United States v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., CASE NO. 08-CV-01673-H (KSC)
Decision Date | 11 April 2012 |
Docket Number | CASE NO. 08-CV-01673-H (KSC) |
Parties | UNITED STATES, for the use of: TECHNICA, LLC, Plaintiff, v. CAROLINA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, et al. CANDELARIA CORPORATION; OTAY GROUP, INC.; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
On March 19, 2012, Defendants' counsel, Robert J. Berens, filed an affidavit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455, alleging this Court's bias or prejudice against Defendants and their counsel. (Doc. No. 153.) Counsel's allegations stem from the Court's rulings in United States ex rel. Ramona Equipment Rental, Inc. v. Carolina Casualty Insurance Co., et al., 08-CV-1685-H (MDD) ("Ramona"), and United States ex rel. Technica, LLC v. Carolina Casualty Insurance Co., et al., 08-CV-1673-H (KSC) ("Technica"). For the following reasons, the Court denies the request for recusal as without merit under section 455 and as legally insufficient under section 144.
The Ramona Miller Act action and related claims came to a nonjury trial before the Court. (Ramona, Doc. No. 112.) Plaintiff's claims in the lawsuit arose from a federal construction project—the El Centro ICE Detention Center—for unpaid equipment rentals supplied by Ramona to Otay, a subcontractor of the general contractor, Candelaria Corporation. (Ramona, Doc. No. 112.) On August 31, 2011, the Court issued a detailed memorandum decision in favor of Plaintiff Ramona Equipment Rental Inc. and against Defendants Carolina Casualty Insurance Company, Candelaria Corporation, and Otay Group, Inc. in the amount of $178,686.56 plus interest, attorney's fees, and costs as allowed by law. (Ramona, Doc. No. 112.) In its memorandum decision, the Court complimented the parties' presentation of the evidence. (Ramona, Doc. No. 112.)
Following the trial, the Court issued a briefing schedule for its determination of interest and attorney's fees. (Ramona, Doc. No. 113.) Concerning interest, the parties submitted their proposed prejudgment interest calculations. (Ramona, Doc. Nos. 114, 117.) The Court did not immediately enter judgment and instead permitted the parties to oppose entry of judgment, if desired. (Ramona, Doc. No. 119.) After due consideration, the Court awarded Plaintiff $106,686.56 plus $106,516.64 as interest for a total sum of $285,203.20, plus attorney's fees. (Ramona, Doc. No. 119.) The Court attached a proposed order to the order regarding interest, to be issued absent opposition from the parties. (Ramona, Doc. No. 119.) Defendants objected to the timing of the Court's entry of judgment, requesting the Court's entry of judgment be delayed until after attorney's fees had been determined by the Court. (Ramona, Doc. No. 121.) Therefore, the Court delayed entry of judgment and directed Defendants to file an opposition to the amount of attorney's fees requested by Plaintiff. (Ramona, Doc. Nos. 122.)
On November 10, 2011, after carefully considering the parties' arguments, papers, and oral argument, the Court awarded Plaintiff Ramona reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of $54,571.25 attributable to James Crosby, Plaintiff Ramona's current counsel, and $59,510.03 attributable to Kevin Carlin, Plaintiff Ramona's former counsel, for the total of$114,081.28, substantially less than Plaintiff's requested amount. (Ramona, Doc. No. 133.) On November 10, 2011, the Court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants in the amount of $399,284.48. (Ramona, Doc. No. 134.) The award included the unpaid equipment rental of $175,658.57; simple, not compounded, contractual interest of $106,516.64; and attorney's fees of $114.81.28. (Ramona, Doc. No. 134.)
On December 1, 2011, Defendants filed a motion to alter judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b). (Ramona, Doc. No. 136.) Defendants moved to exclude contractual interest from the amount awarded to Plaintiff Ramona. (Ramona, Doc. No. 136.) After considering the parties' arguments, on December 30, 2011 the Court denied Defendants' motion to alter or amend the judgment, concluding that Defendants had not met their burden of showing legal error under Rule 59(e) or substantive error of law and fact under Rule 60(b) that would warrant altering or amending the judgment in the case. (Ramona, Doc. No. 142.)
On January 23, 2012, Defendants filed a motion to stay the judgment pending appeal and requested the Court to not order a supersedeas bond. (Ramona, Doc. No. 145.) The Court granted Defendants' request for stay of the judgment but required Defendants to post a supersedeas bond pursuant to Local Rule 65.1.2. (Ramona, Doc. No. 154.) Defendants then sought clarification of the Court's order, requesting that the Court confirm the amount to be posted. (Ramona, Doc. No. 155.) On February 17, 2012, the Court clarified the order for Defendants to post a supersedeas bond for $399,284.49, the amount of the judgment, not the amount requested by Plaintiff of $499,105.60. (Ramona, Doc. Nos. 156, 157.)
The Court was randomly assigned to Technica on March 12, 2012, after the previously assigned judge recused from the matter. (Technica, Doc. No. 144.) No party had filed a notice of related cases in either Technica or Ramona, as required by Local Civil Rule 40.1(f). The Court retained the previously scheduled pretrial conference set for March 14, 2012.1(Technica, Doc. No. 143.) The Court ordered the parties to meet and confer, and submit a joint proposed pretrial order before the pretrial conference. (Technica, Doc. No. 149.) The Court also ruled on the fully briefed and submitted motion for leave to file a third amended answer and counterclaim. (Technica, Doc. Nos. 124, 146.) At a March 15, 2012 hearing, in light of the Court's notice of counsel's intent to file an affidavit under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455 and the parties' inability to agree on a proposed pretrial order in accordance with Local Rule 16.1(f)(6), the Court postponed the pretrial conference until further notice. (Technica, Doc. No. 152.)
On March 19, 2012, counsel for Defendants Candelaria Corporation, Carolina Casualty Insurance Company, and Otay Group, filed a sworn affidavit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455.2 (Technica, Doc. No. 153.) Counsel also filed a certificate of counsel of record certifying that the affidavit was filed in good faith. (Technica, Doc. No. 154.) Counsel asserts that the Court is biased or prejudiced against Candelaria or against him personally based on the Court's rulings in Ramona and Technica. (Technica, Doc. No. 153.)
Requests for recusal are governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. When a court considers a motion brought under section 144, the court should evaluate whether to "grant recusal pursuant to [section 455]," and if it determines that recusal is inappropriate under section 455, proceed to "determine the legal sufficiency of the affidavit filed pursuant to 144." United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1980).
I. Recusal Under Section 455
Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555; see also Pesnell, 543 F.3d at 1044. In Liteky, the Supreme Court held as insufficient a recusal motion based on the district court's rulings, statements, and conduct during trial, including cutting off testimony, exhibiting an "anti-defendant tone," and denying motions subsequent to trial. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556. The Court stated, Id. The Court further explained that "[a]ll occurred in the course of judicial proceedings and neither (1) relied upon knowledge acquired outside such proceedings nor (2) displayed deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism that would render fair...
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