United States v. Alonzo
| Decision Date | 01 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case Number: 4:13-CR-00013 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Lucino Alonzo ALONZO |
Jay Robert Combs, U.S. Attorney's Office, Plano, TX, for United States of America.
Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Compassionate Release (Dkt. #268). The Government has responded in opposition (Dkt. #272). The Court, having considered the motion, the response, the record, and the applicable law, finds that the motion must be DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction .
On July 11, 2013, Defendant Lucino Alonzo Alonzo ("Mr. Alonzo") pleaded guilty to Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute 1 Kilogram or More of a Mixture or Substance Containing a Detectable Amount of Heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. On October 2, 2013, Mr. Alonzo was sentenced to 128 months' imprisonment (Dkt. #173). Mr. Alonzo is currently serving his sentence at CI McRae. Upon his release, Mr. Alonzo will be surrendered for deportation proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. section 1101, et seq. The Bureau of Prisons projects a release date of April 28, 2022.
Mr. Alonzo seeks release based on COVID-19 concerns, arguing the pandemic presents "extraordinary and compelling reasons" to grant a sentence reduction. The Government opposes, arguing: (1) Mr. Alonzo has not demonstrated "extraordinary and compelling reasons" supporting a sentence reduction; and (2) a sentence reduction is not warranted under the section 3553(a) factors.
A judgment of conviction imposing a sentence of imprisonment "constitutes a final judgment and may not be modified by a district court except in limited circumstances." Dillon v. United States , 560 U.S. 817, 824, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b) ); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). One such circumstance, invoked by Mr. Alonzo, arises from 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), which authorizes a district court to reduce a term of imprisonment when "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for a reduction exist that are "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission," and other procedural and substantive requirements are met. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Although Mr. Alonzo has met section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement, he has not met the statute's requirement that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" exist "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission," warranting a reduction of his sentence. Mr. Alonzo's motion, therefore, must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Mr. Alonzo compassionate-release motion may be considered only if he first meets section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement. The statute provides that a court may not consider any modification to a defendant's sentence under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) unless a motion for such a modification is properly made by the Director of the BOP or by a defendant who has fully exhausted his or her administrative remedies. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Director of the BOP may request a sentence reduction in court at any time. Id. A defendant may also make such a request, but only after fully exhausting remedies within the BOP or after 30 days have passed since he or she sought administrative remedies. Id.1
On September 30, 2020, Mr. Alonzo submitted a request for compassionate release to the warden at CI McRae, claiming his underlying health issues — anxiety and panic attacks, high blood pressure
, chronic back pain, and gastritis /acid reflux — place him at risk of contracting COVID-19. On November 9, 2020, the warden denied the request. Mr. Alonzo has, therefore, met section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement.
Under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), a district court may grant a sentence reduction if it finds that (1) "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction," (2) "such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission," and (3) such a reduction is appropriate "after considering the factors set forth in [ 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) ] to the extent that they are applicable." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Congress did not define what constitutes "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(1)(A), but rather delegated that authority to the Sentencing Commission. In 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2), Congress granted the Commission broad authority to promulgate "general policy statements regarding application of the guidelines or any other aspect of sentencing or sentence implementation that in the view of the Commission would further the purposes set forth in [ 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) ]." And, as particularly relevant here, in 28 U.S.C. § 994(t), "Congress instructed the Commission to ‘describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction [under section 3582(c)(1)(A) ], including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples.’ " United States v. Garcia , 655 F.3d 426, 435 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) ).
The Commission's policy statements, issued under 28 U.S.C. § 994(t), are binding concerning what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). As the Fifth Circuit has explained, "a common sense reading" of section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s phrase that a sentence reduction must be "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission," is that, "regardless of whether Congress wanted [the Commission's] policy statements to be binding in the sentencing context, it wished them to be binding in § 3582(c) proceedings." Id. "If a sentence reduction is inconsistent with a policy statement, it would violate § 3582(c)'s directive, so policy statements must be binding." Id. ; see also Dillon , 560 U.S. at 827, 130 S.Ct. 2683 ().
Thus, Mr. Alonzo cannot obtain a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(1)(A) merely by asserting reasons that he, or for that matter this Court, might believe are sufficiently "extraordinary and compelling" to justify a sentence reduction. Instead, under the plain text of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and 28 U.S.C. § 994(t), as well as controlling precedent, Mr. Alonzo's proffered reasons must be consistent with the Sentencing Commission's applicable policy statement concerning what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(1)(A).
Mr. Alonzo's compassionate-release motion turns on his assertion that the risks to his health associated with COVID-19, coupled with his existing anxiety and panic attacks, high blood pressure
, chronic back pain, and gastritis /acid reflux, constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce his sentence. Mr. Alonzo's assertion fails because it is untethered to the Sentencing Commission's binding applicable policy statement in section 1B1.13 of the Sentencing Guidelines. Section 1B1.13 describes what will be considered "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and provides no basis for a reduction based on COVID-19.
Section 1B1.13 allows a sentence reduction for "extraordinary and compelling reasons" only if the reasons are "consistent with this policy statement." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(1)(A), (3).2 Application note 1 to the policy statement explains that "extraordinary and compelling reasons exist under any of the circumstances set forth below," which include only: (a) a defendant suffering from a terminal illness or other medical condition "that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover"; (b) a defendant at least 65 years old who "is experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging process" and "has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less"; (c) a defendant who has minor children without a caregiver or with an incapacitated spouse or partner who needs the defendant to be the caregiver; or (d) "[a]s determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, ... an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the [above] reasons." Id. , comment. (n.1(A)–(D)).
Consistent with the application note, the BOP has issued Program Statement 5050.50 ("PS 5050.50"), which describes the BOP's consideration of compassionate-release requests. PS 5050.50, which was amended effective January 17, 2019, following the passage of the First Step Act, sets forth in detail the BOP's definition of circumstances that may support a request for compassionate release, limited to the same bases identified by the Commission: serious medical conditions, advanced age, and family circumstances.3 See PS 5050.50 ¶¶...
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