United States v. Benton

• Decision Date: 23 February 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-6023,20-6023
• Citation: 988 F.3d 1231
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Ronald BENTON, Defendant - Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

988 F.3d 1231

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.Ronald BENTON, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 20-6023

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

FILED February 23, 2021

Timothy C. Kingston, Law Office of Tim Kingston LLC, Foley, Alabama, for Defendant – Appellant.

Wilson D. McGarry, Assistant United States Attorney (Timothy J. Downing, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff – Appellee.

Before McHUGH, KELLY, and EID, Circuit Judges.

McHUGH, Circuit Judge.

A jury found defendant-appellant Ronald Benton guilty of one count of possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). The district court imposed a sentence based on the penalty found in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). Mr. Benton challenges his conviction on multiple grounds. Each of these grounds, however, is predicated on accepting his proposed interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in Rehaif v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 204 L.Ed.2d 594 (2019). Specifically, Mr. Benton argues that, under Rehaif , the government was required to prove not only that he knew he was a domestic violence misdemeanant, but also that he knew that status prohibited him from possessing a firearm. Mr. Benton contends his conviction must be vacated because the jury was not instructed it must find he knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm, and because the government presented insufficient evidence concerning his knowledge that he was so prohibited.

We reject Mr. Benton's interpretation of Rehaif and hold that in a prosecution under §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2), the government need not prove a defendant knew his status under § 922(g) prohibited him from possessing a firearm. Instead, the only knowledge required for conviction is that the defendant knew (1) he possessed a firearm¹ and (2) had the relevant status under § 922(g) at the time of his possession. Because we reject Mr. Benton's proposed interpretation of Rehaif , we further reject his challenges to the jury instructions and the sufficiency of the evidence. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm his conviction.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History

In May of 2018, Mr. Benton went to a gun store located in the Western District of Oklahoma. The manager of the store showed Mr. Benton several firearms, and Mr. Benton selected one for purchase. He returned to the store the following week and took possession of the gun.

Sometime after Mr. Benton took possession of the firearm, an FBI analyst discovered Mr. Benton had a prior domestic violence conviction. After verifying the FBI agent's determination, Special Agent Tim Holland, an agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, called Mr. Benton and "advised him, hey, because of your domestic violence conviction in New Mexico, you can't have this firearm." ROA, Vol. 3 at 53. Agent Holland also "advised [Mr. Benton] ... he could return [the firearm] where he bought it or to any other licensed dealer and get his money back." Id. Mr. Benton responded, stating, "he could possess the firearm and that he wasn't prohibited." Id. ; see also id. at 72 (Agent Holland's testimony that Mr. Benton "just flat-out said he could have the gun").

Agent Holland then obtained a warrant to seize the gun, which he executed in June of 2018. Mr. Benton does not dispute on appeal that, at the time he possessed the firearm, he knew he had been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. Nor does he dispute that he knowingly possessed the firearm. See Oral Arg. at 12:24–43 (asked whether Mr. Benton challenged his knowledge that he possessed the firearm or his knowledge that he possessed the status described in § 922(g), his counsel responded "no"). Mr. Benton does assert he was unaware his domestic violence conviction made it illegal for him to possess a firearm. He claims he is innocent because of this lack of knowledge.

B. Procedural History

1. New Mexico Misdemeanor Domestic Violence Conviction

In April 2007, Mr. Benton was charged with one count of "Battery Against a Household Member," under New Mexico Statute § 30-3-15, for "committ[ing] domestic abuse" against his wife. Supp. ROA at 12–13, Ex. 4. He pleaded guilty in June 2007.

2. Federal Proceedings

In December 2018, a grand jury issued an indictment charging Mr. Benton with one count of possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), the penalty for which is found in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). In March 2019, Mr. Benton pleaded guilty to the indictment without a plea agreement.

At the time Mr. Benton pleaded guilty, the law of this circuit applied the mens rea requirement of knowledge only to the defendant's possession of a firearm. See, e.g. , United States v. Games-Perez , 667 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir. 2012) ("Our circuit has expressly held that the only knowledge required for a § 922(g) conviction is knowledge that the instrument possessed is a firearm." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Prior to Mr. Benton's sentencing, the Supreme Court decided Rehaif , in which it held that "in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm." 139 S. Ct. at 2200. Mr. Benton filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in light of Rehaif , which the district court granted.

The grand jury then issued a two-count superseding indictment, followed by a second superseding indictment. As relevant here, the indictment again charged Mr. Benton with possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(9) and 924(a)(2).² The case proceeded toward trial.

The government moved in limine to prohibit Mr. Benton from arguing to the jury that he did not know his misdemeanor domestic violence conviction made it unlawful for him to possess the firearm. Mr. Benton objected, arguing that granting the government's motion "would deprive him of the essence of the defense which Rehaif states it provides." ROA, Vol. 1 at 135. The district court granted the government's motion, reasoning " Rehaif requires that the defendant have knowledge of his status. Rehaif does not hold that the [g]overnment must further prove, based on the defendant's status, that the defendant knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm." Id. at 136. The district court "ma[de] clear that in granting the [g]overnment's Motion, [Mr. Benton] [wa]s not prohibited from arguing that he did not have knowledge of his status"—that is, he was not prohibited from arguing to the jury that he did not know he was a domestic violence misdemeanant. Id. at 136–37. Mr. Benton was solely "prohibited from arguing he did not know that his status made it unlawful for him to possess a firearm." Id. at 137.

Mr. Benton thereafter submitted proposed jury instructions. He requested that the district court instruct the jury that the elements of a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) include that he "knew that his status made him a prohibited person from possessing a firearm." ROA, Vol. 1 at 120. He cited Rehaif as the authority for the requested instruction. Id. The district court denied Mr. Benton's request, explaining that its "motion in limine ruling had rejected that interpretation of the recent Supreme Court case in Rehaif ." ROA, Vol. 3 at 98. The district court instructed the jury that to find Mr. Benton guilty, it must find, among other things, that the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that "at the time [Mr. Benton] possessed the firearm, [he] knew he had been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." ROA, Vol. 1 at 160. But the court did not instruct the jury that it must further find the government proved Mr. Benton knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm as a result of his domestic violence conviction.

After a two-day trial, the jury convicted Mr. Benton. The district court entered judgment and sentenced Mr. Benton to 6 months of home detention and 5 years of probation. Mr. Benton timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

Mr. Benton was convicted of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(9) and 924(a)(2). Section 922(g) makes it unlawful for certain individuals to "possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition." The provision lists nine categories of individuals subject to the prohibition, the ninth of which is "any person ... who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). A separate provision, § 924(a)(2), adds that anyone who "knowingly violates" § 922(g) shall be fined or imprisoned for up to 10 years.

When Mr. Benton pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) in March of 2019, the Courts of Appeals had unanimously applied the mens rea requirement of knowledge to only one element under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) —possession of a firearm. See, e.g. , Games-Perez , 667 F.3d at 1140 ("[The Tenth C]ircuit has expressly held that the only knowledge required for a § 922(g) conviction is knowledge that the instrument possessed is a firearm." (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Williams , 946 F.3d 968, 970 (7th Cir. 2020) (observing that before Rehaif , "[t]he Courts of Appeals had unanimously concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) ... required the government to prove a defendant knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition, but not that he knew he belonged to one of the prohibited classes"). The Supreme Court in Rehaif disagreed, holding that "in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of...