United States v. Martin

Decision Date26 October 2021
Docket Number98-cr-329-RCL
PartiesUNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JEROME MARTIN, JR., SAMUEL CARSON, WILLIAM KYLE SWEENEY, SEAN COATES, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Royce C. Lamberth United States District Judge

In 2001, defendants Jerome Martin, Jr., Samuel Carson, William Sweeney, and Sean Coates were each convicted for narcotics- and racketeer-influenced corrupt organization ("RICO") conspiracies, murder and other violent crimes, violent crimes in aid of racketeering, narcotics trafficking, and weapons possession. The trial court sentenced each defendant to lengthy prison terms in 2002. In February 2008, defendants each moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct their sentences. ECF Nos. 1017, 1020, 1021, 1023. Years later-beginning in 2014-defendants filed numerous amendments to their initial motions.[1] ECF Nos. 1104, 1140, 1156, 1166, 1170 1182, 1183, 1184, 1191, 1192, 1197, 1198, 1229, 1233, 1273. The government then filed an omnibus response in opposition. ECF No. 1255.

Defendants pepper their motions with claims alleging government misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, and unconstitutional sentences. Many are time-barred or procedurally defaulted. Some claims are one-sentence assertions with no factual support. And other claims misrepresent the record. All told, defendants have alleged nearly ninety claims for the Court to adjudicate. After considering defendants' filings, the government's response, and the entire record, the Court will DENY defendants' motions to vacate, set aside, or correct their sentences.

I.BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background

This case is a "story of mayhem and disorder." United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 339-47 (D.C Cir. 2006). Defendants organized and operated a massive narcotics conspiracy around the 200 block of K Street, Southwest, in the District of Columbia for nearly twenty years. Id. at 339. Their drug business "led to an astonishing amount of violence and a seemingly complete repudiation of civil society and respect for human life." Id. Defendants' drug conspiracy ended only after a multiyear investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") resulted in their arrests. Id. Though defendants' § 2255 motions focus on the crimes listed below, these events are only a fraction of defendants' overall misconduct.

In 1991, defendant Carson shot and killed Anthony Fortune after a dispute over a craps game. An eyewitness testified that Carson "walk[ed] towards [Fortune], shooting," then "stood over top of him and shot him." 02/13/01 (AM) Tr. 25, ECF No. 668. Carson then got into a car driven by Martin and the two drove away. Id. at 27. Other witnesses testified that Martin and Carson bragged about shooting Fortune years later. See, e.g., 03/12/01 (PM) Tr. 34-35, ECF No. 954 (James Montgomery).

In 1993, the defendants kidnapped Anthony Pryor-who testified against them at trial. A Maryland resident awoke to the sound of four individuals outside. Carson, 455 F.3d at 343. She saw four men arguing with Anthony Pryor. Id. After an argument, the men began to fight him. Id. Pryor started to run, but an assailant shot him twice and the men kidnapped him. Id. As the car drove off, the witness saw that the door to the trunk had come off of the car. Id. Later that night, police investigated a car that was missing a trunk door and had "bloodstains," "clothing items, car parts, and duct tape ... scattered all around." Id. Defendant Coates's fingerprints were found on the car. Id. Coates later told James Montgomery-the government's key witness at trial-that he had kidnapped someone who had broken the trunk door of a car to escape. Id.

In 1996, K Street members committed a robbery that resulted in the triple murder of Alonzo Gaskins, Darnell Mack, and Melody Anderson. Id. at 344. Sweeney, Coates, and Montgomery drove to Gaskins's craps house in Temple Hills, Maryland. Id. at 345. Sweeney brought a .40 caliber Glock firearm with him. Id. at 345. Sweeney and Montgomery jumped out of the car to rob the house; Coates stayed behind. Id. "Without attempting to rob Gaskins, Sweeney shot Gaskins, shot Mack, and then shot Anderson on his way out." Id. Montgomery recounted this story in detail at trial.

Seemingly undeterred by the blood on their hands, defendants soon began killing off potential witnesses. In 1997, the FBI arrested Robert Smith, one of the K Street gang's main suppliers. Id. at 346. Smith agreed to cooperate and gave statements incriminating the defendants in crimes of violence-including the Maryland triple murder. Id. at 347. Carson and Montgomery looked for opportunities to kill Smith, but he was often with others. Id. On June 16, 1997, Carson borrowed Montgomery's car. Id. Smith was shot later that day. Id. Though the government presented no eyewitness testimony at trial, Montgomery testified that when Carson returned with the car, Carson said, "man, trust me, we're all right" and told Montgomery to avoid the crime scene. Id. Smith was shot eleven times-seven times in the head. Id.

B. Procedural Background

On September 18, 1998, the government indicted defendants for a narcotics conspiracy, a racketeering conspiracy, murders, other violent crimes, narcotics trafficking, and weapons possession. Id. at 347. Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson presided over a nine-month joint trial of all the defendants. Id. Ultimately, the jury returned guilty verdicts against defendants on most counts in the indictment. Id. The Court sentenced each defendant to life imprisonment, with consecutive sentences based on 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) to run after the life sentences. See Id. at 382. In 2006, the D.C. Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions. Id. at 339. The Supreme Court denied defendants' petitions for writs of certiorari on February 20, 2007. Carson v. United States, 549 U.S. 1246(2007).

These collateral proceedings then began. On February 15, 2008, then-Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan ordered the Clerk's Office to provide "copies of any necessary sealed pleadings in this matter" to defendant Sweeney's counsel. ECF No. 1016. The remaining defendants indicated that they received access to these materials at that time. See, e.g., ECF No. 1170 at 9 n.6 (stating that the records were "turned over by the clerk in 2008"). Defendants all filed their first § 2255 motions between February 18 and 28, 2008. ECF Nos. 1017, 1020, 1021, 1023.

Years later-starting in November 2014-defendants each filed amendments to their § 2255 motions. ECF Nos. 1156, 1166, 1170, 1197, 1198, 1273. After Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2251 (2015), and Davis v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019), defendants submitted arguments that their convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) were unconstitutional. ECF Nos. 1182, 1183, 1184, 1192, 1229. Defendants also moved to adopt arguments in their co-defendants' motions. ECF Nos. 1024, 1185, 1228, 1229 1230, 1249, 1279. On March 18, 2020, the government filed an omnibus response to these filings. ECF No. 1255.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence if: (1) the sentence was imposed "in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence "was in excess of the maximum authorized by law"; or (4) the sentence is "otherwise subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). The petitioner bears the burden to prove his right to relief by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Baugham, 941 F.Supp.2d 109, 112 (D.D.C. 2012). Moreover, a district court need not hold an evidentiary hearing when "the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show the prisoner is entitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).

Obtaining collateral relief requires a defendant to clear several procedural hurdles. First, § 2255 motions are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). The limitations period begins on the latest of:

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

Id. § 2255(f)(1)-(4). In most cases, the operative date will be the date that the "judgment of conviction becomes final." Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005). If a defendant seeks Supreme Court review, the judgment is "final" when the Supreme Court affirms the conviction on the merits or denies the certiorari petition altogether. See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003).

Claims raised after the one-year limitations period may still be considered if they "relate back" to timely claims. Claims relate back to the date of the initial § 2255 motion if they "arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set out... in the original [motion]." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(B); see United States v. Hicks, 283 F.3d 380, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2002). But later-raised claims will not relate back when they "assert[] a new ground for relief based on "facts that differ in both time and type" from the facts supporting the original pleading. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 650 (2005); see United States v. Coughlin, 251 F.Supp.3d 212, 218-19 (D.D.C. 2017).

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