United States v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 18 November 2022
• Docket Number: 1:20-cr-00213-TWP-MJD
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN ANDERSON, and TODD ANDERSON, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN ANDERSON, and TODD ANDERSON, Defendant.

No. 1:20-cr-00213-TWP-MJD

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division

November 18, 2022

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT 2 FOR IMPROPER VENUE

HON TANYA WALTON PRATT, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Carolyn Anderson and Todd Anderson's (together, the "Andersons") Motion to Dismiss Count 2 of the Superseding Indictment for Improper Venue (Filing No. 103). Count 2 of the Superseding Indictment, (Filing No. 76), alleges the Andersons conspired to import controlled substances from the United Kingdom to Arizona for distribution to various locations in the United States, including Indiana. The Andersons argue their alleged conspiracy ended when the controlled substances arrived in Arizona, so venue for Count 2 lies exclusively in the District of Arizona. The United States of America (the "Government") argues the Andersons' conspiracy continued until the controlled substances reached their final destination in Indiana, so venue is proper in this district. For the following reasons the Court agrees with the Government and denies the Andersons' Motion to Dismiss Count 2.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

The United States Constitution and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require that criminal defendants be prosecuted in a district in which the charged offense occurred. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 and amend. VI; Fed.R.Civ.P. 18. "'The Constitution twice safeguards the defendant's venue right': in Article III and again in the Sixth Amendment." United States v. Orona-Ibarra, 831 F.3d 867, 872 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 6 (1998)); see U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. Const. amend. VI. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 “echoes the constitutional commands.” Cabrales, 524 U.S. at 6; Fed. R. Crim. P. 18. Pursuant to the Constitution and Rule 18, the federal government may only prosecute a defendant in a district in which the charged offense was committed. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 and amend. VI; Fed.R.Civ.P. 18. "For crimes that occur in more than one state or district, venue is constitutionally and statutorily proper in any district in which part of the crime was committed. Thus, the traditional rule is that a conspiracy charge may be tried in any district in which an overt act of the conspiracy occurred." United States v. Ochoa, 229 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a); United States v. Tingle, 183 F.2d 719, 726 (7th Cir. 1999)).

Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the mechanism for seeking dismissal of an indictment for improper venue, among other reasons. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(A)(i). To establish proper venue, the Government must show by a preponderance of the evidence the charged offense(s) occurred in the district in which the case was brought. United States v. Herrera-Ordones, 190 F.3d 504, 509 (7th Cir. 1999). In deciding a Rule 12(b) motion, the Court must accept all allegations in the indictment as true and view those allegations in the light most favorable to the Government. See id. The Court must only consider the allegations on the face of the indictment. See United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75, 76 (1962).

District courts use a two-part inquiry to determine whether venue is proper. United States v. Muhammad, 502 F.3d 646, 652 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1). First, the court must "ascertain whether there is any statutory directive on the matter of venue." Id. at 652. If there is not, then the court uses the nature of the alleged offense and the location of the act(s) constituting it as a "general guide" for determining proper venue. Cabrales, 524 U.S. at 6; United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703 (1946). There is no "single defined policy or mechanical test to determine constitutional venue." Muhammad, 502 F.3d at 652 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 481 (7th Cir. 2007)).

II. DISCUSSION

In April 2022, a Superseding Indictment brought the following charges against the Andersons: Count 1: Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute and Distribute Controlled Substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); Count 2: Conspiracy to Import Controlled Substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963; and Count 4: Distribution of Morphine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Defendant Carolyn Anderson faces additional charges of Count 3: Distribution of Morphine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and Count 5: Distribution of Morphine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The Andersons contend the Court should dismiss Count 2 of the Superseding Indictment for improper venue pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(A)(i).

Count 2 alleges that between 2015 and 2020, the Andersons conspired to import poppy straw and morphine (together, "poppy pods") from a supplier in the United Kingdom to various addresses in Arizona, where the Andersons would repackage the poppy pods and ship them to purchasers in locations throughout the United States, including the Southern District of Indiana, for distribution (Filing No. 76 at ¶¶ 13-18, 37-38).

The Andersons argue there is no "statutory directive" regarding venue for Count 2. The Andersons note that neither 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 nor 963 contain a specific venue clause, and the Government does not disagree. The parties disagree as to whether the venue statute for multidistrict offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 3237, governs venue for Count 2.

"Many offenses touch more than one district. For these, Congress may, consistent[] with the Constitution, authorize venue in any district where conduct that is part of the offense occurred.

This is reflected in 18 U.S.C. § 3237, which is the default venue statute." Orona-Ibarra, 831 F.3d 867, 872 (citations omitted). Section 3237 governs venue for offenses committed in more than one district within the United States. Section 3237(a) states:

Except as otherwise expressly provided by enactment of Congress, any offense against the United States begun in one district and completed in another, or committed in more than one district, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed.

Any offense involving . . . the importation of an object or person into the United States is a continuing offense and, except as otherwise expressly provided by enactment of Congress, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district from, through, or into which such . . . imported object or person moves.

18 U.S.C. § 3237(a).

The Andersons argue their alleged conspiracy to import poppy pods took place entirely in the District of Arizona and is therefore not a continuing offense under Section 3237. They contend that importation offenses are automatically completed "when the parcels first arrive within the customs territory of the United States," so their alleged importation conspiracy was completed as soon as the poppy pods arrived in Arizona (Filing No. 104 at 5). The Government responds that an importation conspiracy may continue until the imported substances reach their final destination, which in this case is the Southern District of Indiana, so venue is proper in this district under Section 3237.

The Seventh Circuit addressed this issue in United States v. Lawson and decided that a conspiracy to import controlled substances may continue, for venue purposes, until the controlled substances reach their final destination. 507 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1974), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hollinger, 553 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1977). In Lawson, the defendant was tried and convicted in the Northern District of Illinois for importing and conspiring to import cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 963. Id. at 435. In that case, several non-parties met with the defendant, Lawson, at his home in Jamaica, where Lawson proposed that the non-parties buy his supply of cocaine. The non-parties agreed to buy the cocaine if Lawson would deliver it to Chicago, Illinois, which he agreed to do. Lawson gave the cocaine to his girlfriend, who "flew to Chicago by way of Baltimore," where she sold the cocaine to the non-parties. Id. at 435-36. Lawson was later arrested in Puerto Rico. On appeal, Lawson argued venue did not properly lie in the Northern District of Illinois because "he first entered the United States and was arrested in Puerto Rico." Id. at 445. The Seventh Circuit rejected Lawson's argument and found that venue was proper in the Northern District of Illinois because "the offenses were 'continued or completed'" in the Northern District of Illinois. Id. The Lawson court stated "[i]t has long been recognized that, in conspiracy cases, venue is proper, under Section 3237, in the district where the conspiracy was formed or in any district in which any overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed, even though the defendant has never been present in that district." Id. (citing Downing v. United States, 348 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 1965)).

Accordingly under Lawson, conspiracies to import controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963 are not necessarily completed once the controlled substances first arrive in the United States. Venue for importation conspiracies, like venue for other conspiracies, is proper in any district in which the defendants committed overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, including the act of delivering the controlled substances to their final destination. The Court recognizes that Lawson's theory of improper venue differs from the Andersons' theory. Lawson based his argument on...