United States v. Bowling, 13–3895.
Decision Date | 07 November 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 13–3895.,13–3895. |
Citation | 770 F.3d 1168 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. James BOWLING, Defendant–Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Matthew J. Rinka, Office of the United States Attorney, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Robert L. Sirianni, Jr., Brownstone, P.A., Winter Park, FL, for Defendant–Appellant.
Before FLAUM, MANION, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.
James Bowling was convicted of two counts of making false statements in connection with the purchase of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). Bowling argues that he deserves a new trial because the trial court made three errors: it prevented him from asserting a mistake-of-fact defense; it refused to require the government to enter into a stipulation; and, it failed to submit the issue of materiality to the jury. We hold that the trial court violated Bowling's due process right to present a mistake-of-fact defense and remand for a new trial.
On December 15, 2011, a prosecutor in Rush County, Indiana charged James Bowling with strangulation, battery, and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The strangulation charge constituted a felony, while the others were misdemeanors. Bowling made his initial appearance on February 9, 2012, where he was informed that he faced potential imprisonment exceeding one year for the strangulation charge as it was a Class D felony.
Bowling's trial was originally set for the beginning of July 2012, but did not proceed as scheduled. At some point in the first half of July, the matter was continued when the prosecutor extended a plea offer to Bowling's counsel to dismiss the felony count against Bowling in exchange for a plea of guilty to misdemeanor offenses. Approximately three months later, on October 23, 2012, Bowling pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct—a new misdemeanor charge—in exchange for the dismissal of all other state charges against him.
On July 14, 2012, prior to the guilty plea and while the charges were still pending, Bowling attempted to purchase a firearm from Fields Outdoor Adventures (“Fields”), a federally licensed firearms dealer in Rushville, Indiana. Per federal regulations, Bowling was required to fill out ATF Form 4473 (“Form 4473”) before Fields could transfer possession of the firearm. The trial focused on two answers provided by Bowling. First, he answered “no” to question 11(b), which asked: “Are you under indictment or information in any court for a felony, or for any other crime, for which the judge could imprison you for more than one year?” Second, in the “Current Residence Address” block, Bowling provided a former address that was listed on his driver's license and where he maintained an office, but no longer resided. Before completing the paperwork, Bowling certified that his answers were correct.
Based upon these answers, the government filed a superseding indictment on June 4, 2013, charging Bowling with two counts of making a false statement in connection with the acquisition of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6).1 Prior to trial, Bowling filed a motion in limine to preclude the government from introducing the charging information and the transcript of the February 9, 2012 initial hearing. Instead, Bowling offered the following stipulation:
The court rejected Bowling's arguments. At trial, the government introduced a recording of the initial hearing, which included allegations that Bowling strangled a minor by “wrapping his arm around the neck and cutting off the airflow of ‘R.A.S.’ with a birthdate of, July 5, 1995.” (Case No. 1:12cv149–LJM: Tr. at 17 ; ECF Doc. 76–2 at 5–6.) Additionally, the jury heard allegations that Bowling induced the minor “to consume alcoholic beverages in his home.” Id. at 7.
The Rush County Prosecutor, Phillip Caviness () , testified for the government that he drafted the charging information against Bowling, including the felony charge for strangulation and the misdemeanor charges of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Finally, he testified that all of the charges were pending against Bowling on July 14, 2012 when Bowling filled out Form 4473.
On cross-examination, Bowling's counsel sought to question the county prosecutor about the plea offer to dismiss the felony count. The government objected that this testimony was irrelevant. After the trial judge sustained the government's objection, Bowling's counsel made an offer of proof in which the county prosecutor acknowledged that the trial in Bowling's state case had been scheduled for early July and that he had communicated a plea offer to Bowling's counsel whereby the state would dismiss the felony count in exchange for Bowling pleading guilty to a misdemeanor offense. The jury never heard this testimony.
The second count charged in the information addressed Bowling's false statement about his residential address. During closing argument, defense counsel argued that Bowling did not intend to deceive Fields by supplying the address listed on his driver's license, as he maintained an office at this address and received bills and other mail there. Further, the proximity of the given address to Bowling's residence (two blocks apart), and the small, rural nature of the town of Manilla, Indiana (population 267 according to the 2010 census), meant that Bowling was neither intending, nor likely, to deceive Fields regarding his actual residence.
Perhaps anticipating an argument from the defense that the false address provided by Bowling was not material, the government sought an instruction that a false statement was material as a matter of law. Noting that it was unusual for a “trial judge in a jury case to instruct the jury that one of the elements is good ...,” (Tr. at 164), the judge ultimately gave an instruction that: “A false street address is material to the lawfulness of the sale of a firearm.”
The jury convicted Bowling on both counts and he was sentenced to twenty-one months' imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently. Bowling appeals.
We review a district court's ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Jumper, 497 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir.2007). For a question of law, we review de novo whether an evidentiary ruling had the effect of infringing upon a defendant's constitutional rights. Id. If we find a constitutional error in an evidentiary ruling, we reverse unless the error is harmless. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).
To sustain a conviction that a defendant violated § 922(a)(6), the government must establish (1) that the defendant knowingly made a false statement to a licensed firearms dealer, (2) that the false statement was made in acquisition of a firearm, and (3) that the false statement was intended or likely to deceive the firearms dealer with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale of the firearm. See United States v. Dillon, 150 F.3d 754, 759 (7th Cir.1998).
Where the intent of the accused is an ingredient of the crime, its existence is a question of fact, which must be submitted to a jury. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). A mistake-of-fact defense relieves a person of criminal liability where a reasonable mistake of certain facts means that the person did not have the culpable mental state required for the commission of the offense. 1 Wharton's Criminal Law § 78 (15th ed.). To that end, § 922(a)(6) requires that the government establish that the defendant acted “knowingly,” meaning that Bowling knew that his statement was false. See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193, 118 S.Ct. 1939, 141 L.Ed.2d 197 (1998) ( ).
Also, § 922(a)(6) requires the government to prove either that the defendant made the statement with the intent to deceive the firearms dealer, or that the statement was of such nature that it was likely to deceive the dealer. See Dillon, 150 F.3d at 759. Both the knowledge and specific intent elements require evidence relating to the state of mind of the defendant; more significantly, both may be negated by evidence that the defendant labored under an honest misunderstanding of the facts. See Bryan, 524 U.S. at 192, 118 S.Ct. 1939 ( )(internal quotation omitted). In either case, a mistake of fact on the part of a defendant—determined by...
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