United States v. Brooks

• Decision Date: 09 February 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-2283,19-2283
• Citation: 987 F.3d 593
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Demetrius BROOKS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

987 F.3d 593

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Demetrius BROOKS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-2283

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Decided and Filed: February 9, 2021

ON BRIEF: Michael R. Dezsi, LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL R. DEZSI, PLLC, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Douglas C. Salzenstein, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee.

Before: GUY, LARSEN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

After police officers pulled over the vehicle in which Demetrius Brooks had been riding, they smelled marijuana and saw him making a "stuffing motion" under his seat. The police found a gun partially hidden there. After a jury convicted Brooks of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the lone African-American juror emailed the court that the other jurors had pressured her into a guilty verdict. Brooks now claims that the stop and search of the vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment, that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence that he "possessed" a gun, and that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 855, 197 L.Ed.2d 107 (2017), to investigate the racial biases of the other jurors. These claims require us to consider among other questions: Did the number of officers who conducted the traffic stop affect whether it was "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment? Does the felon-in-possession statute require a defendant to control a gun for any significant period of time? And does Peña-Rodriguez permit an evidentiary hearing to impeach a jury verdict even when no jurors made race-based statements? Answering "no" to these questions, we affirm Brooks's conviction.

I

Because the district court denied Brooks's motion to suppress and the jury convicted him, we recount the facts in the light most favorable to the prosecution. See United States v. Maya , 966 F.3d 493, 496 (6th Cir. 2020) ; United States v. Canipe , 569 F.3d 597, 600 (6th Cir. 2009).

Late at night on August 4, 2018, three Detroit police officers (Lenin Amarante, Joseph Anthony, and Jaime Rodriguez) stopped at a red light next to a Jeep Compass. Alexsand Pina was driving the Jeep; Angel Torres was in its front passenger's seat; Brooks sat behind Torres in the backseat. While waiting for the light to turn green, Officers Amarante and Anthony both observed that Torres was not wearing his seatbelt. The officers decided to pull the Jeep over for this civil infraction. They stopped it at a vacant gas station.

As Officer Anthony approached the Jeep's passenger side, he smelled marijuana emanating from the vehicle. Anthony also saw Brooks in the backseat leaning forward with his shoulders parallel to his knees "making a stuffing motion under the seat." Believing that Brooks was trying to conceal contraband (and potentially a firearm), Anthony asked Brooks what he had stuck under the seat. Anthony also alerted his fellow officers to Brooks's conduct because, as he explained, the conduct raised "an officer safety issue." After Brooks denied hiding anything, Anthony opened the car door and ordered him out of the vehicle.

In the meantime, Officer Amarante had approached the driver, Pina. Pina told Amarante that he had a permit to carry a firearm and that it was located in the driver-side door. Amarante also noticed the smell of marijuana as he spoke with Pina, but Pina denied allowing anyone to smoke in the car. Amarante realized at that point that Brooks had been in the backseat and saw what appeared to be a "marijuana cigar" in Brooks's left ear. Amarante also heard Officer Anthony convey to Brooks something like: "My man, let me see your hands." Amarante secured Pina's gun and ordered him out of the Jeep so that they could look for marijuana.

Officer Rodriguez searched the Jeep while the other two officers conversed with the three occupants outside the vehicle. When searching the Jeep's rear passenger side where Brooks had made his stuffing motion, Rodriguez saw the handle of a firearm protruding out between the seat and floorboard. The handgun had been loaded and its serial number scratched off. Rodriguez immediately turned around from the rear passenger-side door and showed the other officers the gun. The officers also recovered suspected marijuana, a suspected marijuana cigarette, and $723 from Brooks.

The government charged Brooks with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to suppress the gun on the ground that the officers had violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court disagreed. It credited the officers’ testimony that Torres had not been wearing his seatbelt, which gave them probable cause to stop the Jeep. It next credited the officers’ testimony that they smelled marijuana and noticed Brooks make a "stuffing motion," which gave them probable cause to search the Jeep.

