United States v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 07 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 16–cr–43 (KBJ) |
| Citation | 177 F.Supp.3d 458 |
| Parties | United States of America v. Jamel Anderson, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Christopher Macchiaroli, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for United States of America.
Cynthia Katkish, Law Offices of Cynthia Katkish, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
G. MICHAEL HARVEY
This matter comes before the Court upon the application of the United States that Defendant, Jamel Anderson, be detained pending trial. Defendant is charged in a one-count Indictment with possession of body armor by a felon convicted of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 931
. The United States requested a detention hearing under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(f)(1)(D)–(E) and 3142(f)(2)(A), which the Court held on March 25, 2016, and April 4, 2016. The Court now finds that Defendant should be held without bond. This memorandum is submitted in compliance with the statutory obligation that “the judicial officer shall include written findings of fact and a written statement of the reasons for the detention.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)(1).
At the detention hearing, the United States proceeded by proffer based on the Indictment. Defendant offered no contrary evidence. Accordingly, the Court makes the following findings of fact:
In late 2002, Defendant was incarcerated for shooting a victim multiple times in a public street in the District of Columbia. Upon his release from incarceration on March 9, 2015, Defendant was placed on supervised release for three years. His supervision is being overseen by a supervision officer in Maryland. His term of supervised release will expire on March 8, 2018. One year after his release, with two years left on his period of supervision, Defendant found himself again in a shooting in the District, this time while he was wearing a bulletproof vest.
On Thursday, March 10, 2016, at approximately 1:00 a.m., patrol units with the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) were dispatched to the 4700 block of Benning Road, Southeast, Washington, D.C., to investigate a report of the sounds of gunshots. Upon arriving at the scene, officers located two males suffering from gunshot wounds—Defendant and his associate, Ray Brown. Officers observed Defendant wearing body armor, that is, a bulletproof vest, at the time he was shot. Crime-scene photographs confirm that Defendant was wearing body armor at the time he was found. Brown was not wearing body armor. Defendant had suffered a single gunshot wound
to his right shoulder and was transported to a local hospital. Defendant refused to provide identifying information to law enforcement or medical personnel, but was subsequently identified during MPD's investigation of the shooting.
Officers also recovered two handguns, a .38 caliber revolver and a Czech 7.62 x 25 semiautomatic pistol, on the ground approximately 10–15 feet away from each other in a parking lot in front of a residential apartment building at 4742 Benning Road, Southeast. The revolver had what appeared to be blood on it. A blood trail led from the area of where the guns were recovered to the location where MPD officers found Defendant and Mr. Brown. Spent cartridge casings were recovered from or near both firearms. Located on the other side of the parking lot were spent .45 caliber cartridges from a different handgun than the two guns recovered from the scene. Damage to vehicles in the area indicates that the user of the .45 caliber firearm fired toward the location of where the two handguns were recovered.
Mr. Brown told the police that he and Defendant went to speak to some young males when someone shot at them in the area near where the guns were recovered. Mr. Brown then said that he ran in the direction where he was later found by the police. Mr. Brown did not acknowledge his possession or use of a firearm. The government contends that the shell casings found near the .38 caliber revolver and the Czech 7.62 x 25 semiautomatic pistol demonstrate that the users of the two handguns fired toward the user of the .45 caliber handgun. However, the government conceded that there were no bullet marks on vehicles or other surfaces on the side of the parking lot where the user of the .45 caliber firearm allegedly stood.
Defendant has several prior convictions. These include two misdemeanor convictions for Possession of Marijuana and Cocaine, a felony conviction for failure to appear for a scheduled trial in 2002, and Aggravated Assault and Possession of a Firearm During a Crime of Violence (“PFCOV”) convictions. As explained above, Defendant is currently on supervised release for the Aggravated Assault and PFCOV charges after spending twelve years in prison.
The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142 et seq.,
provides, in pertinent part, that if a judicial officer finds that “no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the [defendant] as required and the safety of any other person and the community, such judicial officer shall order the detention of the [defendant] before trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). Thus, even absent a flight risk, danger to the community alone is sufficient reason to order pretrial detention. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) ; United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 113 (3d Cir.1986) ; United States v. Sazenski, 806 F.2d 846, 848 (8th Cir.1986). The government must prove that the defendant poses a danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f), but need only prove that the defendant is a flight risk by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Xulam, 84 F.3d 441, 443 (D.C.Cir.1996).
In determining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required and reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community, the Court considers: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense; (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the history and characteristics of the defendant; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the defendant's release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)
. The Court must weigh all of the pertinent factors and provide a detailed explanation of the reasoning behind its ultimate conclusion. U.S. v. Nwokoro, 651 F.3d 108, 111 (D.C.Cir.2011).
18 U.S.C. § 3142(d)(1)(A)(iii)
. The government requested that Defendant be held for ten days pursuant to this section so that it could contact Defendant's Maryland supervision officer. The Court granted that request. That ten-day period expired on April 5, 2016. On April 4, 2016, the government reported to the Court that Defendant's Maryland supervision officer has applied with the Maryland parole board for a warrant for Defendant's arrest for alleged violations of his conditions of supervised release. As of April 4, 2016, that application had not been ruled upon.
The government also requested that Defendant be held pending trial pursuant to sections 3142(1)(f)(1)(D), 3142(f)(1)(E), and 3142(f)(2)(A) of the Bail Reform Act. Section 3142(f)(1)(D)
provides that the government may request detention in a case that involves “any felony if such person has been convicted of two or more offenses” that would constitute “crimes of violence” as defined in the Bail Reform Act. Id. § 3142(f)(1)(D). Section 3142(f)(1)(E) allows the government to request detention in a case involving “any felony that is not otherwise a crime of violence that involves ... the possession or use of a firearm or destructive device.” Id. § 3142(f)(1)(E). Section 3142(f)(2)(A) provides that the government may request detention when a case “involves a serious risk that [the defendant] will flee.” Id. § 3142(f)(2)(A). As explained below, the Court finds that sections 3142(f)(1)(D) and (f)(2)(A) each provide an independent basis for the government to request pretrial detention in this case. Because it finds that Defendant is eligible for pretrial detention under those sections, the Court need not reach the government's alternative argument that Defendant is eligible for detention under section 3142(f)(1)(E).
Defendant argues that pretrial detention is not authorized by section 3142(f)(1)(D)
because he has not previously been convicted of two or more crimes of violence. There is no question that Defendant's Aggravated Assault conviction constitutes a crime of violence pursuant to section 3142(f)(1)(D). The parties dispute, however, whether PFCOV, a violation of D.C.Code § 22–4504(b), also constitutes a crime of violence under the Bail Reform Act. Defendant argues that PFCOV is not a freestanding crime of violence but is akin to an enhancement of a conviction for a crime of violence.
The Court finds that PFCOV is a crime of...
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