United States v. Carter, 20614.

• Decision Date: 16 April 1971
• Docket Number: No. 20614.,20614.
• Citation: 440 F.2d 1132
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul CARTER, a/k/a Levi Washington, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

440 F.2d 1132 (1971)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul CARTER, a/k/a Levi Washington, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20614.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

April 16, 1971.

Joel M. Shere, Detroit, Mich., court appointed, and on brief for appellant.

Terence V. Page, Detroit, Mich., for appellee; Ralph B. Guy, Jr., U. S. Atty., by Terence V. Page, J. Kenneth Lowrie, Asst. U. S. Attys., Detroit, Mich., on brief.

Before PECK, BROOKS and KENT, Circuit Judges.

KENT, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a conviction for bank robbery. Title 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (d). Appellant, a negro, was found guilty after a jury trial. He presents two issues to this Court, one of which is stated as follows:

"WERE THE ITEMS ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE AGAINST APPELLANT SEIZED INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST?

a) Was there probable cause to arrest appellant?

b) Assuming, arguendo, that there was probable cause, was it incumbent upon the police, under the circumstances, to obtain a search warrant to justify their intrusion into appellant\'s living quarters to effect his arrest?"

This issue has been discussed and disposed of in a related case, United States v. Rose, 440 F.2d 832, in which the conviction of the appellant's co-defendant, who was arrested at the same time and place, was before this Court. The decision of the Court was adverse to the claim of this appellant.

The other issue presented by this appellant, which is framed as follows, raises a more troublesome problem:

"DID THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR BY REFUSING TO PERMIT APPELLANT\'S COUNSEL TO INQUIRE ON VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION WHETHER ANY OF THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS WERE PREJUDICED AGAINST BLACK PEOPLE?"

During the course of the impaneling of the jury the following exchange took place between the Court and appellant's counsel:

"MR. STOORMAN: I have one other question, Your Honor. The defendant is black, and I would like to know whether any of these jurors are prejudiced against black people.

THE COURT: Mr. Stoorman, that question comes often in the court, and it\'s the attitude of the Court, the opinion of the Court, that all the jurors have taken an oath here to render a fair and impartial decision, and it\'s the opinion of the Court that this would include justice for all people, and I don\'t think it\'s a fair question.

MR. STOORMAN: All right. Then I have no further questions."

No further inquiry into the question of the existence or nonexistence of racial prejudice on the part of the members of the jury was made. A stipulation on file, signed by an Assistant United States Attorney from the office having charge of the prosecution of the appellant, reads in part as follows:

"I stipulate that at least 10 of the 12 trial jurors were white in the above-mentioned matter."

This Court recognizes that there is a need in the Trial Courts to avoid excessive delays in impaneling a jury which may make it necessary to limit the scope of the questions submitted to the prospective jurors during the voir dire examination as to their qualifications to sit. There may at times appear to be a conflict between the need to avoid excessive delay and the desire to protect the rights of the accused by assuring him a fair trial by an impartial jury, when counsel for a defendant deems that the only way to assure such fair trial is by extensive and at times what may appear to be interminable questioning of the jury panel. Under Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. there is granted to the Trial Judge a broad discretion in the balancing of these interests.

The leading case on the subject of voir dire examination of prospective jurors in regard to the possibility of racial prejudice is Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 51 S.Ct. 470, 75 L.Ed. 1054 (1931). In that case defendant's counsel requested the Trial Court to question prospective jurors as to the possibility of racial prejudice. The Trial Judge refused to submit such questions and termed such inquiry improper. The defendant's conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals; but the Supreme Court of the United States reversed. In discussing the decision of the Trial Judge in regard to the voir dire examination of prospective jurors, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court in reversing the conviction, stated at page 310, 51 S.Ct. at page 471:

"* * * and the court had a broad discretion as to the questions

...