United States v. Campbell

• Decision Date: 22 August 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13–2287.,13–2287.
• Citation: 764 F.3d 880
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee v. Carl CAMPBELL, also known as Nutty Boy, also known as Carl Smith, also known as Karl Campbell, also known as Earl Campbell, also known as Carl Michael, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

764 F.3d 880

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Carl CAMPBELL, also known as Nutty Boy, also known as Carl Smith, also known as Karl Campbell, also known as Earl Campbell, also known as Carl Michael, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 13–2287.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: March 14, 2014.

Filed: Aug. 22, 2014.

Jeff Larson, argued, Sioux Falls, SD, Plaintiff–Appellee.

Kevin Koliner, Assistant United States Attorney, argued, Sioux Falls, SD, Defendant–Appellant.

Before COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

KELLY, Circuit Judge.

Carl Campbell appeals his conviction and his sentence for one count of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (a)(2), and (b)(1); one count of interstate transportation for prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a); two counts of sex trafficking of a child, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), and (c); and one count of obstructing sex trafficking enforcement, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(d). He was convicted at trial of all five counts. The district court ¹ imposed three life sentences and two 20–year sentences to run concurrently. Campbell appeals the denial of his motion to suppress; raises several evidentiary challenges; claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and contests his sentence. With jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

I. Background ²

In August 2010, Mindy Alesch and Carl Campbell met and began dating in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. After several tumultuous months, Alesch left Campbell on July 12, 2011, while he was sleeping in their hotel room in Chicago, Illinois. Shortly after leaving the hotel, she was pulled over in a traffic stop by Officer Donald Giuliano of the Franklin Park, Illinois, Police Department. Alesch told Officer Giuliano that Campbell had coerced her into prostitution. She told police Campbell's hotel and room number and gave them her room key, and she was taken to the police station for questioning. The officers arrested Campbell, then seized and inventoried the items found in the room, including several laptops (one with the screen open to a website hosting prostitution advertisements), cell phones, and identification cards. Campbell was then charged under Illinois law with promoting prostitution. While he was in custody, he and Alesch wrote each other severalletters. Many of the letters were subsequently admitted at his trial, including one in which Campbell asked Alesch to recant her statements to the Chicago police.

Department of Homeland Security Special Agent Charla Aramayo was leading a team investigating prostitution in Sioux Falls when, in March 2012, she learned Campbell was incarcerated in Illinois. Pursuant to a grand jury subpoena, all evidence recovered during Campbell's arrest, as well as an exhibit list with identification numbers for the unopened bags of evidence, was transferred from the Cook County State's Attorney's Office to Agent Aramayo's custody. Agent Aramayo inventoried the items without opening these bags and spoke with Officer Giuliano, who advised that one of the computers had revealed evidence of various prostitution advertisements. She then applied for and was granted a search warrant for this evidence by Magistrate Judge John E. Simko. Campbell appeals the denial of his motion to suppress this evidence.

Campbell was charged with the sex trafficking of Alesch by force, fraud, or coercion,³ and with transporting her across state lines for purposes of prostitution. In the course of her investigation, Agent Aramayo discovered Campbell had also engaged at least three other young women in prostitution before he met Alesch. He was subsequently charged with two counts of sex trafficking of a minor, girls identified as N.K. and L.O., and with one count of obstruction of sex trafficking enforcement based on the letters he sent to Alesch from jail. He was not charged with the sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion of the third additional person, a Sioux Falls woman identified as J.R., but his conduct with her was factored into the calculation of his offense level at sentencing.

