United States v. Carson

• Decision Date: 07 December 1954
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 12718.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Harold PETERS, Complainant, v. President Judge Roy I. CARSON and John M. Good, Clerk of Courts, Washington County, Pennsylvania, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

126 F. Supp. 137

UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Harold PETERS, Complainant, v. President Judge Roy I. CARSON and John M. Good, Clerk of Courts, Washington County, Pennsylvania, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 12718.

United States District Court W. D. Pennsylvania.

December 7, 1954.

No appearance for complainant.

Adolph L. Zeman, Canonsburg, Pa., Elliott W. Finkel, Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendants.

GOURLEY, Chief Judge.

In this proceeding a person sentenced by a State Judge, after conviction in trial by jury of a criminal offense, brings action for damages against the Judge and the Clerk of the criminal branch of said court.

Jurisdiction is grounded in this court upon the Civil Rights Statutes, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986.

The action is premised on the failure of the sentencing judge to hear and determine a habeas corpus proceeding which had been sent via mail by the confined inmate plaintiff to the Clerk of the criminal court.

Roy I. Carson is President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, Pennsylvania, and President Judge of the Court of Oyer and Terminer and Court of Quarter Sessions of Washington County, Pennsylvania. 17 Pa.P.S. § 334.

John M. Good, an elective office holder, is Clerk of the Court of Oyer and Terminer and Court of Quarter Sessions of Washington County, Pennsylvania. He is not clerk of the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, Pennsylvania, and has no authority or connection with the Clerk of the civil branch of said court, who is known in Pennsylvania as the Prothonotary which is also an elective office. 17 Pa.P.S. § 1451.

The matter comes before the court on defendants' motion to dismiss the action on the basis that the complaint states no cause of action upon which relief can be granted.

Plaintiff, who is confined by state authorities as a parole violator, alleges that on July 29, 1954 he mailed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus to John M. Good, Clerk of Courts, Washington County, Pennsylvania, with a check in the sum of $5.50 to cover filing fees; that no reply was received either from the Clerk or President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas; that no hearing date was fixed, and the matter not adjudicated.

Judicial knowledge will be taken of the records of said court and the official positions of the respondents. Said records have been made part of the record in this proceeding, and identified as court exhibits.

Plaintiff filed no proceeding with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the nature of a mandamus to compel the state court to proceed in the disposition of his petition.

The authority for plaintiff to secure relief in the highest tribunal of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as a court of original jurisdiction is well recognized and clearly chartered both by statute and legal construction.

Article V, Section 3 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, P.S. confers upon the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania original jurisdiction of mandamus to courts of inferior jurisdiction within the state. Under the Act of June 8, 1893, P.L. 345, 12 P.S. § 1911 et seq., it is specifically provided that a writ of mandamus may be used to procure the enforcement of a public duty or to compel a judge of inferior jurisdiction to perform his duties. Commonwealth ex rel. Duff v. Keenan, 347 Pa. 574, 33 A.2d 244.

The judges of the Supreme Court have full power and authority when, and as often as there may be occasion, to issue all remedial writs and processes. 17 Pa. P.S. § 48.

It is well to observe that the instant plaintiff had filed a petition of habeas corpus on December 27, 1951 with the Prothonotary of the Common Pleas Court of Washington County. The proceeding appears to have been abortively terminated without any final disposition.

On March 30, 1954, plaintiff filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Prothonotary of Washington County. Upon the date fixed for hearing, April 12, 1954, no persons appeared, and upon consideration of the papers filed, Judge Carson filed an opinion and order dismissing the said petition.

In spite of the previous history of having filed two petitions for writs of habeas corpus with the office of Prothonotary of Washington County, the plaintiff asserts that he mailed the petition, upon which he now premises his suit for damages, to the office of the Clerk of Courts.

It is further most interesting to note that subsequent to the date that plaintiff alleges that he filed his petition with the Clerk of Courts, he again filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Prothonotary on October 15, 1954, which was dismissed by opinion and order of Judge Carson on November 8, 1954.

In none of the cases in which plaintiff petitioned for writ of habeas corpus which had been filed with the Prothonotary of Washington County did plaintiff exhaust his state remedies by perfecting an appeal to the State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States. Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 70 S.Ct. 587, 94 L.Ed. 761.

It has been the observation of the court in the last several months that many state prisoners have drawn away from exhausting state remedies where petitions for writs of habeas corpus are denied by lower state courts. In lieu thereof, actions of the nature involved in this proceeding are instituted against the sentencing judges, their clerks, arresting officers, or some person involved in the apprehension, arrest, prosecution, conviction and confinement of the state law offender.

An exemplified copy of the records discloses that plaintiff, upon jury trial, was convicted of burglary and sentenced February 24, 1951, at No. 23 February Term 1950 in the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Washington County, Pennsylvania, for a term of not less than one year or not more than five years, to be computed from November 18, 1949. He was released from said confinement by the Pennsylvania Board of Parole on December 27, 1951. During the period of his parole, he was convicted of another crime in the State of Michigan, and upon his release from prison in that state, he was brought to the Western Correctional Diagnostic and Classification Center as a parole violator. As a parole violator, he may have forfeited the benefit of his parole and the balance of his time, two years, ten months and twenty-one days, may be added to his period of incarceration. This will be a matter of future determination on the part of the state authorities.

No useful purpose could be gained by having plaintiff present, he being confined to the custody of the state authorities, since the issues posed evolve entirely on a question of law, all factual issues having been resolved in favor of plaintiff.

In considering a motion to dismiss, the complaint must be viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and should not be dismissed unless it appears to a certainty that plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the plaintiff's claim, and no matter how likely it may seem that the plaintiff would be unable to prove its case, it is entitled upon averring a claim to an opportunity to prove it. The truth of all facts well pleaded is admitted, including facts alleged on information and belief. Frederick Hart & Co., Inc., v. Recordgraph Corp., 3 Cir., 169 F.2d 580.

For purpose of disposition of this motion, resolving as we must all factual issues in favor of the plaintiff, we must assume that plaintiff had properly filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Clerk of the Washington County Courts; that the Clerk had received the filing fees in connection therewith, and that the President Judge of said court failed to act on the petition, and that such failure to act was violative of defendant's civil and constitutional rights.

I shall first discuss the motion as it relates to Roy I. Carson, President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, Pennsylvania, and President Judge of the Court of Oyer and Terminer and Court of Quarter Sessions of Washington County, Pennsylvania.

Rule of Law Prior to Civil Rights Statutes

The principle, which exempts judges of courts of superior or general authority from liability in a civil action for acts done by them in the exercise of their judicial functions, obtains in all countries where there is any well ordered system of jurisprudence. It has been the settled doctrine of the English courts for many centuries, and had never been denied in the courts of this country prior to the adoption of the Civil Rights Statutes in the United States.

It was considered essential in all courts that the judges who are appointed to administer the law should be permitted to administer it under the protection of the law, independently and freely, without favor and without fear. Said firmly embedded rule of law was considered not for the protection or benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences. It was reasoned that a judge could not exercise his office if he were in daily and hourly fear of an action being brought against him, and of having the question submitted to a jury whether a matter on which he had commented judicially was or was not relevant to the case before him.

A defeated party to litigation may not only think himself wronged, but may attribute wrong motives to the judge whom he holds responsible for his defeat. He may think that the judge has allowed passion or prejudice to control his decision. To allow a judge to be sued in a civil action on a complaint charging the judge's acts were the result of partiality, or malice, or corruption, would deprive the judges of the protection which is regarded as essential to judicial independence. It was not in the public interests that such a suit should be maintained; and it was a fundamental principle of English and American jurisprudence...