United States v. Anderson, Case No. 15-cr-30015

• Decision Date: 18 May 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 15-cr-30015
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Michael J. ANDERSON, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois

460 F.Supp.3d 711

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.Michael J. ANDERSON, Defendant.

Case No. 15-cr-30015

United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Springfield Division.

Signed May 18, 2020

Matthew Z. Weir, Sangamon County States Attorney, Springfield, IL, for Plaintiff.

OPINION

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:

Before the Court is Defendant Michael Anderson's Motion for Compassionate Release (d/e 27) requesting a reduction in his term of imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 16, 2015, Defendant pled guilty to possessing with the intent to distribute more than 28 grams of a substance containing crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On April 11, 2016, the Court sentenced Defendant to 96 months' imprisonment and 8 years of supervised release.

Defendant is currently serving his sentence at FCI Forrest City Low and has a projected release date of May 12, 2021. He has incurred no disciplinary infractions while at FCI Forrest City Low, where he works as an electrical shop orderly. Memorandum (d/e 29), at 1. As of May 18, 2020, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) reports that FCI Forrest City Low has 253 confirmed cases of COVID-19. See Federal Bureau of Prisons – COVID-19 Cases, https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ (last accessed May 18, 2020). Defendant tested negative for COVID-19 on May 16, 2020.

According to the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) prepared for Defendant's sentencing, Defendant reports having been diagnosed with high blood pressure when he was in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections. PSR (d/e 17), ¶ 105. The PSR also notes that records from the Sangamon County Jail indicate that Defendant was administered daily medication for high blood pressure. Id. Defendant is listed as standing 5 feet, 6 inches tall and weighing 230 pounds. Id. ¶ 100.

On May 5, 2020, Defendant filed a pro se motion for compassionate release (d/e 26) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). On May 8, 2020, after the Federal Public Defender's Office was appointed to represent Defendant, an amended Motion for Compassionate Release was filed. Defendant requests compassionate release due to his health issues—hypertension, hyperlipidemia, and obesity—and the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant also requests that the Court waive the exhaustion requirement set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

If released from custody, Defendant will reside at his grandmother's house in Springfield, Illinois. The United States Probation Office, in a Memorandum (d/e 30) addressing Defendant's request for compassionate release, concludes that Defendant's grandmother's house is a suitable residence for Defendant.

On May 11, 2020, the Government filed a Response to Defendant's Motion for Compassionate Release (d/e 28). The Government does not oppose Defendant's compassionate release motion.

II. ANALYSIS

Generally, the Court is statutorily prohibited from modifying a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). However, several statutory exceptions exist, one of which allows the Court to grant a defendant compassionate release if certain requirements are met. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Section 603(b)(1) of the First Step Act amended the statutory language at 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat 5194. Prior to the First Step Act, the Court could grant a defendant compassionate release only if the Director of the BOP filed a motion seeking that relief. With the enactment of the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) now allows an inmate to file a motion for compassionate release, but only after exhausting administrative review of a BOP denial of the inmate's request for the BOP to file a motion or waiting 30 days from when the inmate's request was received by the BOP, whichever is earlier. The statute now provides as follows:

The court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that—

(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction ... and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Here, because Defendant has not made a request to BOP to file a compassionate release motion on his behalf, the exhaustion requirement set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) has not been satisfied. Defendant argues that the Court has the authority to waive compliance with this statutory requirement.

Below, the Court addresses whether it has jurisdiction to consider Defendant's motion, whether the Court can waive the exhaustion requirement set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), and whether Defendant is entitled to compassionate release.

A. Jurisdiction

Federal district courts are "courts of limited jurisdiction." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs. Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 162 L.Ed.2d 502 (2005).

Without jurisdiction, this Court cannot hear Defendant's request for compassionate release. See Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011).

An important distinction exists as to whether a procedural rule is a jurisdictional requirement or a claim-processing rule. See id. ("This question is not merely semantic but one of considerable practical importance for judges and litigants."); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 160, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010). Therefore, "a rule should not be referred to as jurisdictional unless it governs a court's adjudicatory capacity, that is, its subject-matter or personal jurisdiction." Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435, 131 S.Ct. 1197. Claim-processing rules "seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times." Id.

The U.S. Supreme Court adopted a "bright-line" test for deciding when to classify a procedural rule as jurisdictional. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515-16, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006). The inquiry is whether Congress has " ‘clearly state[d]’ " that the rule is jurisdictional." Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153, 133 S.Ct. 817, 184 L.Ed.2d 627 (2013). "Absent such a clear statement ... courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character." Id.

In United States v. Taylor, the Seventh Circuit, overruling its own precedent, held that 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) sets forth a non-jurisdictional rule. 778 F.3d 667, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2015) ("A district court has subject-matter jurisdiction to consider a motion for relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) regardless of whether the moving defendant is actually eligible for such discretionary relief."). Section 3582(c)(2) allows the Court to reduce a term of imprisonment if the defendant was sentenced based on a sentencing range that was subsequently lowered by the United States Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).

While Taylor did not address § 3582(c)(1)(A), Taylor's reasoning is equally applicable to that statutory subsection. The Court finds that Congress did not "clearly state" in § 3582(c)(1)(A) that the exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional. Therefore, the Court finds that the exhaustion requirement found in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) is a claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional rule. See Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435, 131 S.Ct. 1197 (noting that claim-processing rules merely require "that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times"); United States v. Haney, 454 F.Supp.3d at 319–20 ("The exhaustion requirement provides "who -- the BOP or defendant -- may move for compassionate release and when such a motion may be made.").

B. Waiver of the Exhaustion Requirement

Although the Court has jurisdiction to hear Defendant's motion, Defendant has not met the exhaustion requirement set forth in § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Court must determine whether it has the authority to waive the 30-day waiting period of the exhaustion requirement.

In the short time the COVID-19 pandemic has wreaked havoc on this country, many federal judges have considered this issue. Some judges have found that they have the discretion to waive the 30-day requirement in light of the serious risks associated with COVID-19. See, e.g., United States v. Scparta, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, 2020 WL 1910481 (S.D.N.Y. April 19, 2020) ; United States v. Guzman Soto, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, 2020 WL 1905323 (D. Mass. Apr. 17, 2020) United States v. Russo, 454 F.Supp.3d 270 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2020) ; United States v. Smith, 454 F.Supp.3d 310 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2020) ; United States v. Bin Wen, 454 F.Supp.3d 187, 192–97 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2020) ; United States v. Haney, 454 F.Supp.3d 316, 317–19 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2020) ; United States v. Sawicz, 453 F.Supp.3d 601, 604–05 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2020) ; United States v. McCarthy, 453 F.Supp.3d 520 (D. Conn. Apr. 8, 2020) ; United States v. Colvin, 451 F.Supp.3d 237, 239–40 D. Conn. Apr. 2, 2020) ; United States v. Perez, 451 F.Supp.3d 288 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2020). Other judges have held that the 30-day requirement is mandatory, not subject to any exception. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 455 F.Supp.3d 830, 830–31 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 21, 2020) ; United States v. Demaria, 2020 WL 1888910 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2020) ; United States v. Rensing, 2020...