United States v. Bryant, 19-14267

• Decision Date: 07 May 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-14267,19-14267
• Citation: 996 F.3d 1243
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas BRYANT, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

996 F.3d 1243

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Thomas BRYANT, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-14267

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

May 7, 2021

Justin Davids, James C. Stuchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney Service - Southern District of Georgia, U.S. Attorney's Office, Savannah, GA, Nancy Greenwood, U.S. Attorney's Office, Augusta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Shon Hopwood, Ann Marie Hopwood, Kyle Singhal, Hopwood & Singhal, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Defendant-Appellant.

Thomas Bryant, Pro Se.

Roy T. Englert, Jr., Jessica Arden Ettinger, Robbins Russell Englert Orseck & Untereiner, LLP, Washington, DC, David Oscar Markus, Markus/Moss, PLLC, Miami, FL, for Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

Kannon K. Shanmugam, Stacie Marion Fahsel, Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison, LLP, Washington, DC, Kristina Bunting, Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison, LLP, New York, NY, for Amici Curiae R Street Institute, The American Conservative Union Foundation Nolan Center for Justice, the Cato Institute, Arthur Rizer, and Brett Tolman.

Before MARTIN, LUCK, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

BRASHER, Circuit Judge:

Thomas Bryant is a corrupt former police officer who was sentenced to prison for running drugs and guns. He filed a motion seeking a reduction in his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), and the district court denied that motion based on the Sentencing Commission's policy statement found at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. In resolving Bryant's appeal, we must answer two questions about the relationship between Section 3582(c)(1)(A) and 1B1.13.

First, we must decide whether district courts reviewing defendant-filed motions under Section 3582(c)(1)(A) are bound by the Sentencing Commission's policy statement. Under Section 3582(c)(1)(A), a court can reduce an otherwise final sentence for "extraordinary and compelling reasons," as long as the reduction is "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." The statute commands the Commission to publish a policy statement that defines "extraordinary and compelling reasons," 28 U.S.C. § 994(t), and the Commission did: 1B1.13, which is entitled "Reduction in Term of Imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)." At the time, the statute required all motions to be filed by the BOP. The policy statement repeats that then-existing statutory language and, in its application notes, lists several circumstances that are "extraordinary and compelling reasons" that justify a sentence reduction.

So far, so good. But after Congress changed the statute to allow defendants to file motions in addition to the BOP, several of our sister circuits have held that 1B1.13 is not an "applicable policy statement[ ]" for those defendant-filed motions. This is so, they say, because the policy statement, quoting the pre-existing statute's language, begins with the following phrase: "Upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons." Based mostly on that language, our sister circuits have held that this policy statement is not an "applicable policy statement" that binds judicial discretion as to defendant-filed motions.

We disagree with that reasoning. The statute's procedural change does not affect the statute's or 1B1.13's substantive standards, specifically the definition of "extraordinary and compelling reasons." The Commission's standards are still capable of being applied and relevant to all Section 3582(c)(1)(A) motions, whether filed by the BOP or a defendant. And the structure of the Guidelines, our caselaw's interpretation of "applicable policy statement," and general canons of statutory interpretation all confirm that 1B1.13 is still an applicable policy statement for a Section 3582(c)(1)(A) motion, no matter who files it.

Second, because we conclude that 1B1.13 is an applicable policy statement, we must determine how district courts should apply that statement to motions filed under Section 3582(c)(1)(A). Bryant argues that Application Note 1(D) of 1B1.13 conflicts with the statute's recent amendment. As a catch-all provision, Application Note 1(D) says that a court may grant a motion if, "[a]s determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, there exists in the defendant's case an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons described in subdivisions (A) through (C)." Bryant argues that, because the statute now allows for defendant-filed motions, we should replace "as determined by the [BOP]" with "as determined by the [court]." This alteration to the policy statement would give courts effectively unlimited discretion to grant or deny motions under Application Note 1(D).

But we cannot do that. Application Note 1(D) is not inconsistent with the procedural change in the statute that allows defendants to file motions. Because we can apply both the amended Section 3582(c)(1)(A) and Application Note 1(D), we must apply both.

