United States v. Burgos-Coronado

• Decision Date: 18 August 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-60380,No. 19-60294, No. 19-60295,19-60294
• Citation: 970 F.3d 613
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Pavel Isaac BURGOS-CORONADO, also known as Pavel Isaac Burgos Coronado, Defendant-Appellant, United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Javier Alejandro Moline-Borroto, also known as Javier Alejandro Moline Borroto, Defendant-Appellant, United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Valentina Sybreg Castro-Balza, also known as Valentina Sybreg Castro Balza, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

970 F.3d 613

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Pavel Isaac BURGOS-CORONADO, also known as Pavel Isaac Burgos Coronado, Defendant-Appellant,United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Javier Alejandro Moline-Borroto, also known as Javier Alejandro Moline Borroto, Defendant-Appellant,United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Valentina Sybreg Castro-Balza, also known as Valentina Sybreg Castro Balza, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-60294

No. 19-60295

No. 19-60380

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED August 18, 2020

Paul David Roberts, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, Northern District of Mississippi, Oxford, MS, for Plaintiff-Appellee (Case no. 19-60294)

Merrill K. Nordstrom, Federal Public Defender's Office, Northern District of Mississippi, Oxford, MS, for Defendant-Appellant

Michael Scott Davis, Federal Public Defender's Office, Northern District of Mississippi, Oxford, MS, for Defendant-Appellant (Case no. 19-60295)

William Farley Travis, Attorney, Travis Law Offices, P.L.L.C., Southaven, MS, for Defendant-Appellant (Case no. 19-60380)

Before Clement, Southwick, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.

Leslie H. Southwick, Circuit Judge:

Defendants challenge the denial of their motion to suppress evidence, arguing police officers did not have reasonable suspicion that would allow prolonging their stop at a highway safety checkpoint. We AFFIRM.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Around midnight on May 18, 2018, State Troopers Gregory Bell, Matthew Minga, Andrew Beaver, and Steven Jones set up a "driver's safety checkpoint" on a highway approximately eight miles east of Starkville, Mississippi. The checkpoint was intended for the troopers to check for driver's licenses, insurance, seat belt usage, and other safety matters. After approximately 15 to 20 minutes of light traffic, the troopers stopped a Toyota with a Florida license plate traveling north, occupied by the three defendants — Pavel Isaac Burgos-Coronado, Javier Alejandro Moline-Borroto, and Valentina Sybreg Castro-Balza. Trooper Minga approached the Toyota and made contact with the occupants. Trooper Bell, who was observing and overheard Trooper Minga's exchange with the Toyota occupants, identified Moline-Borroto as the driver, Burgos-Coronado in the rear driver-side seat, and Castro-Balza in the rear passenger-side seat. At a September 7, 2018 hearing on the defendants’ motion to suppress, Trooper Bell described the exchange with the Toyota occupants:

Trooper Minga asked the driver for his driver's license and proof of insurance. Mr. Borroto provided him a Florida temporary issue driver's license. And, at that time, I believe he said it was a rental vehicle. Trooper Minga asked him, then, who he had in the rear seat and who his passengers were.

Mr. Borroto said something in Spanish to them, rolled down the back window; and Mr. Pavel [Burgos-Coronado] provided another temporary Florida driver's license; and Ms. Balza provided a Venezuela passport.

Bell subsequently answered some questions:

Q.... [W]hen Trooper Minga asked about the other persons in the car, were you able to hear that?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And what happened? How was the conversation between the passengers in the backseat?

A. It was in Spanish between them.

...

Q. Okay. And there was a conversation, then, between the people in the car or Trooper Minga with the persons in the backseat?

A. No. The driver of the vehicle with the persons in the backseat.

Q. And were you able to listen and determine whether it was in English or Spanish?

A. It was Spanish.

Q. Did you ever attempt to speak to the persons in the backseat of the Toyota?

A. I tried to, but we didn't — outside of basic conversation, Mr. [Moline-]Borroto pretty much translated anything we asked.

At the same hearing, Bell also testified that he started questioning Moline-Borroto only after the passengers gave Trooper Minga their identifications. Upon inspecting the Toyota occupants’ identifications, Trooper Bell noticed that Castro-Balza's Venezuelan passport did not have a stamp indicating her entry into the United States.

Trooper Bell also testified that because of the seating arrangement within the Toyota — male driver, empty passenger seat, male occupant in rear driver-side seat, and female occupant in rear passenger-side seat — he had a concern about the trip being abnormal "[f]rom a human trafficking aspect."

