United States v. Arrington
Decision Date | 09 May 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 99-3444,99-3444 |
Citation | 215 F.3d 855 |
Parties | (8th Cir. 2000) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE, v. ROYAL TERRELL ARRINGTON, APPELLANT. Submitted: |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota.
Before Wollman, Chief Judge, Fagg and Murphy, Circuit Judges.
Royal Terrell Arrington appeals his conviction and sentence as a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). We affirm Arrington's conviction, but vacate his sentence and remand to the district court.
Arrington was arrested in Hennepin County, Minnesota after a high speed chase that ended when Arrington and his passenger jumped from their moving car and fled. During an inventory search of Arrington's car, a shotgun was found in the hatchback. Arrington was charged with felony firearm possession and fleeing police. At the police station he was advised of his Miranda rights, requested counsel, and was represented throughout the course of the state proceedings. Arrington pleaded guilty to the charge of fleeing police and the firearm charge was dropped. Shortly after Arrington began serving his state sentence, an Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) agent arrested Arrington at the Hennepin County Detention Center on a federal felon in possession charge and again advised Arrington of his Miranda rights. Arrington waived his Miranda rights and gave a statement to the ATF agent. A jury convicted Arrington on the federal charge and he was sentenced to 77 months imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Arrington appeals his federal conviction and sentence.
Arrington first contends his statement to the ATF agent was taken in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel and should have been suppressed under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988). We agree that Edwards and Roberson mandate that "after a person in custody has expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, he 'is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police,'" Roberson, 486 U.S. at 682, and that this rule applies "[w]hether a contemplated reinterrogation concerns the same or a different offense, or whether the same or different law enforcement authorities are involved in the second investigation," id. at 687. Although the Fifth Amendment right to counsel continues throughout the duration of police custody, see Butler v. Aiken, 846 F.2d 255, 258 (4th Cir. 1988), we find no support in Edwards or Roberson for Arrington's contention that the right also "continu[es] ad infinitum," and certainly not where, as here, the accused has entered a guilty plea and has begun serving his sentence. United States v. Hall, 905 F.2d 959, 963 (6th Cir. 1990) ( ). When Arrington was arrested on state charges, he validly invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel and that right was scrupulously honored throughout the state proceedings. After pleading guilty to the state flight charge, Arrington was transferred from police custody to correctional custody to serve his sentence. At that point, Arrington was no longer "'in custody' as that term has been used in the context of Edwards and Roberson," id. at 962, and Edwards and Roberson were no longer applicable as a basis for suppressing Arrington's statement to the ATF agent, see McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177 (1991) ( ); Holman v. Kemna, 212 F.3d 413, 418(8th Cir.2000) (same). Thus, the district court properly denied Arrington's motion to suppress his statement.
We reject Arrington's claim that the district court erroneously denied his motion for judgment of acquittal because Arrington's conviction was supported by substantial evidence, see United States v. Boyd, 180 F.3d 967, 978-79 (8th Cir. 1999), and as the district court observed, "[a] juror could reason that [Arrington's] possession [of a firearm] was the explanation for his dangerous and lengthy flight from police." We also reject Arrington's claim that the district court should have granted his motion for a new trial. Contrary to Arrington's view, the district court properly instructed the jury on the use of hearsay testimony during final jury instructions, see United States v. Perkins, 94 F.3d 429,...
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