United States v. Anderson
Decision Date | 20 June 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 12–10979.,12–10979. |
Citation | 755 F.3d 782 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Joseph Demont ANDERSON, Defendant–Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Timothy W. Funnell (argued), Attorney, James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Douglas C. Greene, Sr., Esq. (argued), Greene Law Firm, Arlington, TX, for Defendant–Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and DENNIS and ELROD, Circuit Judges.
Defendant–Appellant Joseph Demont Anderson (“Anderson”) was convicted by a jury of aiding and abetting bank robbery. On appeal, he challenges his conviction, sentence, and various rulings by the district court. For the reasons explained herein, we affirm.
In February 2012, a federal grand jury charged Anderson and Jeremy Butler (“Butler”) in a one-count indictment with aiding and abetting each other in the commission of a bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and 2. Anderson pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial where he was the lone defendant. The evidence presented at trial showed that around 2:15 p.m. on January 18, 2012, Butler entered a Chase Bank branch in Dallas, Texas wearing something to cover his face and demanded money from a teller. The teller placed approximately $6,500 in a bag along with a tracking device. Butler then exited the bank through the front door, ran around the side of the bank, and jumped over a fence into someone's back yard. A witness testified that Butler appeared to know exactly where he was running after he exited the bank. Around the time Butler was inside of the bank, a witness who lived in the neighborhood behind the bank saw a gold Grand Marquis driving slowly down his street. The witness testified that as the car traveled down his street, he saw a man—who appeared to have something covering his face—jump over his neighbor's fence and enter the Grand Marquis.
Around the same time, Dallas Police Department received a call for a bank robbery and officers were immediately dispatched to the area near the Chase Bank. The bank's tracking device led officers to a Grand Marquis occupied by three men. When officers attempted to stop the Grand Marquis, its occupants—Butler, Teddy Rogers (“Rogers”), and Anderson—exited the vehicle and ran. The men were eventually apprehended and transported to the police station for questioning.
While in custody at the police station, Anderson signed a Miranda waiver and participated in an interview with a Dallas Police Department detective and a Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) agent. The interview was captured by video and audio recording. During the interview, Anderson explained, inter alia, that he had no idea that Butler planned to rob a bank. Anderson stated that he simply agreed to give Butler a ride across town. According to Anderson, Butler exited his vehicle near the Chase Bank and when Butler did not return, Anderson and Rogers decided to leave Butler. Anderson claimed that as he was driving, Butler appeared out of nowhere and reentered his vehicle. Anderson stated that even after Butler reentered his vehicle, he was not aware of the fact that Butler had just robbed a bank.
The government charged Anderson and Butler with aiding and abetting bank robbery but did not charge Rogers. Prior to his trial, Anderson filed a motion to suppress“all statements taken from [him] at the time of his arrest and during custodial interrogation in an interview room.” The district court denied the motion. After a short trial, the jury convicted Anderson of aiding and abetting bank robbery. The United States Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) that recommended: (1) that Anderson be classified as a career offender because his prior burglary conviction was a crime of violence; (2) that his criminal history category was IV; (3) that his total offense level was 32; and (4) that his United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”) range was 210 to 240 months' imprisonment followed by a term of not more than three years of supervised release. Anderson objected to the PSR on the grounds that his prior burglary conviction did not qualify as a crime of violence. The district court overruled the objection, adopted the PSR's Guidelines calculation, and sentenced Anderson to 210 months' imprisonment followed by a three-year term of supervised release. Anderson timely appealed his conviction and sentence. 1
On appeal, Anderson challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress his interrogation video. “When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law de novo.” United States v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 403 (5th Cir.2006) (citation omitted). All facts should be construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Id. “[A] district court's determination regarding the validity of a defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights is a question of law reviewed de novo, but this court accepts the factual conclusions underlying the district court's legal determination unless they are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 439 (5th Cir.2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In order to use an in-custody statement against a defendant at trial, the government must demonstrate that the defendant was warned of his right to remain silent and his right to consult with an attorney. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). “When a defendant challenges the voluntariness of a confession, the government must prove its voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence in order for the confession to be admissible as substantive evidence at the defendant's criminal trial.” United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 461 (5th Cir.2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We consider the totality of the circumstances to determine if “the statement is the product of the accused's free and rational choice,” and thereby voluntary. Id. A confession is involuntary if it was derived from “coercive police conduct” and a causal link exists between that conduct and the confession. Id.
Having reviewed the interrogation video and other evidence in the record, we affirm the district court's denial of Anderson's motion to suppress. Anderson alleges that the coercion at issue in this case began when he was “roughed-up” at the scene of his arrest. The evidence in the record demonstrates that an officer landed on top of Anderson at the end of the foot chase. Officer Fifield testified that the individual who fell on top of Anderson, Officer Henderson, pulled his hamstring and accidently fell on top of Anderson as a result. According to Officer Fifield, Officer Henderson was transported to Baylor hospital by ambulance as a result of his injury. A finding that Officer Henderson accidently fell on top of Anderson would not be clearly erroneous. Furthermore, Officer Henderson was not present during Anderson's interrogation and no law enforcement officer insinuated that there would be further physical contact if Anderson exercised his right to remain silent.
Next, Anderson alleges that shortly after he was arrested, an officer told him that he was going to prison for forty years. The district court heard testimony, outside the presence of the jury, from Anderson and Officer Otto on the issue of whether such a statement was made. The government impeached Anderson with his prior felony convictions during his testimony on this issue. Officer Otto denied making such a statement or hearing any other officer make such a statement. After assessing the evidence, the district court credited Officer Otto's testimony that neither he nor any other officer told Anderson that he was going to prison for any period of time. Accordingly, we defer to the district court's credibility determination and finding that no officer told Anderson that he was going to prison for forty years. See United States v. Gibbs, 421 F.3d 352, 356–57 (5th Cir.2005) ( ). Nevertheless, even if an officer made such a statement to Anderson, it was not made in the context of his interrogation and discussions about potential prison sentences, without more, do not generally amount to coercion. See United States v. Rico, 51 F.3d 495, 507 (5th Cir.1995). Moreover, no evidence in the record demonstrates that anyone told Anderson that he would be sentenced to forty years if he did not agree to waive his Miranda rights.
Finally, Anderson argues that his will was overborne by the size of the law enforcement officers and their bombarding him with false accusations. Even taking Anderson's characterization of the events as true, this circuit has held that similar tactics do not generally constitute coercion or intimidation. See Bell, 367 F.3d at 462–63 ( ). Additionally, the interrogation video demonstrates that the officers introduced themselves to Anderson and immediately provided him with Miranda warnings. Anderson was not handcuffed during the interview, the officers never displayed any weapons, and they never placed their hands on him. Furthermore, Anderson had significant contact with law enforcement prior to the instant arrest. His experience with the criminal process makes it less likely that his confession was involuntary. See United States v. Hearn, 563 F.3d 95, 104 (5th Cir.2009) ( ).
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