United States v. Barnes
Decision Date | 02 November 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 73-1227.,73-1227. |
Citation | 486 F.2d 776 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. James G. BARNES, Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Daniel P. Reardon, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.
Richard Coffin, Asst. U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., for appellee.
Before VAN OOSTERHOUT, Senior Circuit Judge, and LAY and ROSS, Circuit Judges.
James G. Barnes was convicted on two counts of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) for knowingly and intentionally distributing heroin; he likewise was convicted on two separate counts of violating 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) for knowingly and intentionally possessing heroin and marijuana. He was sentenced to ten years imprisonment and a three year special parole term on each of the distribution counts, said sentences to run concurrently, and a one year concurrent sentence on the possession counts.
On appeal defendant raises a single ground of error. He contends that the government was obligated to produce a paid government informant who allegedly participated with the defendant in the criminal conduct charged under Counts I and II.
The prosecution did not call the informant to the stand. The government's case was submitted through the testimony of three detectives of the St. Louis police department. Their testimony reflected that on the morning of August 29, 1972, Charles Bullock, the informant, came to the Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement in St. Louis where he was "strip-searched" and, finding nothing, he was then given $120 in prerecorded government funds. Bullock was then followed and was observed getting into a truck driven by the accomplice, Bannister Robertson.1 Later, while the detectives still had the truck under surveillance, the defendant Barnes was observed approaching the truck, going into a house and receiving money from Robertson. Barnes was then observed giving Bullock a brown envelope. The detectives were located at distances of 60 to 150 feet away. Bullock was observed driving away and was followed until he was picked up by Detective Stolte, whereupon he gave the small brown envelope to the police officer. A subsequent search of his person revealed nothing more. The powder contained in the envelope was tested and shown to contain a net weight of .8 grams of her-in.
On September 8, 1972, a similar transaction took place. This time Barnes was observed giving Bullock three tinfoil packets, the contents of which later proved to be 1.1 grams net weight of heroin. The informant was not involved in the possession counts which took place on November 27, 1972, when the defendant was arrested at his home.
On December 29, 1972, the defendant moved under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for discovery and inspection of all incriminating and exculpatory evidence and the names of witnesses within the government's control. At the same time the defendant moved for production of witnesses for interview prior to trial, alleging inter alia: "The present whereabouts of said witnesses are unknown to defendant, and defendant believes that the Government knows or by reasonable inquiry could determine their places of confinement and could, without difficulty, make them available for interview by the defendant." (Our emphasis.) These motions were denied by the trial judge on February 8, 1973. Trial commenced on February 12, 1973.
The general rule concerning discovery of witnesses applicable in this circuit was set forth in United States v. Cole, 449 F.2d 194, 198 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 931, 92 S.Ct. 987, 30 L.Ed.2d 806 (1972), wherein we said:
However, since Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957), it is clear that the general rule of nondisclosure of witnesses is not always applicable to the informant. As the Supreme Court stated in Roviaro:
However, even where an informant is involved, the government's disclosure of his name and whereabouts must necessarily turn on the facts and circumstances involved. Again, as the Supreme Court has recognized:
2 Id. at 62, 77 S.Ct. at 628.
Certainly one of the most relevant factors to be weighed by the court is whether or not the evidence is material to the accused's defense or a fair determination of the cause.3
We think it clear from the cases decided since Roviaro that where the witness is an active participant or witness to the offense charged, disclosure will almost always be material to the accused's defense. Cf. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 65 n. 15, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957).
In Gilmore v. United States, 256 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1958), the informant was a witness to the transaction. The court also found that the informant had "set the stage" for the transaction in that he had acted as an intermediary between the defendant and the federal narcotics agent who purchased the drugs. The court held that this situation met the Roviaro test:
Gilmore, supra at 567.
In United States v. Roberts, 388 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1968), the informant was a witness to the alleged sale of narcotics. The court held that the government should have been required to disclose the informant's whereabouts, so that the defendant could interview the informant as a potential witness.4 See also United States v. Barnett, 418 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1969).
However, in many instances where the government failed to disclose the witness prior to trial, subsequent events may well correct any possible prejudice. Thus, where the witness is not disclosed but is produced at trial and the defendant is given ample opportunity for cross-examination no prejudice results. See Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 846, 80 S.Ct. 1619, 4 L.Ed.2d 1729 (1960). In some instances no prejudice results if the informant's identity was either known by the defendant or else disclosed through the testimony of other witnesses. See, e. g., Churder v. United States, 387 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1968); Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 846, 80 S.Ct. 1619, 4 L.Ed.2d 1729 (1960); Sorrentino v. United States, 163 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1947). Cf. United States v. Emory, 468 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir. 1972); Alverez v. United States, 282 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1960).
In some cases, where disclosure might have otherwise been appropriate, the courts have held that the accused waived his right to disclosure. For example, in United States v. Cansler, 419 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1029, 90 S.Ct. 1278, 25 L.Ed.2d 540 (1970), one of the factors relied upon by the court to refuse disclosure was that defendant had never demanded production of the informant prior to trial. See also United States v. Smart, 448 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 998, 92 S.Ct 1269, 31 L.Ed.2d 467 (1972); United States v. Roberts, 401 F.2d 538 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1005, 89 S.Ct. 496, 21 L.Ed.2d 469 (1968); Firo v. United States, 340 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Coke, 339 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1964).
The government contends that it is not obligated to produce the informant for interview prior to trial. It argues that the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation does not involve pretrial disclosure, citing United States ex rel. Meadows v. New York, 426 F.2d 1176 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 941, 91...
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