United States v. Baugham

• Decision Date: 24 April 2013
• Docket Number: Criminal No. 01–253–02 (RCL).
• Citation: 941 F.Supp.2d 109
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Reginald BAUGHAM, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

941 F.Supp.2d 109

UNITED STATES of America

v.Reginald BAUGHAM, Defendant.

Criminal No. 01–253–02 (RCL).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

April 24, 2013.

Thomas Anthony Quinn, Margaret J. Chriss, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Anthony Douglas Martin, Anthony D. Martin, PC, Greenbelt, MD, Herbert Levenstein, Kopstein & Associates, LLC, Seabrook, MD, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, Chief Judge.

Now before the Court is petitioner Reginald Baugham's pro se Motion [646] to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Upon consideration of petitioner's pro se Motion [646], the Government's Opposition [658], the entire record herein, the applicable law, and for the reasons set forth below, petitioner's motion will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner Reginald Baugham (“Baugham” or “Petitioner”) was a prominent player in a drug conspiracy located near the intersection of 60th and Blaine Streets, Northeast, from approximately 1992 through May of 2000. Pre–Sentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) ¶ 8.¹ The Metropolitan Police Department conducted an investigation of the outfit, which it deemed the “Marco Polo Crack Distribution Ring.” ²Id. at ¶ 7. Aspects of the investigation included drug seizures, surveillance activities, use of cooperating witnesses, and undercover police activity. Id. MPD ultimately arrested sixteen people in connection with its investigation. Id.

Baugham's alleged role in the conspiracy at trial was as a “major supplier of crack cocaine to other dealers,” who then distributed it throughout the area in which the enterprise operated. Id. Baugham sold crack on a daily basis, and began acting as a wholesale supplier to others sometime in 1997, ultimately supplying at least five otherdrug distributers. Id. at ¶ 9. Baugham often worked closely with Michael Wells, his half-brother, to buy and sell larger quantities of crack. Id. at ¶ 10.

By a twenty-four count indictment returned by the grand jury against sixteen defendants, petitioner was charged with: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; (2) unlawful distribution of cocaine base, and aiding and abetting, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. § 2; (3) unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); (4) using, carrying, and possessing a firearm during a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1); and (5) possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iii), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Gov't Opp'n 2, ECF No. 658.

After denying petitioner's motion to sever, Order, ECF No. 269, the Court tried Baugham along with four codefendants. Petitioner's defense at trial amounted to admitting to selling drugs but denying his membership in the conspiracy. Gov't Opp'n 18. Among the evidence presented at trial was a surveillance videotape showing Baugham giving a plastic bag to Darrell Young, which was found to contain 2.7 grams of crack, PSR ¶ 17; various informants who testified to obtaining crack from Baugham on a regular basis throughout the course of the conspiracy, id. at ¶¶ 22–24, 27; and a witness called by Baugham, Paula Spriggs, who testified to buying an amount of crack from Baugham that amounts to approximately 2.2 kilograms over twelve years, id. at ¶ 30.

On July 28, 2003, a jury convicted petitioner of the conspiracy and distribution charges; the jury acquitted him of the firearm charges. Id. at 3. The court found that petitioner's Guidelines' level was 43 and sentenced petitioner to a term of life on the conspiracy charge as mandated by the Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”), concurrent terms of 360 months on the distribution and possession charges, and ten years of supervised release. Id. Baugham appealed.

On appeal, Baugham argued, inter alia, that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his various convictions and that there was a “fatal variance between the conspiracy alleged and the proof at trial.” United States v. Baugham, 449 F.3d 167, 170 (D.C.Cir.2006). The D.C. Circuit affirmed petitioner's convictions but remanded the case for resentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), which made the Sentencing Guidelines advisory and was decided after the defendant's sentencing. Baugham, 449 F.3d at 183. On December 14, 2007, the Court resentenced petitioner to three concurrent 240–month terms of imprisonment, three concurrent terms of ten years of supervised release, and a $1,000 fine. Gov't Opp'n 4.

Baugham again appealed, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed his sentences. United States v. Baugham, 613 F.3d 291, 293 (D.C.Cir.2010) (per curium). Both Baugham's petition for rehearing en banc, and his petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, were denied. Baugham v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1510, 179 L.Ed.2d 334 (2011).

On February 17, 2012, Baugham filed this timely pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Mot. Set Aside 2, ECF No. 646. Specifically, petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because his attorney (1) failed to interview Paula Spriggs, a defense witness, before presenting her testimony at trial, id. at 24, (2) failed to challenge the admissibility of co-defendant Marco Polo Honesty's statements, id. at 4, and (3) failed to investigate an allegation that a government witness had been improperly coached during trial, id. at 4–5. The government opposes petitioner's motion on substantive grounds. See generally Gov't Opp'n.

II. DISCUSSION

Section 2255 permits federal prisoners to collaterally attack an otherwise final sentence if (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence was imposed in excess of the maximum authorized by law; or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). The burden of proof is on the petitioner to demonstrate his right to relief under § 2255 by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Basu, 881 F.Supp.2d 1, 4 (D.D.C.2012). The petitioner must “clear a significantly higher hurdle” when seeking collateral relief than he would on direct appeal. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 166, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982). Indeed, claims not raised on direct appeal are generally barred outright “unless the defendant shows cause and prejudice.” Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504, 123 S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims fall outside the bounds of this rule, however, as they may be raised in collateral proceedings under § 2255. Id. Still, a district court may deny a § 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing when “the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619, 625 (D.C.Cir.1996). Baugham's motion does not require a hearing because the record conclusively shows that he is not entitled to relief.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner “must prove both incompetence and prejudice.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). Specifically, petitioner must demonstrate that (1) “counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms” and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). This sets a high bar, as a court's evaluation of counsel's actions “must be highly deferential,” and is assessed under the circumstances present at the time of representation without the benefit of hindsight. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Furthermore, a “reasonable probability” under Strickland's second prong is one that is “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To find prejudice, the petitioner must show that is “a substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood of a different result.” Cullen v. Pinholster, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011) (quotations and internal modifications omitted). An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is defeated if the defendant fails to demonstrate either prong. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

Baugham's claims that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance fail because he has not adequately demonstrated that his counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Each of petitioner's ineffective assistanceof counsel claims stem from the trial portion of his case. The Court will address each of these claims in turn.

A. Alleged Failure to Interview Key Defense Witness

First, Baugham argues that his trial counsel failed to interview a key defense witness, Paula Spriggs, prior to presenting her testimony to the jury. Mot. Set Aside 2–4. Petitioner explains that Spriggs's testimony was meant “to show that Baugham was not involved in a conspiracy with other co-defendants, but distributing narcotics solely and separately from his co-defendants.” Id. at 2. That was his trial strategy. When on the stand, however, Spriggs “grossly misstated the drug quantity she purchased from Baugham, which in turn placed Baugham in a much higher base offense level.” Id. at 2–3. Indeed, Baugham's attorney noted to...