United States v. Burnside

• Decision Date: 20 April 2018
• Docket Number: No. CR17-2094-LTS,CR17-2094-LTS
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JACQUIERE BURNSIDE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JACQUIERE BURNSIDE, Defendant.

No. CR17-2094-LTS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA EASTERN DIVISION

April 20, 2018

ORDER ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before me on a Report and Recommendation (R&R) in which the Honorable Judge C.J. Williams, United States Chief Magistrate Judge, recommends that I deny defendant's motion (Doc. No. 19) to suppress evidence. See Doc. No. 27. Defendant has filed an objection (Doc. No. 40) to the R&R and plaintiff (the Government) has filed a partial objection (Doc. No. 41).

I. APPLICABLE STANDARDS

A district judge must review a magistrate judge's R&R under the following standards:

Within fourteen days after being served with a copy, any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b). Thus, when a party objects to any portion of an R&R, the district judge must undertake a de novo review of that portion.

Any portions of an R&R to which no objections have been made must be reviewed under at least a "clearly erroneous" standard. See, e.g., Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that when no objections are filed "[the district court judge] would only have to review the findings of the magistrate judge for clear error"). As the Supreme Court has explained, "[a] finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). However, a district judge may elect to review an R&R under a more-exacting standard even if no objections are filed:

Any party that desires plenary consideration by the Article III judge of any issue need only ask. Moreover, while the statute does not require the judge to review an issue de novo if no objections are filed, it does not preclude further review by the district judge, sua sponte or at the request of a party, under a de novo or any other standard.

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985).

II. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On December 20, 2017, a grand jury returned an indictment (Doc. No. 2) charging defendant Jacquiere Burnside with one count of illegally possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2). Burnside filed a motion (Doc. No. 19) to suppress evidence and the Government filed a resistance (Doc. No. 22). Judge Williams conducted an evidentiary hearing on February 23, 2018, during which Government's Exhibits 1 and 2 and defendant's Exhibit A were received.¹ The Government also presented thetestimony of Waterloo Police Officer Andrew Tindall. On February 26, 2018, Judge Williams issued an R&R in which he recommends that I deny the motion.

B. Relevant Facts

At 10:00 p.m. on October 20, 2017, Officer Tindall conducted a traffic stop of a silver Hyundai Santa Fe. Burnside was the driver of the vehicle and identified himself by name. The stated reason for the stop was a defective left license plate lamp. At the time of the stop, Tindall was notified that Burnside was known to carry weapons. Tindall asked Burnside to exit the vehicle. Burnside complied and Tindall performed a pat down search, during which he discovered a silver Bryco Arms Jennings Nine Model 9mm handgun on Burnside's person. Burnside did not have a permit for the weapon.

The vehicle at issue was originally equipped with two white lights that illuminated the rear license plate. One license plate lamp was not operating but the other was functioning and illuminated the license plate so it could be seen within 50 feet of the vehicle. Tindall testified that he believed the defective license plate lamp was in violation of Iowa Code § 321.387, which addresses "Rear lamps" on a vehicle. However, he did not issue Burnside a citation for a defective license plate lamp.

C. Judge Williams' Findings

Burnside argues that evidence of the firearm should be suppressed because the officer who stopped him lacked any reasonable suspicion that he was in violation of Iowa law. Burnside contends that the statute referenced by Tindall, Iowa Code § 321.387, is not applicable to defective license plate lamps. Judge Williams found that the plain language of section 321.387 was ambiguous. Doc. No. 27 at 3-4. Applying various federal rules of statutory interpretation, he then found that the statute only applied to rear red lamps on a vehicle, and not rear lamps illuminating license plates. Id. at 4-6.

Judge Williams next analyzed whether the officer's mistake of law was reasonable such that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. Id. at 6. He found that the mistake was reasonable:

Officer Tindall's interpretation is not an unreasonable interpretation based on the plain language of Iowa Code § 321.387. Like in Heien, there is no Iowa or federal case law interpreting § 321.387 that would lead Officer Tindall to believe his interpretation was incorrect. Officer Tindall testified that throughout his training no one has ever instructed him on the interpretation of the final sentence of Iowa Code § 321.387, nor has he been told that his interpretation is incorrect. In addition, Officer Tindall testified that he has made other traffic stops under his interpretation of the final sentence of Iowa Code § 321.387.

Therefore, under the circumstances of this case, I find Officer Tindall had an objectively reasonable belief at the time of the traffic stop that the defective left license plate lamp on the vehicle operated by defendant was a violation of Iowa Code § 321.387. Since Officer Tindall's mistake of law was objectively reasonable, the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion that defendant's vehicle was in violation of Iowa Code § 321.387.

Id. at 7.

III. DISCUSSION

Burnside objects to Judge Williams' finding that Tindall's mistake of law was reasonable.² Doc. No. 40 at 2. The Government objects to Judge Williams' finding that § 321.387 applies only to rear red lamps, not to all rear lamps on the vehicle. Doc. No. 41 at 1-2. During the suppression hearing, the parties confirmed that the validity of the traffic stop is the only disputed issue. Thus, if the traffic stop is valid, the motion to suppress must be denied.

"The Fourth Amendment guarantees the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'"Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 (1996). A traffic stop constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. at 809-10. "As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." Id. at 810; see also United States v. Lyons, 486 F.3d 367, 371 (8th Cir. 2007) ("[I]t is well established that a traffic violation—however minor—creates probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle.") (alteration in Lyons) (quoting United States v. Barry, 98 F.3d 373, 376 (8th Cir. 1996)). Probable cause may exist even if the officer makes a mistake of law. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014). Whether the mistake of law can support reasonable suspicion is judged by whether that mistake is objectively reasonable. Id. at 539.

There are two relevant statutory provisions in this case. The first is Iowa Code § 321.387, titled "Rear lamps," which states:

Every motor vehicle and every vehicle which is being drawn at the end of a train of vehicles shall be equipped with a lighted rear lamp or lamps, exhibiting a red light plainly visible from a distance of five hundred feet to the rear. All lamps and lighting equipment originally manufactured on a motor vehicle shall be kept in working condition or shall be replaced with equivalent equipment.

Tindall testified that he believed Burnside's defective license plate lamp violated the second sentence of this section. However, Burnside argues that another provision is more applicable - § 321.388, titled "Illuminating plates." This section states, in relevant part,

Either the rear lamp or a separate lamp shall be so constructed and placed as to illuminate with a white light the rear registration plate and render it clearly legible from a distance of fifty feet to the rear. When the rear registration plate is illuminated by an electric lamp other than the required rear lamp, the two lamps shall be turned on or off only by the same control switch at all times when headlamps are lighted.

Neither party disputes that the license plate was illuminated and visible up to 50 feet, in compliance with § 321.388. The issue is whether the requirement in § 321.387 that "all lamps and lighting equipment originally manufactured on a motor vehicle shall be keptin working condition" applies only to red rear lamps or includes the white lamps that illuminate the license plate. Both parties argue that the statute is unambiguous, but they argue different interpretations. The Government claims that § 321.387 includes license plate lamps while Burnside argues it applies only to red rear lamps. Because one license plate lamp was still working and the license plate was sufficiently visible, Burnside asserts there was no probable cause to support the traffic stop.

A. Statutory Interpretation

The Government argues that I should find the traffic stop was supported by a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was in...