About 25 to 30 seconds after the Toyota was stopped, a Volkswagen arrived at the checkpoint. Trooper Jones, who had been near Troopers Minga and Bell when the stop of the Toyota took place and had overheard discussion of a Venezuelan passport, talked to the occupants of the Volkswagen and noticed that it too had a Florida license plate, and he noted that the driver of the Volkswagen, Daniel Pena-Morales, also had a Venezuelan passport. When Trooper Jones informed Trooper Bell of the apparent connections between the two vehicles, Trooper Bell asked the driver of the Toyota, Moline-Borroto, if he was traveling with anyone. After hesitation, Moline-Borroto responded that he was traveling with the individuals in the Volkswagen. Trooper Jones asked the driver of the Volkswagen, Pena-Morales, the same question, to which Pena-Morales responded that he was not traveling with anyone. According to Trooper Bell's testimony at the suppression hearing, these conflicting accounts put him on "high alert." Ultimately, the troopers searched the Toyota and the Volkswagen and found evidence of credit card skimming in both.

A grand jury charged Burgos-Coronado, Moline-Borroto, and Castro-Balza — the Toyota occupants — as well as the Volkswagen occupants, with (1) conspiracy to commit offenses against the United States which affected interstate commerce; (2) possession with intent to defraud of an access device card encoder, software, and computer; (3) possession with intent to defraud of credit card skimming equipment; (4) possession with intent to defraud of 15 or more unauthorized access devices; and (5) using or attempting to use with intent to defraud more than one unauthorized access device to obtain goods, services, and money aggregating in excess of $1,000.

The defendants from both vehicles moved to suppress the evidence based on an unconstitutional search and seizure. The district court denied the motions. Pursuant to plea agreements, Burgos-Coronado, Moline-Borroto, and Castro-Balza entered conditional guilty pleas, reserving the right to appeal the denial of their motions to suppress. They were sentenced and entered separate notices of appeal. We granted an unopposed motion to consolidate these three defendants’ appeals for briefing and oral argument purposes. We denied the Government's opposed motion to consolidate the Toyota occupants’ appeals with similar appeals filed by the Volkswagen occupants. On January 29, 2020, we affirmed the district court's denial of the motions to suppress with respect to the Volkswagen occupants. See United States v. Pena-Morales , 791 F. App'x 499 (5th Cir. 2020). We now AFFIRM in the companion cases.

DISCUSSION

Our review of a denial of a motion to suppress evidence requires us to examine factual findings for clear error but to consider conclusions of law de novo ; a determination about the existence of reasonable suspicion is a legal conclusion. United States v. Freeman , 914 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 2019). "We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below." Id. We will uphold the district court's ruling if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support it. See id. at 342.

"A checkpoint-type stop of an automobile is a seizure constrained by the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Green , 293 F.3d 855, 857–58 (5th Cir. 2002). While suspicionless seizures are ordinarily unreasonable, and thus Fourth Amendment violations, certain types of automobile checkpoint stops have been excepted from this general rule. Id. at 858. The Supreme Court has suggested that such checkpoints designed to check a driver's license and registration are permissible. See id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) ). We have explained that "it is a legitimate, programmatic purpose that justifies a checkpoint stop made without any suspicion." United States v. Machuca-Barrera , 261 F.3d 425, 433 (5th Cir. 2001). We examine the available evidence to determine the "primary purpose" of a checkpoint; "a program driven by an impermissible purpose may be proscribed while a program impelled by licit purposes is permitted." City of Indianapolis v. Edmond , 531 U.S. 32, 47, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000). "[T]he primary purpose of a checkpoint is a finding of fact reviewed for clear error." Green , 293 F.3d at 859.

Though the evidence of the programmatic purpose of the checkpoint here was scant, Trooper Bell testified that the troopers were stopping every car that passed to check for driver's licenses, insurance, seat belt usage, and other "safety aspects." The district court's finding "that the purpose of the checkpoint" was to "check[ ] licenses, insurance, and seatbelts" was not clearly erroneous. Seizures carried out at "general crime control" checkpoints are justified only if accompanied by "some quantum of individualized suspicion." Edmond , 531 U.S. at 47, 121 S.Ct. 447. In contrast, the "suspicionless" checkpoint here was permissible because it served a legitimate programmatic purpose closely related to the necessity of ensuring roadway safety and "problem[s] peculiar to the dangers presented by vehicles." Green , 293 F.3d at 858.

Inquiries relating to safety, much like those at a regular noncheckpoint traffic stop, might include checking the driver's license of the driver, determining whether there are outstanding traffic-related warrants against the driver, and inspecting an automobile's registration and proof of insurance, i.e. , inquiries "ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly." Rodriguez...