The jury found Brooks guilty of the felon-in-possession count. Hours after the verdict, the jury's sole African-American juror sent the district court an email. The juror indicated that she felt pressured to return a verdict against Brooks and that the other jurors had sided with the police:

I feel morally responsible to myself, the court, and to the defendant[ ] to let you all know that during deliberations I was pressured by other members of the jury to select a guilty verdict when that is not what I believe to be true. I believe that the[re] was reasonable doubt and more evidence was need[ed] to actually find the defendant guilty. I was told by the members that I was not using common sense and was berated every time I brought up the lack of evidence. During selection we were asked if we would be able to apply the same scrutiny to the testimony of the witnesses because they were officers and everyone answered yes. However, immediately in deliberations the other jurors sided with the police even though they all agreed that the[re] was enough lack of evidence to cause a reasonable doubt. ... But they said they are leaning more towards guilty because the cops say he is guilty. I am fine with whatever consequence happens to me because I allowed myself to be peer press[ur]ed into a guilty verdict.

Brooks suggested that the other jurors may have been racially biased and requested an evidentiary hearing and a new trial under Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 855, 197 L.Ed.2d 107 (2017). The court denied the motion because there was no evidence that the jurors had made race-based comments against Brooks or this juror. It sentenced Brooks to 66 months’ imprisonment.

II

Brooks challenges the district court's rulings on: (1) his motion to suppress evidence; (2) his motion for judgment of acquittal on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds; and (3) his motion for an evidentiary hearing and new trial based on the juror's post-verdict email.

A

Seeking to suppress the firearm, Brooks argues that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they discovered it in the Jeep. The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]" U.S. Const. amend. IV. Brooks characterizes the officers’ initial stop of the Jeep as an "unreasonable" "seizure" and their later inspection of the Jeep as an "unreasonable search." We consider the officers’ actions in that order.

Initial Stop . The stop of a vehicle qualifies as the "seizure" of a "person" that must be "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. See Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 809–10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). Yet reasonableness in this context does not require a warrant. "[P]ractically since the beginning of the Government," officers have been allowed to stop a vehicle on public roads without a warrant when they have probable cause to believe that the occupants have committed a crime. Carroll v. United States , 267 U.S. 132, 153–56, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). Our cases also permit vehicle stops based on a mere "reasonable suspicion" that a felony has occurred or that a misdemeanor is occurring, analogizing these temporary stops to the well-known " Terry stop" from Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). See United States v. Collazo , 818 F.3d 247, 253–54 (6th Cir. 2016) ; see also Arizona v. Johnson , 555 U.S. 323, 330–31, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009). But our cases leave unclear whether we continue to require probable cause for a stop if officers believe that an occupant has committed only a civil traffic offense. See United States v. Shelton , 817 F. App'x 217, 219 & n.2 (6th Cir. 2020) ; United States v. Taylor , 471 F. App'x 499, 510–11 (6th Cir. 2012). This lingering uncertainty does not matter in this case because we have also held that an officer has probable cause if the officer sees an individual in the vehicle not wearing a seatbelt in violation of state law. See United States v. Tillman , 543 F. App'x 557, 560 (6th Cir. 2013) ; United States v. Street , 614 F.3d 228, 232 (6th Cir. 2010) ; United States v. Canipe , 569 F.3d 597, 601 (6th Cir. 2009) ; United States v. Draper , 22 F. App'x 413, 414–15 (6th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).

These rules doom Brooks's challenge to the initial stop of the Jeep. Michigan law requires most individuals in the front seat of a vehicle to wear a seatbelt, and it makes the failure to do so a civil infraction. Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.710e(3), (9). Officers Amarante and Anthony both personally observed the Jeep's front passenger (Torres) not wearing a seatbelt when their cruiser pulled up next to it. The district court credited their testimony. And the officers’ observation that Torres was likely committing a civil seatbelt infraction gave them probable cause to stop the vehicle under the Fourth Amendment. See Street , 614 F.3d at 232.

Brooks counters with a factual point and a legal one. Factually, Brooks cites evidence cutting...