In short, 1B1.13 is an applicable policy statement for all Section 3582(c)(1)(A) motions, and Application Note 1(D) does not grant discretion to courts to develop "other reasons" that might justify a reduction in a defendant's sentence. Accordingly, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Thomas Bryant used to be a cop. But he abused that position, flouting the law that he had vowed to uphold. For years, Bryant worked with other officers to help traffic cocaine. Armed and in uniform—often in police vehicles—they acted as the cocaine couriers’ personal security detail. Bryant also sold cocaine and stolen guns himself. And he passed along confidential police information to the cocaine gang.

But duplicity begets duplicity. Soon enough, one of the informed became an informant and turned on his fellow criminals. A jury convicted Bryant of multiple drug and gun offenses. The district court eventually sentenced him to 292 months imprisonment to be followed by a mandatory, consecutive 300 months.

B. Statutory Background

In 2018, Congress passed and the President signed the First Step Act. Bryant brought his motion to reduce his sentence under that Act. To understand the FSA, we look first to the history of federal sentencing.

For a long time, sentencing judges had nearly unbridled discretion, bound only by statutory minimums or maximums. United States v. Irey , 612 F.3d 1160, 1180–81 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc); see also Dorszynski v. United States , 418 U.S. 424, 431, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 41 L.Ed.2d 855 (1974) ("[O]nce it is determined that a sentence is within the limitations set forth in the statute under which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end."). Parole boards also had discretion to release a prisoner after he had served as little as one third of his sentence, see, e.g. , Barber v. Thomas , 560 U.S. 474, 482, 130 S.Ct. 2499, 177 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010), obscuring at sentencing the actual amount of time that the defendant would serve. Cf. Setser v. United States , 566 U.S. 231, 248, 132 S.Ct. 1463, 182 L.Ed.2d 455 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining the system as involving "a parole commission and a judge trying to second-guess each other about the time an offender will actually serve in prison"). That system spawned drastic disparities and uncertainty in sentencing, which drove Congress to pass the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. See Irey , 612 F.3d at 1180–81.

The SRA sought uniformity and honesty in sentencing. To achieve uniformity, it created the U.S. Sentencing Commission and delegated to it the power to create a comprehensive system of sentencing guidelines. See Peugh v. United States , 569 U.S. 530, 535, 133 S.Ct. 2072, 186 L.Ed.2d 84 (2013). To achieve honesty, it abolished the parole system and prohibited courts from "modify[ing] a term of imprisonment once it ha[d] been imposed," 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). See Barber , 560 U.S. at 481–82, 130 S.Ct. 2499.

Nonetheless, the SRA provided three narrow exceptions to that general prohibition on sentence modification, one of which is relevant here. See United States v. Denson , 963 F.3d 1080, 1086 (11th Cir. 2020). Section 3582(c)(1)(A) allows a court to reduce a term of imprisonment for extraordinary and compelling reasons. But the SRA did not put district courts in charge of determining what would qualify as extraordinary and compelling reasons that might justify reducing a prisoner's sentence. Instead, it directed the Commission to define "what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples" and to do so through "general policy statements regarding the sentencing modification provisions in section 3582(c)(1)(A)." 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) ; see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(C).

The only boundary the SRA placed on the Commission's definition was that "[r]ehabilitation ... alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason." 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). And it required district courts to follow that definition. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) ; see Dillon v. United States , 560 U.S. 817, 826–27, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010) ; United States v. Colon , 707 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2013). Put another way, the SRA made clear that a district court cannot grant a motion for reduction if it would be inconsistent with the Commission's policy statement defining "extraordinary and compelling reasons." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

It took the Commission over twenty years to publish its substantive definition of "extraordinary and compelling reasons." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (U.S. Sent'g Comm'n 2007). That definition listed four reasons as extraordinary and compelling: (i) a "terminal illness"; (ii) a "permanent physical or medical condition" or "deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging process," which "substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care" in prison; (iii) "death or incapacitation of the defendant's only family member capable of caring for" a...