United States v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 19 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 19-20081-01-DDC |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. CARL ANDERSON 01, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Defendant Carl Anderson filed a pro se[1] Motion for Downward Departure Due to Conditions of Confinement (Doc. 85). The government filed a Response to Mr. Anderson's motion (Doc. 88).
Mr Anderson doesn't identify which statute's authority he invokes to seek a downward departure in his sentence. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), the court may impose a sentence other than “a sentence of the kind, and within the range” provided by the United States Sentencing Guidelines when “there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines[.]” But the court considers downward departures when it imposes sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (). It doesn't do so at the post-sentencing stage. Generally, a “court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed[.]” Id. at § 3582(c).
Mr Anderson cites United States v. Carty, 897 F.Supp.2d 201 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) to support his argument. In Carty, the defendant appealed after the court imposed his sentence. Id. at 205. The Second Circuit vacated his sentence and remanded the case so the district court could reconsider his request for downward departure. Id. The district court then, after reconsideration issued the same sentence that the Circuit had vacated. Id. While that defendant was in prison, the Commission revised the Sentencing Guidelines and made them retroactive. Id. Thus, the defendant made his motion to modify his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
Here Mr. Anderson argues that Carty means the court can consider presentence confinement conditions as grounds for a downward departure. But the court already sentenced Mr. Anderson in August 2022. Doc. 83. And Mr. Anderson doesn't assert that he raised the issue of his confinement conditions during the sentencing phase. Thus, the time to request a downward departure has passed, and the court need not determine whether Carty's reasoning should apply here.
However, like the defendant in Carty, Mr. Anderson raises an issue covered under § 3582(c). Specifically, Mr. Anderson makes arguments that invoke those provisions in the statute which allow the court, “after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable,” to modify an imposed sentence “if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). For this reason, the court construes Mr. Anderson's motion as a Motion to Reduce Sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and assesses the parties' arguments on this subject below. For reasons explained in this Order, the court denies Mr. Anderson's motion (Doc. 85).
On January 2, 2020, the government arrested Mr. Anderson after a grand jury had indicted him on four counts of distributing methamphetamine. Docs. 1, 4. A few days later, the court arraigned Mr. Anderson and ordered him detained pending trial. Docs. 8, 9. The U.S. Marshals Service then detained Mr. Anderson at CoreCivic in Leavenworth, Kansas, a for-profit detention center that housed federal defendants proceeding through the trial process. Doc. 88 at 1. After President Joe Biden issued an executive order directing the Attorney General not to renew contracts with privately operated detention facilities, the U.S. Marshals Service transferred all detainees at CoreCivic out of the facility by the end of 2021. Id. at 1-2.
Mr. Anderson pleaded guilty to one count of distributing methamphetamine on February 18, 2022. Doc. 67. On August 12, 2022, the court entered judgment after sentencing Mr. Anderson to 112 months' imprisonment and five years' supervised release. Doc. 83.
Mr. Anderson filed his motion 19 days later on August 31, 2022. He asserts that his motion “has nothing to do with any portion of [his] Federal Charge, Conviction, Sentence, Plea Agreement or anything along that nature” but, instead, “outlines the conditions of [his] confinement while [he] was housed at Core Civic Of America (CCA) while awaiting [his] court proceedings[.]” Doc. 85-1. Mr. Anderson argues that “during the time [he] was a detainee . . . [he] witnessed extreme life-threatening and increasing violence, and cruel and unusual punishment that left [him] irreversibly traumatized.” Doc. 85 at 1. Today, Mr. Anderson is incarcerated at FCI Yazoo City Medium. See Carl F. Anderson (Reg. No. 29942-031) (last visited Apr. 12, 2023), https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/.
United States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821, 830 (10th Cir. 2021) (quotation cleaned up). This exception permits the court to modify a term of imprisonment:
upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier[.]
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see also Maumau, 993 F.3d at 830-31 (). Our Circuit has held that the exhaustion requirement is a claim-processing rule that the government may waive or forfeit. United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1030-31 (10th Cir. 2021).
Aside from this exhaustion requirement, the court applies a three-step analysis to motions filed under § 3582(c)(1)(A). United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1042 (10th Cir. 2021). Under that analysis, the court may grant a motion for sentence reduction only if “(1) the district court finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; (2) the district court finds that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; and (3) the district court considers the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a), to the extent that they are applicable.” Id. The court may grant relief “only if all three prerequisites are satisfied,” and so, “the three steps [can] be considered in any order.” United States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932, 942 (10th Cir. 2021).
To modify a sentence “upon motion of the defendant[,]” the court may only do so “after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). It also may entertain such a motion from a defendant after “the passage of 30 days from the defendant's unanswered request to the warden for such relief.” Maumau, 993 F.3d at 830 (emphasis added).
Here the Bureau of Prisons didn't make the pertinent motion-the inmate did. See generally Doc. 85. That means Mr. Anderson must demonstrate that he has exhausted all his administrative rights to appeal or that 30 days passed after he requested relief from the warden of his facility. But Mr. Anderson never asserts that he exhausted those administrative rights. Also, fewer than three weeks had passed between Mr. Anderson's sentencing and the filing of his motion. This means it's unlikely-if not impossible-that more than 30 days had passed between the putative request to the warden and Mr. Anderson's filing of the motion.
“Section 3582(c)(1)(A) requires exhaustion before a court may consider a motion for compassionate release.” Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th at 1030. But because the exhaustion requirement isn't a jurisdictional one, the government may waive the exhaustion requirement if it doesn't raise it. Id. at 1030-31. Here, the government argues that “it doesn't appear [Mr.] Anderson has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on [his] behalf.” Doc. 88 at 5. Thus, the government hasn't waived the exhaustion requirement. The court can't consider Mr. Anderson's motion on its merits because he hasn't satisfied that exhaustion requirement.
Even if Mr. Anderson properly had exhausted, his motion nonetheless fails to present extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying that the court modify his sentence. District courts have “discretion . . . to independently determine the existence of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons,'” as long as they are “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” McGee, 992 F.3d at 1044. The Sentencing Commission hasn't issued an applicable policy statement for defendant-filed compassionate release motions like this one. Maumau, 993 F.3d at 837. So, “until the Sentencing Commission issues such a policy statement, the second requirement does not apply.”[2] United States v. Quinn, No. 10-20129-03-KHV, 2021 WL 3129600, at *2 (D. Kan. July 23, 2021).
Mr Anderson makes several assertions about his pretrial confinement at CoreCivic, arguing that he “witnessed extreme life-threatening and increasing violence, and cruel and unusual punishment that left [him] irreversibly traumatized.” Doc. 85 at 1. Among his allegations of cruel and unusual punishment, Mr. Anderson contends that poor management caused extensive lockdowns between 23 and 24 hours per day; limited shower access to three days per week; provided improper nutrition and precluded access to hygiene supplies; restricted contact with his family and depleted...
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