United States v. Carr

• Decision Date: 09 March 1978
• Docket Number: Crim. No. N-77-106.
• Citation: 445 F. Supp. 1383
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Benjamin CARR, Jr., Defendant.

445 F. Supp. 1383

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Benjamin CARR, Jr., Defendant.

Crim. No. N-77-106.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

March 9, 1978.

Michael Hartmere, Asst. U. S. Atty., Richard Blumenthal, U. S. Atty., New Haven, Conn., for plaintiff.

John Williams, New Haven, Conn., for defendant.

RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS

DALY, District Judge.

Defendant, Benjamin Carr, Jr., is charged with receiving three shotguns and one rifle in violation of § 902 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1). This statute prohibits convicted felons from receiving firearms that have crossed state lines.

On August 17, 1976 the New Haven Police arrested defendant on charges of reckless endangerment. After the arrest, the car in which defendant was riding was searched and the shotguns and rifle were found. In the period that followed defendant made several inculpatory statements concerning his ownership of the seized weapons. The details of the complex factual pattern on which this decision turns are considered subsequently with the legal analysis.

Defendant moves to suppress both the use of these weapons and his inculpatory statements. The motion to suppress is denied.

ADMISSIBILITY OF THE WEAPONS

The record before the Court contains ample evidence to support the warrantless arrest of defendant and the warrantless search of the car in which defendant was an occupant. It is axiomatic that a warrantless arrest will be upheld where there is probable cause to believe a felony is being committed. Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381, 382, 81 S.Ct. 632, 5 L.Ed.2d 620 reh. den. 365 U.S. 890, 81 S.Ct. 1025, 6 L.Ed.2d 200 (1961). The test for probable cause is whether the police had within their collective knowledge at the moment of the arrest a sufficient factual basis "to warrant a prudent man in believing that the defendant had committed or was committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); United States v. Rosario, 543 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1976). The legal standard controlling the warrantless search of the car in which defendant was an occupant is equally clear. In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), the Court explained that although the Fourth Amendment generally requires both probable cause and the issuance of a search warrant, warrantless searches are permissible when there are probable cause and exigent circumstances that justify an immediate search. The Court in Chambers found the necessary exigent circumstances where a movable car was stopped on the highway, the occupants were alerted and the car's contents would in all probability never be found again unless seized immediately. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925).

As was the case in Chambers the facts that establish probable cause to arrest defendant in the instant case also provide probable cause to search the car in which he was riding. Chambers v. Maroney, supra, 399 U.S. at 47 n.6, at 1976. Defendant's arrest and the search of the car are justified by probable cause to believe that he was violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1). Furthermore, the record before the Court demonstrates the existence of precisely the type of exigency that justified the warrantless search in Carroll v. United States, supra.

The facts adduced at the suppression hearing establish that Officer Mingione, the policeman who arrested the defendant and conducted the search, had a sufficient factual basis on which to conclude that there was probable cause to arrest and to search. Officer Mingione first learned of the car in which defendant was riding in a broadcast over his police radio. The broadcast stated that several blacks had been seen loading weapons into a brown Dodge Challenger. The car was described as having a Connecticut license with the marker number HE 1229. Additionally, he was informed that the car was in the upper Chapel Street area of New Haven. Within fifteen minutes of the police broadcast, Mingione observed a car which fit this description in the same area of New Haven.¹ On approaching the car, Mingione learned that the car's engine was running and that the defendant was sitting in the rear seat. The officer recognized defendant on sight as a convicted felon and as one of two men who were wanted for a shooting incident that had occurred the previous evening.

In addition to Officer Mingione's personal knowledge, an unidentified member of the New Haven police department interviewed the individual who had initially alerted the police. This interview was conducted prior to the search. In the course of this interview the police obtained an even more detailed description of the car, its occupants and its contents — including the fact that the rifles had been "dumped" into the trunk of the car. This interview also gave the police ample opportunity to learn the witness' identity and to assess his credibility.

