United States v. Bennett

• Decision Date: 14 June 2021
• Docket Number: 13-CR-17S (1)
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. STEVEN BENNETT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. STEVEN BENNETT, Defendant.

13-CR-17S (1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

June 14, 2021

DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Presently before this Court is Defendant Steven Bennett's Motion for Compassionate Release, which the government opposes. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A). For the reasons discussed below, Bennett's motion is denied.

II. BACKGROUND

On August 14, 2017, Bennett pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute, and to distribute, 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, and 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, as well as to conspiring to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (h). (Docket Nos. 380, 381.) Approximately five months later, on January 9, 2018, this Court sentenced Bennett to 180 months' imprisonment on each count (concurrent), 5 years' and 3 years' supervised release (concurrent), a $200 special assessment, with no fine, fees or costs. (Docket Nos. 436, 439.) Bennett is presently serving his sentence at FCI Edgefield, with a release date of October 30, 2025. (See Sentence Computation Sheet, Docket No. 519, p. 34.)

On April 2, 2021, Bennett filed a pro se motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A)(i) on the basis that he is at heightened risk of severe illness from COVID-19 due to his medical conditions, which include diabetes, hypertension, hyperlipidemia, and obesity. (Docket No. 519.) The government opposed Bennett's motion on May 7, 2021. (Docket Nos. 523, 526.) Bennett had the opportunity to reply by June 4, 2021, but did not file any further submissions. (Docket No. 522.) Upon the expiration of the reply period, this Court took Bennett's motion under advisement without oral argument.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Compassionate Release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A)(i)

"A court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except pursuant to statute." United States v. Gotti, 433 F. Supp. 3d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). One such statute is 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A)(i) which, as amended by the First Step Act of 2018,¹ provides as follows:

The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that—in any case—the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553 (a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that—(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; . . . and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the SentencingCommission.

The defendant carries the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to a sentence reduction under the statute. See United States v. Ebbers, 432 F. Supp. 3d 421, 426-27 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). A defendant proceeding on his or her own motion may meet that burden by demonstrating (1) that he or she satisfied the statutory exhaustion requirement, (2) that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist for a sentence reduction, and (3) that a sentence reduction is consistent with the applicable Sentencing Guidelines provisions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A)(i); United States v. Perez, 451 F. Supp. 3d 288, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). If the court finds, after consideration of the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a) factors, that the defendant has met this burden, it may reduce the defendant's sentence under the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A)(i); see also United States v. Gileno, 448 F. Supp. 3d 183, 185 (D. Conn. 2020).

The statutory exhaustion requirement is mandatory and "must be strictly enforced." United States v. Monzon, No. 99 Cr. 157, 2020 WL 550220, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2020) (citing Theodoropoulos v. I.N.S., 358 F.3d 162, 172 (2d Cir. 2004)); United States v. Cassidy, 17-CR-116S, 2020 WL 1969303, at *3-8 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2020) (finding exhaustion mandatory). The exhaustion requirement is met when the earlier of two circumstances occurs: (1) the defendant fully exhausts all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion to modify an imposed term of imprisonment on his or her behalf,² or (2) 30 days lapse from the date the warden of thedefendant's facility receives the defendant's request to file such a motion on his or her behalf. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A).

Congress delegated to the Sentencing Commission the task of "describ[ing] what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction" under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A)(i). See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (t). The Commission, in turn, promulgated a Policy Statement concerning sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A) in § 1B1.13 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The Commentary to that section contains four examples of circumstances that constitute "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for a sentence reduction: "Medical Condition of the Defendant"; "Age of the Defendant"; "Family Circumstances"; and "Other Reasons". See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.

At issue here are the "Medical Condition of the Defendant" and "Other Reasons" examples. The "Medical Condition of the Defendant" example provides as follows:

Medical Condition of the Defendant—

(i) The defendant is suffering from a terminal illness (i.e., a serious and advanced illness with an end of life trajectory). A specific prognosis of life expectancy (i.e., a probability of death within a specific time period) is not required. Examples include metastatic solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-stage organ diseaseand advanced dementia.

(ii) The defendant is—

(I) suffering from a serious physical or medical condition,

(II) suffering from a serious functional or cognitive impairment, or

(III) experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging process,

that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover.

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 comment n. 1 (A).

The "Other Reasons" example is a catch-all provision encompassing "an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the [other] reasons described."³ Id. n. 1 (D).

As it relates to the requirement that a sentence reduction be consistent with the applicable Sentencing Guidelines provisions, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is once again the relevant provision. It provides that a court may reduce a sentence if, after consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a) factors, it determines that

(1) (A) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant thereduction; or

(B) the defendant (i) is at least 70 years old; and (ii) has served at least 30 years in prison pursuant to a sentence imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (c) for the offense or offenses for which the defendant is imprisoned;

(2) the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (g); and

(3) the reduction is consistent with this policy statement.

See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.

Finally, district courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny motions for sentence reduction. See Gileno, 448 F. Supp. 3d at 186.

B. Bennett's Motion for Compassionate Release

1. Exhaustion of Administrative Rights

As indicated above, 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A) contains a threshold exhaustion requirement. To satisfy this requirement, a defendant must demonstrate that either (1) he or she fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion to modify an imposed term of imprisonment on his or her behalf, or (2) 30 days have lapsed from the date the warden of the defendant's facility received the defendant's request to file such a motion on his or her behalf. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A).

For reasons discussed at length in two previous decisions (fully incorporated herein), this Court has found that the statutory exhaustion requirement is mandatory and cannot be excused. See Cassidy, 2020 WL 1969303, at *3-8; United States v. Schultz, 454 F. Supp. 3d 217, 220-223 (W.D.N.Y. 2020); accord United States v. Montanez, 458F. Supp. 3d 146, 149-160 (W.D.N.Y. 2020) (finding § 3582 (c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement mandatory).

Here, Bennett submitted his request for compassionate release to the warden of the Great Plains Correctional Facility⁴ on February 16, 2021, which the warden denied on February 22, 2021. (Motion for Compassionate Release, Docket No. 519, pp. 37, 38.) Thirty days having lapsed since February 16, 2021, this Court finds that Bennett has satisfied the statutory exhaustion requirement, and the government concedes as much. (See Memorandum of Law, Docket No. 523, p. 2.)

2. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons for Sentence Reduction

Bennett has served approximately 100 months of his 180-month sentence, or about 55% of it. (Sentence Computation Sheet, Docket No. 519, p. 35.) He is nearly 51 years old and suffers from several documented medical conditions, including diabetes, hypertension, hyperlipidemia, and obesity, all of which he argues makes him highly susceptible to severe illness from COVID-19. Bennett's recent medical records confirm these diagnoses and the government does not dispute them. (Docket No. 526.) Those records also reveal that Bennett has received a COVID-19 vaccine and is now completely inoculated. (See id. pp. 6, 27, 37.)

Having thoroughly reviewed the record, this Court first finds that Bennett's medical...