United States v. Cano
| Decision Date | 30 May 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. CR16-4072-MWB,CR16-4072-MWB |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JUAN CARLOS CANO, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ............................................................. 2
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS ................................................................................................. 2
III. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 11
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
On March 9, 2017, defendant Juan Carlos Cano was convicted, following a jury trial, of failing to register as a sex offender, in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). Cano moved for an acquittal, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a), at the close of the prosecution's case. I denied his motion. Cano then moved for an acquittal at the close of all evidence. I again denied his motion. Presently before me is Cano's Renewed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Motion for New Trial (docket no. 85).
Cano argues for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that there was insufficient evidence introduced at trial to support his conviction on the charged offense. Alternatively, Cano requests that I use my "greater" discretion to grant him a new trial. The prosecution has filed a timely resistance to Cano's motion. The prosecution contends that the evidence introduced at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict and granting all reasonable inferences supported by that evidence, supports the jury's finding Cano guilty of the charged offense. With respect to Cano's alternative request for a new trial, the prosecution argues that the jury's verdict must be allowed to stand because the evidence does not weigh against it. Cano did not file a reply brief.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(b). If the jury returns a guilty verdict, the defendant may renew a motion for a judgment of acquittal "within 14 days after a guilty verdict or after the court discharges the jury, whichever is later." FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c)(1). "If the court reserve[d] decision, it must decide the motion on the basis of the evidence at the time the ruling was reserved." FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(b). Here, Cano has renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal. Thus, I may consider the entire trial record in deciding whether to grant Cano's motion. A judgment of acquittal is only appropriate if "the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction." FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a). "The standard for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is strict, and a guilty verdict should not be lightly overturned." United States v. Jiminez-Perez, 238 F.3d 970, 972-73 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Ryan, 227 F.3d 1058, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000)); see United States v. Peneaux, 532 F.3d 882, 890 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Stroh, 176 F.3d 439, 440 (8th Cir. 1999). "Sufficient evidence exists to support a verdict if 'after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Jiminez-Perez, 238 F.3d at 972 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Thus, I may grant a judgment of acquittal "only if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Tate, 633 F.3d 624, 628 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Morales, 445 F.3d 1081, 1084 (8th Cir. 2006)) (internal marks omitted). I must "'view the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, granting all reasonable inferences that are supported by that evidence.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Milk, 447 F.3d 593, 598 (8th Cir. 2006)).
Cano argues that he was not required to register in Iowa because he maintained his residence in Texas. Cano also contends that he was an employee in Texas because he was employed by a Texas-based company. The prosecution contends that Cano's theories fail because they fly in the face of specific language in SORNA and would thwart SORNA's purposes. As the First Circuit Court of Appeals explained in United States v. Morales-Cruz, 712 F.3d 71, 75 (1st Cir. 2013),
In order to convict Cano of violating SORNA, the prosecution was required to establish three elements.1 Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2234-35 (2012). First,the prosecution must establish that Cano "is required to register under [SORNA]." 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(1). Second, the prosecution must establish that Cano is a sex offender as defined in SORNA. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2). Third, the prosecution must establish that Cano knowingly failed to register or update his registration as required by [SORNA]." 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(3).
SORNA provides: "A sex offender shall register, and keep the registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, where the offender is an employee, and where the offender is a student." 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a). Following the change of a sex offender's name, residence, employment, or student status, SORNA requires a sex offender provide notification of any such changes.2 42 U.S.C. § 16913(c). Cano stipulated that he was required by SORNA to register as a sex offender where he resided or was an employee; that he travelled from Texas to a work assignment in Iowa, and that he did not register inIowa. Cano argues that he never resided nor was he employed in Iowa and, therefore, he was not required to register in Iowa under SORNA. Specifically, Cano argues that he did not "reside" in Iowa because he maintained his permanent residence in Texas during his temporary stay in Iowa. He also contends that he was an employee in Texas because he was employed by a Texas-based company, which sent him to work on a project in Iowa. After he finished work on the Iowa project, Cano returned to Texas, where he worked on projects in that state. The prosecution contends that Cano can reside in more than one state at the same time, and argues that the fact that Cano resided in Texas does not eliminate the possibility that he also resided in Iowa at the same time. I agree.
Cano's argument confuses the related concepts of domicile and residence. Generally, an individual's "domicile" is "the state in which a person intends to live over the long run." Heinen v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 671 F.3d 669, 670 (7th Cir. 2012); see Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 454 (1973) (). "'Residence,' in contrast, requires both physical presence and an intention to remain some "indefinite period of time, but not necessarily permanently." Eastman v. Univ. of Mich., 30 F.3d 670, 673 (6th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, a domicile is distinguished from a residence by the "permanency and scope" of a person at either location. "It is 'the place where a person dwells and which is the center of his domestic, social, and civil life.'" Keys Youth Servs., Inc. v. City of Olathe, 248 F.3d 1267, 1273 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). While domicile focuses largely upon a person's intent to remain at or return to a given place, residence focuses more upon a person's physical presence at a location. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989). Consequently, a person may have multiple residences, but only one domicile. Comm'r of IRS v. Sanders, 834 F.3d 1269, 1279 (11th Cir. 2016); Vento v. Dir. of Virgin Islands Bureau of Internal Revenue, 715 F.3d 455, 467 (3d Cir. 2013); Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857-58 (9th Cir. 2001); Eastman, 30 F.3d at 673; Rosario v. I.N.S., 962 F.2d 220, 224 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Martinez v. Bynum, 461U.S. 321, 339-40 (1983) ...
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