United States v. Arnulfo-Sanchez
| Decision Date | 04 August 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-4186.,No. 01-4132.,01-4132.,01-4186. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JUAN ARNULFO-SANCHEZ, Defendant - Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
(Utah) (D. Ct. No. 2:99-CR-641-J).
Before HARTZ, McKAY and O'BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Juan Arnulfo-Sanchez, along with a codefendant, Robert Escamilla, was convicted by a jury in a joint trial of one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He challenges his conviction on three grounds: 1) his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by an unlawful detention and an involuntary consent to search; 2) he was prejudiced by prosecutorial misconduct; and 3) the evidence was insufficient to prove he had constructive possession of the controlled substance. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
On November 3, 1999, Mr. Sanchez was driving on I-70 with Mr. Escamilla in the passenger seat. A highway patrol trooper stopped the vehicle for two traffic offenses. (ROA, Vol. IV at 4). Upon request from the trooper, Mr. Sanchez produced a valid driver's license, and Mr. Escamilla provided a California vehicle registration showing David Guarcia to be the owner. (ROA, Vol. IV at 5-6). When asked about their travel plans, Mr. Sanchez told the trooper they were en route to Indiana to attend a family reunion, but could not say exactly where the reunion was being held. (ROA, Vol. IV at 7; 41). Mr. Escamilla added that they were to call a family member to confirm where they were headed once they neared Indiana. (ROA, Vol. IV at 7). During this initial encounter, the trooper detected an odor he believed to be indicative of methamphetamine. (ROA, Vol. IV at 5,27,43). The trooper obtained written consent to search the vehicle from both passengers. (ROA, Vol. IV at 8, 54). Following his nose, the trooper traced the scent to the passenger compartment, then to the trunk, and finally to the back seat. The trooper removed the seat, which revealed a hidden compartment under the floorboard where approximately twenty pounds of methamphetamine was discovered wrapped in duct taped packages.(2) (ROA, Vol. IV at 8-10). After arresting both Mr. Escamilla and Mr. Sanchez, the trooper conducted a thorough search of the trunk and its contents. In the trunk, the trooper found a gas can, a bag of dog food, and two bags of clothing. (ROA, Vol. V at 8). One of the clothing bags carried a tag bearing Mr. Sanchez's name, and inside that bag was a day planner. (ROA, Vol. V at 8). A search of the passenger compartment revealed another day planner with an airline ticket stub issued in Mr. Escamilla's name. (ROA, Vol. V at 9, 13). Both passengers' wallets were seized. (ROA, Vol. V at 10, 13). Mr. Escamilla was carrying $1,872 in cash along with a small quantity of cocaine. (ROA, Vol IV at 11, 61). Mr. Sanchez was carrying $991 in cash. (ROA, Vol. IV at 11).
Mr. Sanchez challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the methamphetamine found hidden in the compartment under the rear floorboard, as well as the day planner and its contents, which were found in the trunk. His appeal presents two issues: 1) whether the officer had objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify further detention beyond the scope of the traffic stop; and 2) whether the consent to search the vehicle was voluntary.
We will uphold the district court's denial of the motion to suppress unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479, 1483 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 511 U.S. 1095 (1944) (citations omitted). But, the ultimate determination of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is a question of law, which we review de novo. Id.
During a routine traffic stop, an officer may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, ask about travel plans and vehicle ownership, and may run a computer check before issuing a citation. United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1267-68 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied 535 U.S. 1019 (2002); United States v. Zubia-Melendez, 263 F.3d 1155, 1161 (10th Cir. 2001). Once the driver has produced a valid license and proof that he is entitled to operate the car, further detention and questioning beyond that related to the initial stop is permissible "only if there exists an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is occurring." Williams, 271 F.3d at 1268; Zubia-Melendez, 263 F.3d at 1161 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Mr. Sanchez does not contend the initial traffic stop was improper. Instead, he claims his constitutional rights were violated because the trooper fabricated his justification for the subsequent detention and further questioning. Mr. Sanchez challenges the trooper's testimony that an odor of raw methamphetamine was detectable during the initial encounter.(3) As a result, we must determine whether reasonable suspicion existed to support the detention of Mr. Sanchez beyond the time required for the initial stop.
