United States v. Arkansas

• Decision Date: 06 February 2012
• Docket Number: No. 4:09CV00033 JLH,4:09CV00033 JLH
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PLAINTIFF v. STATE OF ARKANSAS; MIKE BEEBE, Governor of the State of Arkansas, in his official capacity only; JOHN M. SELIG, Director of the Arkansas Department of Human Services, in his official capacity only; JAMES C. GREEN, Ph.D., Director of the Arkansas Division of Developmental Disabilities Services, in his official capacity only; and CALVIN PRICE, Superintendent of the Conway Human Development Center, in his official capacity only DEFENDANTS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PLAINTIFF

v.STATE OF ARKANSAS; MIKE BEEBE, Governor of the State of Arkansas, in his official

capacity only; JOHN M. SELIG, Director of the Arkansas Department of Human Services, in his official

capacity only; JAMES C. GREEN, Ph.D., Director of the Arkansas Division of Developmental

Disabilities Services, in his official capacity only; and CALVIN PRICE, Superintendent of the

Conway Human Development Center, in his official capacity only DEFENDANTS

No. 4:09CV00033 JLH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION

Dated: February 6, 2012

OPINION AND ORDER

The United States of America brought this action pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (2006), et seq., alleging in Count I that conditions at Conway Human Development Center are so deplorable as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; in Count II that Conway Human Development Center violates the integration mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006); and in Count III that Conway Human Development Center violates the rights of children guaranteed by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act by failing to provide them with a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (2006). After a six-week trial, the Court found that Conway Human Development Center was in compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment; that the plaintiff failed to prove that Conway Human Development Center was in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act; that Conway Human Development Center educated children in the least restrictive environment but failed to provide a free appropriate public education; and that no injunction was needed because the agency charged with enforcing theIndividuals with Disabilities Education Act, the Arkansas Department of Education, would ensure that Conway Human Development Center would come into compliance. The defendants have now moved for an award of attorneys' fees and costs.

I.

Generally, successful litigants must pay their own attorneys' fees unless a statute or contractual agreement provides otherwise. See, e.g., Borntrager v. Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 577 F.3d 913, 924 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 448, 127 S. Ct. 1199, 1203, 167 L. Ed. 2d 178 (2007)). In support of their motion for attorneys' fees, the defendants invoke a provision of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act that provides: "In any action commenced under this section, the court may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee against the United States as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1997a(b) (2006).¹ That provision, by use of the word may, grants the Court discretion to award a reasonable fee to the prevailing party, other than the United States, but does not explain the factors to be considered or the standards that should inform the Court's exercise of discretion. Cf. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417, 98 S. Ct. 694, 698, 54 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1978) (interpreting a similarly-worded attorney's fees provision and noting that the "question in the case before us is what standard should inform a district court's discretion in deciding whether to award attorney's fees to a successful defendant[.]"). In a decision resolving a case similar to the present one, the Eleventh Circuit observed, "there must be standardsto guide the district court's exercise of discretion." Johnson v. Florida, 348 F.3d 1334, 1350 (11th Cir. 2003).

No controlling precedent specifies the standards that should inform a district court's exercise of discretion in determining whether to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant pursuant to subsection 1997a(b). The defendants contend that a prevailing defendant is presumptively entitled to attorneys' fees in the absence of special circumstances, whereas the plaintiff contends that attorneys' fees should be awarded to a prevailing defendant only if the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

In Christiansburg, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission unsuccessfully pursued a Title VII action against a private employer. 434 U.S. at 413-15, 98 S. Ct. at 696-97. After a successful summary judgment motion, the employer sought attorneys' fees under Title VII's attorneys' fees provision, which provided,

In any action or proceeding under this title the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.

Id. The Supreme Court recognized that it has already settled upon the rule that a prevailing plaintiff in a civil rights case "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Id. at 416-17. The question in Christiansburg, however, was "what standard should inform a district court's discretion in deciding whether to award attorneys' fees to a successful defendant in a Title VII action." Id.

Because the attorney's fees section provided "no indication whatever of the circumstances under which either a plaintiff or a defendant should be entitled to attorney's fees[,]" the Court did not rely simply on the "plain meaning of the statute" to resolve the question before it. Id. at 418.Instead, the Court pointed to "two strong equitable considerations counseling an attorney's fee award to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff that are wholly absent in the case of a prevailing Title VII defendant." Id. "First . . . the plaintiff is the chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate " 'a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.' " Id. (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S. Ct. 964, 966, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1263 (1968)). "Second, when a district court awards counsel fees to a prevailing plaintiff, it is awarding them against a violator of federal law." Id. The Court also sifted through the sparse legislative history of the attorney's fees provision and found evidence that Congress intended "to make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious suit" and to " 'deter the bringing of lawsuits without foundation' by providing that the 'prevailing party'—be it plaintiff or defendant—could obtain legal fees.' " Id. at 420 (citing Grubbs v. Butz, 548 F.2d 973, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). In light of these considerations, the Supreme Court held that "a district court may in its discretion award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation[.]" Id. at 421.

In Johnson, the Eleventh Circuit has held that the Supreme Court's Christiansburg standard applies "to a claim for attorneys' fees under [the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act]." 348 F.3d at 1354. The Eleventh Circuit interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1997c(d) (2006), which provides: "In any action in which the United States joins as an intervenor under this section, the court may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee against the United States as part of the costs." Subsection 1997c(d), which controlled in Johnson, differs from subsection 1997a(b), which controls here, in that section 1997c authorizes the Attorney General to intervene in actions seeking relief for institutionalized persons, whereas section 1997a authorizesthe Attorney General to institute civil actions to obtain relief for such persons. Subsection 1997c(d) also contains an additional sentence: "Nothing in this subsection precludes the award of attorney's fees available under any other provisions of the United States Code." Otherwise, the two subsections are identical. The parties here do not argue, nor is there any apparent reason to conclude, that Congress intended different standards to apply to the effectively identical language of subsection 1997a(b) and subsection 1997c(d).

In support of their argument that the Court should not adopt the Christiansburg standard in applying subsection 1997a(b), the defendants first point out that the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, unlike other civil rights statutes, only exists for the purpose of providing the United States with standing; it does not create any substantive rights. In addition, subsection 1997a(b) specifically disallows an award of attorney's fees to the United States when it prevails. It follows that there can never be an attorney's fees award to a prevailing plaintiff under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act. Therefore, the defendants urge, the Court should not interpret its provisions in the same manner as traditional civil rights statutes.

Second, the defendants contend that the legislative history supports the conclusion that attorney's fees may be awarded pursuant to subsection 1997a(b) simply if a defendant prevails. The defendants rely on the House conference report on the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act which states, in pertinent part,

In both the initiation and intervention sections, the Act makes clear the liability of the United States to opposing parties for attorneys' fees whenever it loses. The award is discretionary with the court, and it is intended that the present standards used by the courts under the civil rights laws will apply.

H. Conf. Rep. No. 96-897, at 12 (1980), reprinted at 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 832, 837. According to the defendants, the "present standards" language refers to the standard set forward in Piggie Park,namely, that fees should ordinarily be awarded to the prevailing party in the absence of special circumstances. The defendants also point out that Christiansburg was decided only a few years before the Civil Rights...