United States v. Biehunko, Civil Action No. 60.

• Decision Date: 03 June 1944
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 60.
• Citation: 55 F. Supp. 706
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. BIEHUNKO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

55 F. Supp. 706

UNITED STATES v. BIEHUNKO.

Civil Action No. 60.

District Court, S. D. Texas, Victoria Division.

June 3, 1944.

Brian S. Odem, United States Attorney, and J. K. Smith, Assistant United States Attorney, both of Houston Tex., and Benjamin S. Catchings, Senior Attorney, Department of Agriculture, of Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

No appearance for defendant.

KENNERLY, District Judge.

This is a suit by the Government against the defendant, a cotton farmer and producer, residing in Lavaca County, in this District and Division, under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Sections 1281 to 1393, Title 7 U.S.C.A., to recover the penalty fixed by the Act for excessive production of cotton, and for injunction under Section 1376.

Though duly served with citation, defendant has not served nor filed an answer or other pleading, nor has he appeared. The Government has moved for a judgment by default under Rule 55(b) (2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, but a trial was had, at which the Government offered evidence in support of its claim.

The facts are substantially these:

(a) The evidence shows the making of Allotments to, and the fixing of quotas of, cotton farmers in Lavaca County, as required by the Act.

(b) Defendant's allotment for 1940-41 marketing year was 23.4 acres of cotton, and his marketing quota was 3604 pounds of cotton. During such year, however, he planted 41.9 acres of cotton, and produced and marketed 4608 pounds of cotton, or 1004 pounds in excess of his quota.

(c) Defendant's allotment for 1942-43 marketing year was 24 acres of cotton, and his final marketing quota was 4094 pounds of cotton. During such year, however, defendant planted 36.1 acres of cotton, and produced and marketed 6150 pounds of cotton, or according to the Government's claim, 2047 pounds in excess of his quota.

(d) The Government has heretofore recovered from defendant a judgment in this Court in Civil Action No. 26 for $80.79, being the penalty it was claimed he incurred for marketing cotton in excess of his quota during the marketing year 1938-39. This judgment has not been paid.

(e) There is sufficient evidence to support a finding, and I find, that a large part of the cotton produced in Texas during the marketing years 1940-41 and 1942-43, including the cotton raised by defendant, moved in interstate commerce.

1. No questions have been raised with respect to the constitutional validity of the Act. This may be regarded as settled. See Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 47, 59 S.Ct. 648, 83 L.Ed. 1092; Troppy v. La Sara Farmers Gin Company, Inc., 5 Cir., 113 F.2d 350; Hawthorne v. United States, 5 Cir., 115 F.2d 805. The only question is as to the injunction prayed for by the Government.

2. Claiming that defendant has violated the provisions of the Act and Regulations promulgated thereunder, and has maintained a hostile attitude towards the cotton marketing program, while enjoying the benefits therefrom, etc., the Government prays for injunctive relief.¹ An examination of the Act discloses that unlike some other similar Acts, it contains no specific provision for the issuance of an injunction. The wording is that the several District Courts are vested with jurisdiction specifically to enforce the provisions of the Act, i.e., that in enforcing the Act, such Courts may exercise their jurisdiction both at law and in equity.² But it is clear that such Courts, in any proceeding in Equity to enforce the Act, have only the plain and time honored jurisdiction of a Court of Equity. Hecht Company v. Bowles, Administrator, 321 U.S. 321, 64 S.Ct. 587. And that no matter how hostile defendant may have been or may be to the enforcement of the Act, the Government, to obtain injunctive relief against him, must point to and prove some unlawful or inequitable act threatened by defendant, which Courts of Equity will, under the settled equity practice, enjoin.

3. One of these claimed by the Government is set forth by it in its prayer in its complaint, as follows:

"Wherefore, plaintiff demands:

"(1) That the Court issue a permanent injunction commanding defendant: (a) fully to comply with the provisions of Section 373(b) of the act and report or ascertain and report to the treasurer of the Agricultural Conservation Committee for Lavaca County, Texas, the names and addresses of the buyers of each and every bale of cotton produced on his said farm and marketed therefrom during the marketing years 1940-1941, and 1942-1943, not heretofore reported, with the date of each sale and the quantities sold using form number `Cotton-417'."

It is undoubtedly true that in enforcing in a Court of Equity the provisions of the Act, the Court has power, upon application of the Government, to require the farmer to make the reports which the Act provides that he shall make, but the Government's application must show good grounds and reasons for requiring him to do...