Prior to trial, the government submitted a notice of intent to introduce res gestae evidence and evidence pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). Specifically, in an effort to show Alesch was coerced into prostitution, the government sought to introduce evidence that Campbell had physically assaulted both J.R. and Alesch. Campbell contended evidence concerning J.R. could only show a propensity toward violence and, regardless, his conduct with J.R. was simply not comparable to his relationship with Alesch. Campbell objected that any assault of Alesch not directly connected to prostitution was irrelevant and that all assault evidence was more prejudicial than probative. The district court admitted evidence of all assaults. The court found Campbell's similar conduct with J.R. rebutted his defense that violence was simply part of his romantic relationship with Alesch and that his assaults on Alesch were all intrinsic to his exercise of coercion. See18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(2)(B) (defining “coercion” to include “any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against any person”). This ruling permitted the government to present much of its evidence, including testimony by law enforcement officers, photographs of Alesch's injuries, and extensive testimony by Alesch herself.

The jury convicted Campbell of all five counts. The district court imposed three life sentences and two 20–year sentences, to run concurrently. Campbell appeals. We address each of his claims in turn.

II. Discussion

A. Motion to Suppress

Campbell appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress, arguing the warrant failed to provide enough detail for the officers to know the items to be searched.⁴ The Fourth Amendment mandates that “no Warrants shall issue ... [unless] particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. We review de novo whether a search warrant satisfies this particularity requirement. United States v. Fiorito, 640 F.3d 338, 346 (8th Cir.2011). Although “[t]he Fourth Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the warrant, not in the supporting documents,” “a court may construe a warrant with reference to a supporting application or affidavit if the warrant uses appropriate words of incorporation, and if the supporting document accompanies the warrant.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557–58, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004).

The warrant authorized the search of the property “described in Attachment A, which is incorporated into this search warrant by reference,” and the parties and the district court considered the warrant and Attachment A as one document governing the scope of the search. Attachment A—titled “description of property to be searched for and seized”—listed the evidence bags from Cook County to be opened, each bag's unique identification number, and information about the contents as perceived without opening the bags. In addition, Attachment A indicated the types of information that would be sought from the laptops, CDs, and cell phones at issue. Reading the two documents together, we find the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement was satisfied. See United States v. Riesselman, 646 F.3d 1072, 1076–77 (8th Cir.2011). We affirm the district court's denial of Campbell's motion to suppress.

B. Evidentiary Rulings

Campbell raises several evidentiary arguments on appeal. “We review a district court's interpretation and application of the rules of evidence de novo and its evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Street, 531 F.3d 703, 708 (8th Cir.2008). We review de novo evidentiary rulings that “implicate constitutional rights.” United States v. Pumpkin Seed, 572 F.3d 552, 558 (8th Cir.2009). We reverse only if we find an error was not harmless. Generally, “the government is required to establish that we do not have ‘grave doubt’ as to whether the error substantially influenced the outcome of the proceedings.” United States v. Haidley, 400 F.3d 642, 645 (8th Cir.2005) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764–65, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). Yet “[i]f the error is of constitutional magnitude, then the government is required to prove the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)).

1. Evidence of Campbell's Other Acts

a. Intrinsic Evidence

The district court allowed the government to offer evidence that Campbellhad physically assaulted Alesch on a number of occasions, concluding this evidence was res gestae. Res gestae, also known as intrinsic evidence, is “evidence of wrongful conduct other than the conduct at issue ... offered for the purpose of providing the context in which the charged crime occurred.” United States v. Johnson, 463 F.3d 803, 808 (8th Cir.2006) (citation omitted). “Such evidence is admitted [to] ... complete [ ] the story or provide[ ] a total picture of the charged crime.” Id. (quotation omitted). Unlike evidence admitted under Rule 404(b), pertaining to distinct prior acts, intrinsic evidence relates to crimes that are “so blended or connected with the ones on trial as that proof of one incidentally involves the others.” United States v. Luna, 94 F.3d 1156, 1162 (8th Cir.1996) (quotation omitted).

Campbell's specific argument is that each assault against Alesch had to be directly connected to prostitution in order to be admissible as res gestae. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we disagree. The jury could find his actions amounted to coercion if the assaults were part of a “pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act [of prostitution]...