Considering all the evidence, the district court believed the trooper's testimony that he detected an odor, which his training and experience indicated was the scent of raw methamphetamine. The trooper testified the odor was "distinct," and he recognized the scent when he first approached the vehicle. (ROA, Vol. IV at 5). Even though the odor testimony alone, if credible, could satisfy the threshold test and justify further detention and questioning, the district court also credited the testimony about inconsistent travel plans given by the two defendants, as well as the dubious registration of the vehicle to a person they could not readily identify.(4) Nothing suggests the district court's finding of reasonable and articulable suspicion was erroneous, so we turn to the question of probable cause to search.(5)
"An officer has probable cause to search a car if, under totality of circumstances, there is a fair probability the car contains contraband or evidence." United States v. Parker, 72 F.3d 1444, 1450 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). The scent of raw methamphetamine emanating from vehicle (as was the case here) will suffice to provide probable cause for a search of the entire vehicle, including the trunk. United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).(6)
Additionally, the factors found to justify the detention and questioning also support a probable cause determination. Still further, after discovering the secret compartment and its contents (twenty pounds of methamphetamine), the trooper had abundant reason to thoroughly search the trunk and its contents, which we note was done post-arrest. There was no Fourth Amendment violation.
At the close of the government's evidence, Mr. Sanchez's counsel moved in open court for a dismissal of the charges as a matter of law, and in the alternative, he renewed a previous objection to discovery violations and asked for a mistrial. (Sanchez Appdx. Vol III., 457). The district court denied the motion to dismiss and reserved ruling on the motion for a new trial.(7) (Id. at 467). Mr. Sanchez's trial motions attacked the chain of custody of evidence and accused the government of intentionally delaying discovery of a handwriting analysis report. (Sanchez. Appx. Vol. III, pp. 457-67). After trial, but before the district court ruled on the motion for a new trial, Mr. Sanchez filed a Motion for Judgement of Acquittal pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29,(8) requesting a mistrial and dismissal of the indictment as a sanction for the government's alleged violation of his constitutional rights. (Vol.1, Doc. 158). In support of his motion, he filed a supplemental memoranda containing a plethora of accusations of prosecutorial misconduct. (Id.). At the post-trial hearing on his motion for acquittal, Mr. Sanchez focused only on his claims that the prosecution falsely represented to the defense the availability and substance of a report from the government's handwriting analyst, and that the government was under an obligation to, but did not, disclose the findings of the report to the jury.(9) (Sanchez Vol. XXIII, 8-9). The district court denied his motion for acquittal as well as his pending motion for a new trial, concluding that the government did not misrepresent to the defense or to the court either the availability of the report or its substance. (Id. at 26-28). The district court also discarded Mr. Sanchez's claim that he was prejudiced by the government's choice not to divulge the handwriting report to the jury. (Id.).
On appeal, Mr. Sanchez narrows the issues and now argues: 1) by failing to disclose the handwriting report to the jury, the government deliberately misrepresented the truth; and 2) the government intentionally withheld information from the defense that might have been used to impeach the arresting trooper. Nowhere in Mr. Sanchez's briefs on appeal do we find any express reference that he is appealing either the denial of his motion for acquittal or the denial of his motion for a new trial. He simply requests that "[t]he conviction should be reversed, and the case remanded for judgment of acquittal." (Sanchez Second Corrected Opening Brief at 29). In any event, the district court did not err.
Prosecutorial misconduct is not grounds for action under Rule 29. United States v. Ellison, 684 F.2d 664, 665 (10th Cir. 1982) vacated on other grounds, 722 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1982). "The proper basis for a Rule 29(a) motion for judgment of acquittal is a claim of insufficient evidence in light of the elements of the offense charged." United States v. Urena, 27 F.3d 1487, 1490 (10th Cir. 1994) cert. denied, 513 U.S. 977 (1994). Sufficient evidence was presented to sustain Mr. Sanchez's convictions. (See discussion infra).
We review the...
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