district court, pursuant to Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, acting within 14 days after the imposition of sentence, wishes to correct an arithmetical, technical, or other clear error identified in a previously imposed sentence; (3) when the defendant has provided substantial assistance and the government moves for a sentence reduction; or (4) when the defendant has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based upon a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); see United States v. Lopez, 989 F.3d 327, 332 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Section 3582(c)(2) permits the discretionary modification of a defendant's sentence ‘in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. [§] 994(o),' so long as the ‘reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements.'”); Banks, 770 F.3d at 348; United States v. Meza, 620 F.3d 505, 507 (5th Cir. 2010).

Alfaro fails to identify a statutory basis by which the court may credit him for two days served for every day he spends incarcerated. Other courts across the nation have similarly rejected such a claim for lack of a cognizable legal basis. See, e.g., United States v. Green, No. CR415-204, 2021 WL 1929552, at *1 (S.D. Ga. May 13, 2021) (finding no authority to support defendant's motion for “hardship credit for hard time served”); United States v. Mitchell, No. 15-20609, 2021 WL 1827202, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 7, 2021) (same); United States v. Brown, No. 2:14-CR-130, 2021 WL 1725545, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. April 30, 2021) (same); United States v. Barnes, No. CR 113-199, 2021 WL 1395199, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 13, 2021) (same).

A. Compassionate Release

To the extent that Alfaro's motion could be construed as a request for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), such relief is not warranted. The First Step Act allows a defendant, who has fully exhausted his administrative remedies, to file a motion for compassionate release based on extraordinary and compelling reasons. When a defendant moves for compassionate release he must establish three criteria. United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2021). First, he must meet one of two conditions listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A)-either the defendant has extraordinary and compelling reasons that warrant a reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) or the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison, and meets the additional requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii). Id. at 391. Second, the defendant “must show that compassionate release is consistent with the applicable policy statements from the [United States Sentencing Commission (“Commission”)].” Id. at 392. Third, the defendant “must convince the district judge to exercise discretion to grant the motion after considering the § 3553(a) factors.”^[2] Id.; accord United States v. Keys, 846 Fed.Appx. 275, 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 846 Fed.Appx. 275 (2021); United States v. Cooper, 996 F.3d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 2021).

Alfaro neither asserts nor provides documentation showing that he exhausted his administrative remedies with the BOP prior to filing the instant motion. See, e.g., Barnes, 2021 WL 1395199, at *1 (holding the defendant did not show that she had exhausted her administrative remedies, and thus, the court would not consider her motion under § 3582(c)(1)(A) for “hard time” credit). Moreover nothing in his motion indicates that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist to modify his term of imprisonment. Section 3582 (c)(1)(A)(i) does not define the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that may merit compassionate release. Rather, Congress elected to delegate its authority to the Commission. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (directing the Commission to “describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples”); Cooper, 996 F.3d at 287; Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 392. Prior to the passage of the First Step Act, the Commission issued a policy statement set forth in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, which, along with its commentary, describes what reasons qualify as extraordinary and compelling.^[3] However, § 1B1.13 references only motions filed by “the Director of the [BOP]”-not an individual defendant.^[4] Consequently, the Fifth Circuit has held that when a defendant files a motion for compassionate release on his own behalf, the Commission's policy statement in § 1B1.13 is not applicable because that policy statement governs only motions filed by the Director of...