United States v. Haney

• Decision Date: 13 April 2020
• Docket Number: 19-cr-541 (JSR)
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, v. Hugh Brian HANEY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

454 F.Supp.3d 316

UNITED STATES of America,

v.Hugh Brian HANEY, Defendant.

19-cr-541 (JSR)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed April 13, 2020

Attorneys for the Government: Samuel Raymond, Tara Marie La Morte (Assistant U.S. Attorneys, United States Attorney's Office at the Southern District of New York, New York, NY)

Attorney for the Defendant: Martin Samuel Cohen (Federal Defenders of New York Inc., New York, NY)

OPINION AND ORDER

JED S. RAKOFF, U.S.D.J.

Defendant Hugh Haney, who has yet to serve 33 months of his 42 months' sentence for selling and laundering narcotics proceeds on a Bitcoin exchange, moves for temporary or permanent "compassionate release" from prison pursuant to the FIRST STEP Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). See Emergency Motion for Compassionate Release, ECF No. 22 ("Def. Mem."). Normally, such an application would be frivolous on its face. But these are not normal times. The rapid spread of COVID-19 has caused a public health crisis and a national emergency that can best be reduced by the kind of social distancing not easily attained in an overcrowded federal prison facility, such as the Metropolitan Detention Center ("MDC") where Haney resides. Moreover, because of his age (61), Haney faces a somewhat higher risk of falling seriously ill from contracting COVID-19 than much of the prison population. In that context, his motion -- although strenuously opposed by the Government, see Government's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Defendant's Emergency Motion for Compassionate Release, ECF No. 23 ("Gov. Opp.") -- must be given serious consideration.

But before turning to the merits, the Court must consider the Government's objection that this matter is not properly before this Court at this time, because Haney has not yet exhausted the opportunity that Congress has given to the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") to address such motions in the first instance.

Compassionate release allows a court to reduce a term of imprisonment where, among other things, "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Prior to the enactment of the FIRST STEP Act, only the Director of the BOP could file a motion for compassionate release. The FIRST STEP Act amended this provision to permit an inmate to file a motion in federal court seeking compassionate release, but only after either exhausting administrative review of a BOP denial of his request or after 30 days had passed since he made his request, whichever was earlier. See id.

Here, neither alternative is satisfied. Specifically, it was not until March 26, 2020 that Haney (through his counsel) sent an email to the warden of the MDC requesting compassionate release. See ECF No. 22, Ex. C. To this date, the BOP has yet to rule on the request, and 30 days have yet to pass.

But that is not the end of the issue, because Haney here argues that the Court has the authority in a crisis to excuse compliance with the statutory exhaustion requirement and urges the Court to exercise that authority. See Def. Mem. 3-7; Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Hugh Brian Haney's Emergency Motion for Compassionate Release, ECF No. 24 ("Def. Reply"), at 4-12. The Government responds that the Court lacks the authority to do so. See Gov. Opp. 7-15.

Federal courts, not least in this District, are already divided on this issue, while the Second Circuit has not yet directly addressed that division.¹ The issue, in turn, raises two questions: whether the exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional; and whether, even if the exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, it is still not waivable, even in circumstances like those presented by the COVID-19 crisis.²

Whether the exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional

The term "jurisdiction" refers specifically to "a court's adjudicatory authority." Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 160, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010).³ Because federal courts are "courts of limited jurisdiction," Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 162 L.Ed.2d 502 (2005), the failure to satisfy a jurisdictional requirement would require the Court to dismiss the motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, even if the parties themselves consented to the Court hearing the motion. Therefore, "a rule should not be referred to as jurisdictional unless it governs a court's adjudicatory capacity, that is, its subject-matter or personal jurisdiction." Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011).

The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized the necessity of observing "the important distinctions between jurisdictional prescriptions and claim-processing rules." Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 161, 130 S.Ct. 1237. Claim-processing rules "seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times." Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435, 131 S.Ct. 1197. Because claim-processing rules do not "govern[ ] a court's adjudicatory capacity," they may, in certain cases, be waivable by the parties or by the courts. Id.

The U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a "bright line" test for when to classify statutory restrictions as jurisdictional. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006). A rule qualifies as jurisdictional only if "Congress has clearly stated that the rule is jurisdictional." Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153, 133 S.Ct. 817, 184 L.Ed.2d 627 (2013). "[A]bsent such a clear statement," the Supreme Court has cautioned, "courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character," with the specific goal of "ward[ing] off profligate use of the term ‘jurisdiction.’ " Id. In considering whether Congress has spoken clearly, courts consider both the language of the statute and its "context, including ... [past judicial] interpretation[s] of similar provisions." Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 168, 130 S.Ct. 1237.

While the Second Circuit has not squarely addressed the question of whether the exhaustion requirement in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is jurisdictional, in a related context it has firmly disagreed with the characterization by certain other circuits that § 3582(c)(2)⁴ is jurisdictional. See United States v. Johnson, 732 F.3d 109, 116 n.11 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court finds that such holding by the Second Circuit should also extend to the exhaustion requirement in § 3582(c)(1)(A), because § 3582(c)(1)(A) does not "clearly state" that the exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional.

Instead, the exhaustion requirement in § 3582(c)(1)(A) merely controls who -- the BOP or defendant -- may move for compassionate release and when such a motion may be made. It simply delineates the process for a party to obtain judicial review, not referring to the adjudicatory capacity of courts. That is, § 3582(c)(1)(A) "does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the [federal] courts." Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982).

Moreover, § 3582 is "not part of a jurisdictional portion of the criminal code but part of the chapter dealing generally with sentences of imprisonment." United States v. Taylor, 778 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2015). Section 3582 lists factors to be considered in imposing a sentence and provides that a prison sentence is final and appealable. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582. Similarly, subsection (c) states that courts "may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed," with few enumerated exceptions, assuming a priori courts' jurisdiction exists over these sentences. Id. § 3582(c). Tellingly, the word "jurisdiction" or its variation never appears.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the exhaustion requirement in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is a claim-processing rule that does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction.

Whether the exhaustion requirement is waivable

Even though the exhaustion requirement does not deprive the Court of subject matter jurisdiction to consider Haney's motion, it is a separate question whether the Court has the authority, either in general or in the particular circumstances here presented, to excuse or "waive" the exhaustion requirement and consider the merits of Haney's motion. Indeed, although, as shown above, the exhaustion requirement here in issue is a claim-processing rule, the Supreme Court has observed that such claim-processing rules may still be "important and mandatory." Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011).

Under the present circumstances, however, the Court concludes that it has the discretion to waive the exhaustion requirement in § 3582(c)(1)(A). In so holding, the Court joins certain other courts in this District and Circuit that have already found this exhaustion requirement to be waivable, though others have disagreed. See cases cited, supra note 1.

The Court is sensitive to the fact that the here-relevant exhaustion requirement is imposed by statute, rather than by case law. In such situations, Congressional intent is "paramount" to any determination of whether exhaustion is mandatory. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992) (quoting Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 501, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982) ). Therefore, although it is well-settled that courts may excuse judge-made exhaustion requirements in situations where exhaustion would unduly prejudice the defendant, or where the agency could grant effective relief, or where exhaustion would be futile, see McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 146-49, 112 S.Ct. 1081 ; Washington v. Barr, 925 F.3d 109, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2019), courts must be more hesitant to do so with respect to an exhaustion requirement contained in the plain language of a statute. Nevertheless, the Court concludes that Congress cannot have intended the 30-day waiting...