United States v. Brandon Michael Council
| Decision Date | 17 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | Criminal No.: 4:17-cr-00866-RBH |
| Parties | United States of America, v. Brandon Michael Council, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
This capital case is before the Court on Defendant Brandon Michael Council's "Motion for New Sentencing Trial and/or for Judgment of Acquittal As to Sentencing." See ECF No. 866 (emphases added). The Government has filed a response in opposition to Defendant's motion. See ECF No. 867. The Court denies the motion for the reasons herein.1
Defendant has been convicted of two capital offenses—bank robbery resulting in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (e), and use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence and causing death in such a manner to constitute murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and (j)—and sentenced to death for both offenses under the Federal Death Penalty Act ("FDPA").2 He has now filed a motion seeking a new sentencing trial and/or judgment of acquittal as to his death sentences, pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 29(c) and 33(b)(2). See ECF No. 866.
Rule 29(c) provides that "[a] defendant may move for a judgment of acquittal . . . after the court discharges the jury," and that "[i]f the jury has returned a guilty verdict, the court may set aside theverdict and enter an acquittal." Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c). It is unclear whether Rule 29 can be used to obtain a judgment of acquittal as to a capital sentencing hearing.3 Compare United States v. Runyon, 652 F. Supp. 2d 716, 718 (E.D. Va. 2009) (), and United States v. Sampson, 335 F. Supp. 2d 166, 198-202 (D. Mass. 2004) (same), with United States v. Lawrence, 735 F.3d 385, 411 (6th Cir. 2013) (), and United States v. Wilson, 967 F. Supp. 2d 673, 677 & n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (same). In any event and regardless, a district court has "inherent judicial power" to entertain a post-trial motion regarding a defendant's capital sentencing hearing. See Runyon, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 718-19 (collecting cases). Generally, Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d at 379 (internal citation omitted).
Rule 33 provides that "after the verdict" and "[u]pon the defendant's motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires." Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a), (b)(2); see, e.g., United States v. Lee, 274 F.3d 485, 491 (8th Cir. 2001) (). "A trial court should exercise its discretion to award a new trial sparingly, and a jury verdict is not to be overturned except in the rare circumstance when the evidence weighs heavily against it." United States v. Burfoot, 899 F.3d 326, 340 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). When the evidence is "wholly sufficient" to support the jury's verdict, a Rule 33 motion must be denied. United States v. Singh, 518 F.3d 236, 250 (4th Cir. 2008).
Defendant presents two arguments, which the Court will address in turn.
Defendant argues that his death sentences should be set aside and that he should be resentenced because the Court erred in allowing the jury to find and weigh two "inherently contradictory" aggravating factors. See ECF No. 866 at pp. 2-5. Specifically, he asserts that the statutory aggravating factor of Pecuniary Gain conflicted with the nonstatutory aggravating factor of Targeting Innocent Victims and that no rational jury could have found both these aggravators because they were inherently contradictory. Id.
ECF No. 603 at p. 3 (emphasis added). The Court rejected Defendant's pretrial argument that the Pecuniary Gain and Targeting Innocent Victims aggravators were in conflict. See ECF No. 413 at pp. 9-10. The jury unanimously found both aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt.4 See ECF Nos. 856 & 857 at pp. 3-4.
Defendant contends the jury's dual finding of both the Pecuniary Gain and Targeting Innocent Victims aggravators—which he claims were inherently contradictory—violated his rights to due process and to a reliable sentencing determination under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. See ECF No. 866 at p. 4. He argues, "Because jurors were invited to find both contradictory factors, they were freed from the important task of determining [his] motivation." Id.5
First, the Court finds the evidence clearly supported the jury's findings on both the Pecuniary Gain and Targeting Innocent Victims aggravators at issue. Moreover, the Court disagrees with Defendant's argument that these two aggravators were inconsistent, contradictory, or in conflict with each other. The factor alleging Defendant killed in expectation of pecuniary gain was not in conflict with the factor alleging Defendant targeted innocent victims. As the Government argued in its previous briefing:
The fact that the Defendant could have secured the gain without engaging in the level of violence he chose to employ certainly weighs in favor of the application of the innocent victim factor (and in part forms the basis for it); however, this in no way invalidates the fact that he killed the victims in order to acquire an ill-gotten pecuniarygain.
ECF No. 289 at p. 21. There was nothing "inherently contradictory" about these two aggravators. The Court has found no authority supporting Defendant's position, and Defendant has not established a basis for a new sentencing hearing or that his constitutional rights to due process and a reliable sentencing determination under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments were violated.
The Court will deny Defendant's motion with respect to his first argument.
Defendant makes a "non-delegation argument" contending "[t]he FDPA and the Court's judgment unconstitutionally delegate the authority to determine the form of [his] punishment." See ECF No. 866 at pp. 5-8. Specifically, he contends that 18 U.S.C. § 3596(a) impermissibly delegates legislative authority to the judiciary, and that both § 3596(a) and the criminal judgment entered by this Court (which cites § 3596(a), see ECF No. 860) impermissibly delegate the form of capital punishment to the State of South Carolina. See ECF No. 866 at pp. 7-8.6
"The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies ourtripartite system of Government." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989). "The principle of non-delegation requires that core governmental power must be exercised by the Department on which it is conferred and must not be delegated to others in a manner that frustrates the constitutional design." Kerpen v. Metro. Washington Airports Auth., 907 F.3d 152, 160 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) (); In re Search Warrant Issued June 13, 2019, 942 F.3d 159 (4th Cir. 2019) ().
Thus, when the Constitution vests "all legislative Powers" in a Congress of the United States, "the executive Power" in a President of the United States, and "the judicial Power" in one Supreme Court and such courts as Congress may establish, see U.S. Const. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1; id. art. III, § 1, a nondelegation principle serves both to separate powers as specified in the Constitution, see, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001), and to retain power in the governmental Departments so that delegation does not frustrate the constitutional design. Moreover, because the Constitution's text "permits no delegation of those powers," see Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472, in exercising conferred powers, a Department may authorize a person or body to act on its behalf only by designating "'an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to act is directed to conform.'" Id. (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
Pittston Co. v. United States, 368 F.3d 385, 394 (4th Cir. 2004) (). Kerpen, 907 F.3d at 161 (cleaned up).7
Section 3596(a) of the FDPA provides:
A person who has been sentenced to death pursuant to this chapter shall be committed to the custody of the Attorney General until exhaustion of the procedures for appeal of the judgment of conviction and for...
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