These facts not only demonstrate probable cause to arrest and search, but also the existence of exigent circumstances that justify a warrantless search. Before the search of the car was conducted, Officer Mingione had only arrested the defendant and one other occupant of the car. As later discussed, Officer Mingione made these arrests on the basis of charges of reckless endangerment. It was not until after the search that the other occupants of the car were arrested. Therefore, if the search had not been conducted, the car would have been free to depart and the weapons would have eluded the police. It is precisely this type of exigence that the Supreme Court relied on in Carroll and Chambers to justify warrantless searches. As the government pointed out in its well-briefed argument, the seizure of a car while waiting for a search warrant is no less an intrusion than carrying-out an immediate, warrantless search. The Supreme Court has explicitly held that once probable cause exists to search, either procedure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Chambers v. Maroney, supra 399 U.S. at 51-52, 90 S.Ct. 1975.

An additional factor weighed in this Court's determination of the propriety of the search. Based on the record before the Court, it is clear that the search of the car in this instance constituted a minimal invasion of the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy. The car had been on a public street and, only minutes before the search, the trunk had been opened and the weapons had been carried through a commercial section of downtown New Haven.

Although the facts justify both a warrantless arrest for illegal possession of weapons and a warrantless search of the car for the weapons, the propriety of the arrest and search are complicated by the fact that defendant was actually arrested on the charge of reckless endangerment. It is important to emphasize that the charge of reckless endangerment is totally unrelated to the illegal possession of weapons charge. Not only are the factual bases for these charges distinct, but there was no probable cause to arrest on the charge of reckless endangerment.²

Defendant contends that his arrest was illegal because Officer Mingione did not have probable cause to arrest on the reckless endangerment charge. This argument is premised on the claim that since Officer Mingione testified that he had arrested defendant for reckless endangerment, the arrest was illegal unless probable cause to arrest on that charge is demonstrated. The government does not contend that the arrest is valid on the basis of reckless endangerment, but claims that the arrest should not be declared illegal where probable cause clearly existed to arrest on charges of illegal possession of firearms. The fact that Officer Mingione arrested defendant on the charge of reckless endangerment does not mean the arrest cannot be upheld on the basis of probable cause to arrest for illegal possession of firearms. In United States ex rel. La Belle v. LaVallee, 517 F.2d 750, 754 (2d Cir. 1975), an arrest for assault in the third degree was upheld on the basis of probable cause to arrest for second degree assault and attempted kidnapping.³ See United States v. Bonds, 422 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1970) (misdemeanor arrest upheld on basis of probable cause to arrest for felony); Chaney v. Wainwright, 460 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1972) (arrest for misdemeanor of damaging telephone equipment upheld because arresting officer had probable cause to arrest for possession of burglar tools, a felony). In LaVallee the Second Circuit cited with approval decisions of other circuits that held the validity of an arrest is contingent upon whether the arresting officer actually had probable cause to arrest rather than upon whether the officer articulated the correct basis for the arrest. See, e. g., United States v. Dunavan, 485 F.2d 201, 205 (6th Cir. 1973) (arrest on vagrancy charge upheld on basis of probable cause to arrest for bank robbery); United States v. Saunders, 476 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. 1973) (charge of concealing a fugitive upheld on basis of probable cause to arrest for possession of marijuana); Klingler v. United States, 409 F.2d 299, 305-06 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 859, 90 S.Ct. 127, 24 L.Ed.2d 110 (1969) (arrest on vagrancy charge upheld because of probable cause to arrest for armed robbery). This Court finds these decisions persuasive. As stated in United States v. Dunavan, supra at 205, "This is one occasion where a constable's blunder does not so offend constitutional rights or fundamental justice as to require that a potentially guilty man goes free." Thus, the existence of probable cause to arrest for illegal possession of firearms makes the arrest legal despite the fact that the arresting officer actually made the arrest for reckless endangerment.

ADMISSIBILITY OF DEFENDANT'S INCULPATORY STATEMENTS

The second question raised by defendant's motion to suppress concerns the...